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Abstract
In this thesis, we shall consider a certain class of algebraic cryptosystems called
Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems. In 1994, Koblitz introduced the Polly Cracker cryp-
tosystem that is based on the theory of Gro¨bner basis in commutative polynomials
rings. The security of this cryptosystem relies on the fact that the computation of
Gro¨bner basis is, in general, EXPSPACE-hard. Cryptanalysis of these commutative
Polly Cracker type cryptosystems is possible by using attacks that do not require
the computation of Gro¨bner basis for breaking the system, for example, the attacks
based on linear algebra. To secure these (commutative) Gro¨bner basis cryptosys-
tems against various attacks, among others, Ackermann and Kreuzer introduced a
general class of Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems that are based on the difficulty of
computing module Gro¨bner bases over general non-commutative rings. The objec-
tive of this research is to describe a special class of such cryptosystems by introduc-
ing the Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems. We divide this class of cryptosystems
in two parts namely the (left) Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems and Two-Sided
Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems. We suggest to use Gro¨bner bases for left and
two-sided ideals inWeyl algebras to construct specific instances of such cryptosys-
tems. We analyse the resistance of these cryptosystems to the standard attacks and
provide computational evidence that secureWeyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems can
be built using left (resp. two-sided) Gro¨bner bases in Weyl algebras.

Acknowledgement
I would like to use this space to say a big ‘Thank You’ to many people who have
helped and encouraged me through out the long and difficult process of completing
my doctoral studies.
At the top of the list is the name of my supervisor, Professor Dr. Martin Kreuzer,
whose encouragement, guidance and support from the initial to the final level en-
abled me to develop an understanding of the subject. It has been an honour to be
his Ph.D student. I appreciate all his contributions of time, ideas, and suggestions
to make my Ph.D. experience productive and stimulating, and above all for pro-
viding a wonderful research and working environment in our group of ‘Symbolic
Computations’.
I wish to acknowledge Dr. Viktor Levandovskyy for helpful discussions about
the computations in Weyl algebras and for providing many valuable suggestions on
the topic. Funds for this work are provided by the Higher Education Commission
of Pakistan and the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (German Academic
Exchange Service) . The services and support of both of these organizations are
highly appreciated. At this point, I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Graf and Dr. Levan-
dovskyy for recommending my application for the further financial support.
I am indebted to all my colleagues who have shared their expertise with me.
In particular I would like to thank S. Kasper, J. Limbek and S. Schuster for their
help and fruitful discussions during the development of the package Weyl for the
computer algebra system ApCoCoA. Many thanks to my office-mate Ehsan Ullah
for the proof-reading some parts of this work and for the fruitful discussion related
to polynomial system solving.
I would also like to thank my friends Dr Tayyab Kamran, Dr Asif Bashir, Bi-
lal, Riaz-ur-Rehman, Izhar, Imran andMudassar for being available at any time for
everything and for their continuous motivation and encouragement for the comple-
tion of this work. In fact, they qualify the criteria that ‘A friend in need is a friend
indeed’. My experience at Passau would not have been such a pleasurable one with-
out the presence of all my ‘new’ friends living there. In particular, the presence of
Ehsan-Ullah Farman, Aamir Shahzad, Amir Chishti and their families have made
my experience of living abroad such a nice and wonderful that cannot be forgotten
throughout my life.
Lastly, I would like to thank my whole family for all their love and encourage-
ment. For my parents who raised me with love and care and supported me in all my
pursuits. I wish to express my love for my lovely son Ahmed, and my cute daughter,
Maheen for allowing me utilizing the time that I should have to spend with them.
And most of all, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my loving, supportive,
and encouraging wife Samina for her continuous support and patience during all the
stages of this thesis. Thank you.
Rashid Ali
April 14, 2011
Universita¨t Passau, Germany
vi
Contents
Abstract iii
Acknowledgement v
Notations xi
List of Abbreviations xiii
1 Introduction 1
2 Gro¨bner Bases in Weyl Algebras 13
2.1 Weyl Algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Basic Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Left Gro¨bner Bases in Weyl Algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Left Ideal Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Constructing Gro¨bner Bases of Left Ideals of An . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.6 Computer Algebra Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems 39
3.1 Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 The Polly Cracker Cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Cryptanalysis of Polly Cracker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 The Chosen Ciphertext Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5 The Linear Algebra Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
vii
Contents
3.6 Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.7 Commutative Gro¨bnr Basis Cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.8 Attack By Partial Gro¨bner Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.9 Chosen Ciphertext Attack and CGBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.10 General Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4 Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems 63
4.1 The WGBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 WGBC Key Generation and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Construction of Hard Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4 A WGBC Based on Remark 2.5.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5 Efficiency and Security 87
5.1 Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.2 Linear Algebra Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 Partial Gro¨bner Basis Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4 Chosen Ciphertext Attack and WGBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.5 Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.6 Further Security Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6 Two Sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems 109
6.1 Two-Sided Gro¨bner Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.2 Two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.3 TWGBC Key Generation and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.4 Concrete Hard Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.5 Efficiency and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.6 TWGBC Challenge: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
A Package Weyl 149
A.1 Available Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
B Implementation 161
B.1 Linear Algebra Attack (commutative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
B.2 Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
viii
Contents
B.3 Linear Algebra Attack for Weyl Algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
B.4 Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack for Weyl Algebras . . . . . . . . 168
C Examples Data 173
C.1 Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
C.2 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
C.3 Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
ix
Contents
x
Notations
K; Fp;Q Fields
P a commutative polynomial ring
x1; : : : ;xn indeterminates
Tn the set of terms of polynomial ring P, the K-basis of P
An Weyl algebra of index n
¶1; : : : ;¶n additional indeterminates for a Weyl algebra
Bn the set of Weyl terms of A, the K-basis of A
st term orderings
p prime number
m plaintext unit
c ciphertext unit
dc degree of the ciphertext c
G the secret key or the set of elements of a Gro¨bner basis
Os (I) is the complement of LTs (I)
G the tuple of elements in G
H the set of elements of a partial Gro¨bner basis
H the tuple of elements in H
Q the public key
I; J (left) ideals of A
IT ; JT two-sided ideals of A
xi
xii
List of Abbreviations
PKC Public Key Cryptography
SKC Secret Key Cryptography
PCC Polly Cracker Cryptosystem
CAS Computer Algebra System
CGBC Commutative Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem
GBC Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
LAA Linear Algebra Attack
ILAA Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack
WGBC (left) Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem
TWGBC Two-Sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem
xiii
xiv
Chapter1
Introduction
The distance is nothing; it is only the first step that is difficult.
Anonymous
The development and study of Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems is an active area of re-
search in the Gro¨bner basis community. It is believed that if such cryptosystems are
developed successfully, they will not be threatened by the development of quantum
computers. Motivated by the fact that Ackermann and Kreuzer [1] recently defined
a general class of Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems, the goal of this thesis is to intro-
duce a new special class of Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems by using ideals in Weyl
algebras and to present presumably hard instances of such cryptosystems.
Why?
In 1976, the new concept of Public Key Cryptography presented in the historical
paper “New Directions in Cryptography”, by Diffie and Hellman [14] has radically
altered the face of modern cryptography. The security of the Diffie and Hellman
protocol is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in a an abelian
group. Many public-key cryptosystems have been proposed and implemented since
1976. Among them, the most prominent are the ones by Rivest, Shamir, and Adle-
man [44] and by ElGamal [17]. The security of these encryption schemes rely,
respectively, on the intractability of the integer factorization problem (IFP) and the
discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Furthermore, due to the improvements in algo-
rithms for solving IFP and DLP, parameters of these cryptosystems are required to
be bounded by new limits in order to achieve a reasonable level of security. For
instance, 156 and 200-digit RSA numbers have already been factorized. As com-
puters get faster, to keep using cryptology, present cryptosystems have to become
stronger by using longer keys and more clever techniques. In 1999, Peter Shor [46]
discovered polynomial time algorithms to solve the IFP and DLP on a ‘hypotheti-
cal’ quantum computer. Once quantum computers have been developed, cryptosys-
tems based on these problems will not remain secure any more. Therefore, there
is a strong need to find new encryption schemes that do not depend on these two
closely related problems.
The threat of quantum computers is a very hot topic in today’s world of cryp-
tography. It has been realized that there is a great need for the development of
cryptosystems which are as secure on quantum computers as on conventional com-
puters. Multivariate cryptography is one of the main fields of research for the de-
velopment of multivariate algebraic cryptosystems which are believed to be secure
against attacks with quantum computers [15]. The goal of this thesis is to intro-
duce a new algebraic multivariate public key cryptosystem based on the difficulty
of computing Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl algebras. Note that the problem of
computing a Gro¨bner basis is totally different from the IFP and DLP. In the com-
mutative setting, the worst case complexity of computing Gro¨bner bases is known
to be EXPSPACE (see [36]). Before we explain how we are going to achieve our
goal, let us first have a brief overview of related work.
Related Work
The question whether there exist ‘secure’ public-key cryptosystems based on NP-
hard problems has remained open for a long time. In 1994, Fellows andKoblitz [18],
introduced a new algebraic multivariate encryption scheme which became known
as the Polly Cracker Cryptosystem (PCC). This encryption scheme relies on the
hard problem of polynomial system solving over a finite field. In principle, these
cryptosystems could encode NP-hard problems, but constructing a hard instance
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turned out to be a non-trivial matter. Koblitz’s PCC works as follows: Let K = Fq
be a finite field, where q = pe with a prime number p and e > 0. The encryption
scheme operates in a commutative ring P = K[x1; : : : ;xn] over the field K. The
public key Q = fp1; : : : ; psg is set by choosing a point (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Kn such that
for all i = 1; : : : ;s, we have pi(a1; : : : ;an) = 0. For encrypting a message m 2 K,
choose “random” polynomials h1; : : : ;hs 2 P and compute the encrypted message
as c = h1 p1+   + hs ps+m. Decryption is then achieved by evaluating c at the
common-zero (a1; : : : ;an) of pi (see Section 3.2 for details). One can attempt to
attack an instance of PCC for instance by using the following two kinds of attacks:
 total-break attacks, where an attacker tries to reveal the secret key or to make
another equivalent secret key. In this way, the attacker will be able to decrypt
successfully any encrypted message.
 single-break attacks, where an attacker knows the encrypted message and
tries to recover the corresponding original message by using publicly avail-
able information.
The cryptanalysis of various instances of PCC have been carried out success-
fully. Koblitz’s “graph perfect code instance” [25], has been broken byHofheins and
Steinwandt [23] by introducing a differential attack. R. Steinwandt and M. Vasco
showed in [50] that PCC is susceptible to a chosen-ciphertext attack which is a total
break attack. In [49], Steinwandt et. al. also describe a timing attack that may
be used to reveal the secret key. The cryptosystem ENROOT [20] can be viewed
as a special instance of Polly Cracker which has been successfully attacked in [6].
Here we also remark that the main weakness of PCC is that its secret key is a point
(a1; : : : ;an) in Kn and the decryption is achieved by evaluating a polynomial at this
point. This fact has been exploited in most of the above mentioned attacks on an
instance of a PCC.
Soon PCCwas generalized (see for instance [25] and [8]) to commutativeGro¨bner
Basis Cryptosystem, or CGBC for short, where the underlying hard problem of
polynomial system solving was replaced by the hard problem of computing Gro¨bner bases
of ideals in commutative polynomial rings.
In particular, for an instance of a CGBC, the secret key is a Gro¨bner basis G=
fg1; : : : ;gsg of an ideal I  P with respect to some term ordering s . The public key
3
is a finite subset Q of I, constructed by choosing “random” polynomials p1; : : : ; ps
of the ideal I. The messages are the polynomials that are reduced with respect
to G. For sending a message m, we choose random polynomials h1; : : : ;hs and
compute the encrypted message as c= h1 p1+   +hs ps+m. The original message
m then can be recovered by reducing c with respect to the secret key G. Again,
theoretically, the security of a CGBC relies on the hard problem of computing a
Gro¨bner basis but, practically, constructing a really secure instance is a non-trivial
matter.
Moreover, this generalized form of PCC is also threatened by the above men-
tioned two kinds of attacks. That is, there are single-break attacks like the basic
linear algebra attack, the ‘intelligent’ linear algebra attack (see [25]), and the par-
tial Gro¨bner basis attack (see [8]) as well as total break attacks like the chosen-
ciphertext attack. Most of these attacks exploit the structural weaknesses of CGBC.
For example, in the commutative polynomial ring setting it is very difficult to hide
the terms used in the polynomials h1; : : : ;hs for computing the encrypted message
c = h1 p1+   + hs ps+m, because in this representation, terms on the right-hand
side rarely cancel. Therefore, an attacker can play with the statistics of the terms in
c and in the public polynomials and can have a very high probability of success for
the attacks based on linear algebra. In [8], another threat for the security of a CGBC
has been raised by introducing a partial Gro¨bner bases attack. The success of this
attack greatly depends on the successful computation of a partial Gro¨bner basis up
to a certain degree bound. Again, in the commutative setting, this method of at-
tack might be feasible in some cases. No computational results are provided in
favour of feasibility of this attack on specific instances of CGBC, but still the way
it is presented suggests that these earlier suggestions of CGBC instances met a very
polemic response by the Gro¨bner basis community. Note that the main criticisms
of this encryption scheme were single-break attacks based on linear algebra and on
the computation of a partial Gro¨bner basis.
Later, Ackerman and Kreuzer [1] discovered that the commonly used cryptosys-
tem, RSA, can be viewed as a special case of a general kind of Gro¨bner basis cryp-
tosystem. Note that RSA has not been broken yet. It follows that, the existence of
the above attacks does not mean that secure instances of Gro¨bner basis cryptosys-
4
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tems cannot be constructed at all. In fact, in the following years, several possible
countermeasures against these attacks have been proposed. Moreover, several mod-
ifications, to improve the general idea, have also been investigated. For instance,
L. Ly [34], cleverly constructed a more refined version of Polly Cracker which is
known as Polly Two and which she believed to be secure against all these standard
attacks. One instance of Polly Two has been broken recently by R. Steinwandt [47]
using a side channel attack. Because of the proposed cryptanalysis of such com-
mutative Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems, it remained an open problem to construct
hard instances of such systems which are secure against all standard attacks. An-
other attempt can be found in [41], where T. Rai introduced non-commutative Polly
Cracker cryptosystems. The motivation for such cryptosystems was the fact that
there are ideals of non-commutative polynomial rings over finite fields that have
infinite reduced Gro¨bner bases, and hence, theoretically, there is no chance for the
usual total break attack. Moreover, by construction, the single-break attacks based
on linear algebra are not possible against such cryptosystems. One major weakness
here seems to be the explicit suggestion to use Gro¨bner bases containing only one
element. Principal ideals might allow an easier recovery of the secret key from the
public information through a factoring attack. Moreover, finding suitable ideals for
constructing concrete instances turns out to be a difficult task.
Going further in this direction, recently, Ackermann and Kreuzer have devel-
oped the most general and intelligent technique in [1] by defining general Gro¨bner
Basis Cryptosystems. This general class of cryptosystems is special in the sense
that it allows well known cryptosystems, such as RSA, El-Gamal, Polly Cracker,
Polly 2 and Rai’s non-commutative Polly Cracker to be formulated as special cases.
Although no specific instances of these cryptosystems are provided, it seems to be
a promising frame-work for future cryptosystems.
In this thesis, we introduce two special classes of instances of General Gro¨bner
Basis Cryptosystems by using left and two-sided Gro¨bner basis for ideals in Weyl
algebras respectively. They will be called (left) Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
(WGBC) and Two-Sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems (TWGBC), respec-
tively. They are a straightforward generalization of CGBC and can also be formu-
lated as a special case of the very general setting used in [1].
5
How?
The goal of constructing left and two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems will
be achieved by going through the following steps:
(1) Introduce Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems and present methods for key
generation and implementation of the enciphering and deciphering maps.
(2) Construct hard instances of these cryptosystems.
(3) Study efficiency and security issues of these cryptosystems.
Recall that the Weyl algebra An of index n over a field K is the associative al-
gebra An = Khx1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶ni such that [xi;x j] = [¶i;¶ j] = 0 and [¶i;x j] = di j,
where 1  i; j  n and di j is the Kronecker delta. The computational environment
of our proposed cryptosystems is someWeyl algebra An over a field K. For a variety
of reasons, it appears necessary to use a finite base field K. The secret key, G, is a
Gro¨bner basis of an ideal I  An with respect to a term ordering s . The message
space is the K-vector space generated by a small subsetM of Os (I), the comple-
ment of the set of leading terms of elements of I. The public key Q is a finite set of
polynomials p1; : : : ; ps of I. For sending a message m, we carefully choose polyno-
mials `1; : : : ; `s and compute the encrypted message as c = `1 p1+   + `s ps+m.
Finally, the message m can be recovered by computing the normal remainder of c
with respect to the secret key G.
Why Weyl Algebras?
With the above ingredients, we shall now explain why we feel that choosing Weyl
algebras as base rings for defining a special class of general Gro¨bner basis cryp-
tosystems is better than the usual CGBC setting. The reasons for choosing Weyl
algebras as base rings are provided by the following facts.
(1) There is a well developed and carefully studied theory of Gro¨bner bases of
ideals in Weyl algebras. Moreover, due to non-commutativity of An, the com-
putation of Gro¨bner bases of ideals of An is usually much harder than the
computation in a commutative polynomial ring P.
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(2) For n  1 the set Bn = fxa ¶ b j a; b 2 Nn g of all terms forms a K-vector
space basis of An. Therefore, every element f 2 An has a unique standard
form given by f = åca ;b xa¶ b , where xa = x
a1
1   xann ; ¶ b = ¶ b11   ¶ bnn , and
ca;b 2Knf0g. For example, consider the Weyl algebra A2 = F7[x1;x2;¶1;¶2].
Then the term ¶ 31 ¶2x
3
1x2 will be written in its standard form as x
3
1x2¶
3
1 ¶2+
x31¶
3
1 +2x
2
1x2¶
2
1 ¶2+2x
2
1¶
2
1  3x1x2¶1¶2 3x1¶1 x2¶2 1. This feature turns
out to be helpful in performing efficient multiplication of elements of An.
(3) Another main reason for suggesting the use of Weyl algebras for cryptogra-
phy stems from Proposition 2.1.5. This result implies that every multiplica-
tion of polynomials in Weyl algebras substantially increases the size of the
support of the corresponding product. For instance, let A2 be given as above.
Then the standard form of the product of a term x21¶
3
1 ¶
2
2 with another term
x21x
3
2¶1 contains 9 terms,
x21¶
3
1 ¶
2
2  x21x32¶1 = x41x32¶ 41 ¶ 22   x41x22¶ 41 ¶2  x31x32¶ 31 ¶ 22   x41x2¶ 41 + x31x22¶ 31 ¶2
 x21x32¶ 21 ¶ 22 + x31x2¶ 31 + x21x22¶ 21 ¶2+ x21x2¶ 21 :
From this observation about the product of two terms, one can imagine what
is going to happen when several polynomials containing several terms are
multiplied and added together to obtain a single polynomial of An. This
means that, when we compute the encrypted message c= `1 p1+   +`s ps+
m in the setting of Weyl algebras, many lower degree terms are added and
the coefficients of the lower degree parts change in a way that is in general
hard to predict. Later, we shall see that this phenomenon is helpful to make
attacks based on linear algebra infeasible when applied to an instance of our
proposed cryptosystem.
(4) In the encryption process of computing c = `1 p1+   + `s ps+m, the poly-
nomials `1; : : : ; `s can be chosen to cancel the degree forms of ` j p j of highest
degree. By the process of converting c to its standard form, the other degree
forms of ` j p j cancel or their coefficients are changed in c. Let us observe this
effect in a simple example. Consider the Weyl algebra A2 as given above, and
let p1 = 2x1x22¶1¶
2
2  3x21¶1+2x2¶2 x1+1 and p2 = 3x32¶2+x22 x2¶2 3 be
the given polynomials of A2. Choose `1 = 2x1x22¶1¶2  3x1¶1¶2+ 2x2¶2  3
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and `2 = x21x2¶
2
1 ¶
2
2  2x21¶ 21 ¶2+ x1x2¶1¶ 22 + x1¶1¶ 22 . Then the standard form
of c= `1 p1+ `2 p2+3 is given as
c = x31x
2
2¶
2
1 ¶2+2x
2
1x
2
2¶
2
1 ¶2+3x1x
3
2¶1¶
2
2   x21x2¶ 21 ¶ 22 +2x31¶ 21 ¶2  x1x2¶1¶ 32
 2x21x2¶ 21 + x21x2¶1¶2+ x21¶ 21 ¶2 2x1x2¶1¶ 22  2x1x22¶2+ x1x2¶1¶2 
3x22¶
2
2 +2x1¶1¶
2
2 +2x
2
1¶1+2x1x2¶1 2x1x2¶2 2x1¶1¶2+2x1¶1+
3x1¶2+3x1
Note here that the degrees of the polynomials p1; p2; `1 and `2 are 6, 4, 5, and
7, respectively, and the degree of c is not 11 but 8. This means that all terms
of degree greater than 8 are cancelled. Moreover, the plaintext m = 3 is also
not visible in c. The total number of terms in c is 21 whereas the summands
`1 p1 and `2 p2 contain 22 and 19 terms respectively. That is, many terms are
either cancelled or their coefficients are changed in c.
(5) All the gaps in the degrees of various homogeneous components of c can be
removed, for example by including a few lower degree terms in some of the
polynomials `1; : : : ; `s. In this way, the encrypted message can be made more
‘random-looking’. This is a relatively difficult task in the setting of CGBC.
Later, in Chapter 5, we shall see that this strategy of reducing the sparsity
of the polynomial c can make the intelligent linear algebra attack harder to
apply in the setting of WGBC.
(6) Our methods suggested for the key generation for an instance of a WGBC do
not allow the chosen ciphertext attack to work as in the setting of CGBC. In
fact, using the countermeasures suggested in [42], both WGBC and TWGBC
have a built-in mechanism of recognizing ‘illegal’ ciphertext messages. Hence
the chosen ciphertext attack fails.
(7) In contrast to the commutative setting, the computation of a partial Gro¨bner
basis turns out to be quite hard in the Weyl algebra setting. In fact, due to the
properties of Weyl multiplication, the sizes of the supports of the interme-
diate polynomials during the computation of partial Gro¨bner bases grow too
large. This in turn slows down the reduction process of computing normal
remainders and also increases the amount of memory required to store the
intermediate results during the process of computing a Gro¨bner basis. Hence,
8
Chapter 1. Introduction
a partial Gro¨bner basis required for the success of the partial Gro¨bner basis
attack is hard to compute in the setting of Weyl algebras. Several examples
of left as well as two-sided ideals of An are given in Chapters 4 and 6 which
provide the evidence that large enough partial Gro¨bner bases of these ideals
are infeasible to compute.
(8) The setting of TWGBC turns out to be even more favourable as compared
with the WGBC setting. For TWGBC, the encryption is achieved by com-
puting the standard form of c = `1 p1 r1+   + `s ps rs+m, where m is the
message to be encrypted. Now the process of multiplying pi from the left-
hand and the right-hand side by suitably choosing polynomials `i and ri and
then converting c to its standard form can really mess up the resulting en-
crypted message (see Section 6.2 for details). In this way, it will be very hard
to predict the terms used in the polynomials for left and right multiplication
with the polynomials in the public key. Moreover, this encryption scheme is
not vulnerable to usual attacks based on linear algebra since it is based on
two-sided ideals of Weyl algebras.
Motivated by these observations, the main part of this thesis is devoted to present a
detailed study and investigation of our proposed cryptosystems.
Organization of the Thesis
This section presents an outline of the remainder of the thesis and our contribution
to the field of algebraic cryptography particularly the construction of hard instances
of general Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems as presented in [1].
In Chapter 2, we introduce Weyl algebras and give their basic properties. We
emphasize that Weyl algebras in positive characteristic have properties which differ
from the well-known case of characteristic 0. Then we briefly describe the funda-
mentals of Gro¨bner basis theory of left ideals in these algebras. Most of this theory
is available in [24] in general setting of solvable polynomial rings and in [30] for
the even more general case of G-algebras. In our case, we are mostly interested in
left Gro¨bner bases of left ideals, and in this setting most results are similar to the
corresponding results from commutative Gro¨bner bases theory [27], or they can be
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adapted from commutative Gro¨bner bases theory using minimal alterations. The
readers familiar with the theory of Gro¨bner bases in commutative setting can skip
this section and continue with Chapter 3. We also present an easy way of construct-
ing non-trivial left ideals in Weyl algebras, both for positive and zero characteristic.
We conclude the chapter by listing various computer algebra systems available for
computations in Weyl algebras. Here we also introduce our own package Weyl
written for the computer algebra system ApCoCoA. The details about the usage of
this package have been set out in Appendix A.
Chapter 3 provides the cryptographic background with emphasis on public key
cryptography. After some preliminary material on cryptography, we describe Fel-
lows and Koblitz’s [18] Polly Cracker cryptosystems and then study their cryptanal-
ysis. In particular, we describe very serious single-break attacks based on linear
algebra and a total-break attack the chosen ciphertext attack, to break an instance of
Polly Cracker. Afterwards, we describe commutative Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems
and explain a partial Gro¨bner bases attack on such systems. We conclude the chap-
ter by introducing the most general class of Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems presented
in [1].
In Chapter 4, we introduce the class of (left) Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems.
They can be viewed as a special case of the setting used in [1]. Our main contribu-
tion is then to present methods for the key generation and implementation of these
cryptosystems, such that they have resistance against the standard attacks. We con-
structed three explicit concrete instances of these cryptosystems which we believe
to be reasonably secure.
In more detail, the security and efficiency issues of these cryptosystems are
studied in Chapter 5. We provide computational evidence that our proposed cryp-
tosystems can be built to have security against all known standard attacks. In par-
ticular, we examine the security of our concrete instances of these cryptosystems
against these standard attacks. By the construction and the methods introduced in
Chapter 4, we think that attacks like the chosen ciphertext attack and the partial
Gro¨bner basis attack can be safely ignored.
Finally, Chapter 6 is devoted to introduce and study two-sidedWeyl Gro¨bner ba-
sis cryptosystems. We briefly present the fundamentals of two-sided Gro¨bner basis
10
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theory following the approach in [24] and [30]. We study the structure of two-sided
ideals of Weyl algebras defined over a prime field Fp. Then we provide methods for
key generation for such cryptosystems and by using these methods, we construct
some concrete instances of these cryptosystems. We examine their efficiency and
their security against the standard attacks. In the end, we give a brief conclusion
and wrap up the chapter by presenting a decryption challenge in Section 6.6.
In Appendix A we introduce the package Weyl for performing various com-
putations in Weyl algebras using the computer algebra system ApCoCoA. After a
brief introduction to the package, all the functions available for performing specific
computations in Weyl algebras are explained with the syntax and an example de-
scribing the usage of these functions. Appendix B contains our implementation of
the basic linear algebra attack and the “intelligent” linear algebra attack, both in the
commutative polynomial rings and in the setting of Weyl algebras. Finally, the last
Appendix C is provided to contain the data related to various examples presented
throughout the thesis.
To summarize our results, we can say that one can build hard instances of our
proposed cryptosystems which have resistance against the known standard attacks
proposed by cryptanalysts of Gro¨bner basis type cryptosystems. It seems that, in
order to break a Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystem, an attacker will have no choice
except to compute a Gro¨bner bases of the ideal generated by the elements in the
corresponding public key. In [32], the degree bound for the Gro¨bner bases in al-
gebras of solvable type has been established to be doubly exponential. In general,
the problem of computing Gro¨bner bases is EXPSPACE-hard [53]. Altogether, we
believe that Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems have potential for further investiga-
tion. Our challenge in Section 6.6 is intended to entice the readers to get into this
subject. There may be many further interesting results on computations in Weyl
algebras, particularly when the base field has positive characteristic.
Some results presented in this thesis are based on the joint paper “Weyl Gro¨bner
Basis Cryptosystems” [2] submitted for publication.
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Chapter2
Gro¨bner Bases in Weyl Algebras
In this thesis, we are going to introduce a special class of Gro¨bner basis cryptosys-
tems by usingWeyl algebras as the base ring. The purpose of this chapter is to intro-
duceWeyl algebras, and their basic properties. We also introduce the computational
theory of Gro¨bner basis for Weyl algebras and study the structure of ideals in such
algebras. In fact, we describe algorithms for computing Gro¨bner bases of ideals in
Weyl algebras. The computational complexity of these algorithms motivated us to
use Weyl algebras for designing the “Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems” that we
describe in chapter 4.
2.1 Weyl Algebras
In this section we shall describe the main ingredients of our proposed cryptosystem,
the Weyl algebra and then present some of its basic properties that are required for
establishing the theory of Gro¨bner basis in the Weyl algebras.
Throughout the thesis let K be a field and n 1. The characteristic of K will be
denoted by char(K). We define the Weyl algebra of index n as follows:
Definition 2.1.1. Let fx1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶ng denote a set of indeterminates, and
let Khx1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶ni be the free associative algebra in these indeterminates.
Then theWeyl algebra of index n over K is the associative K-algebra
An = Khx1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶ni=I
2.1. Weyl Algebras
where I is the two-sided ideal generated by the following elements,
xi x j  x j xi; 1 i; j  n;
¶i ¶ j ¶ j ¶i; 1 i; j  n;
xi ¶ j ¶ j xi; 1 i 6= j  n;
¶i xi  xi ¶i 1; i= 1; : : : ;n
The last element indicates that ¶i xi 6= xi ¶i and hence An is not commutative. If no
confusion arises, from now on we denote (x1; : : : ;xn) and (¶1; : : : ;¶n) respectively
by x and ¶ . The elements of An will be calledWeyl polynomials.
For details on the subject, we refer to standard textbooks such as [12] in the case
when the field-characteristic is zero, and to the articles [43], [52] and [7] whenK has
a positive characteristic. For a more general class of non-commutative Noetherian
rings we refer to [37] and [19] where some properties and examples are given for
Weyl algebras as a special class of solvable polynomial rings both for positive and
zero characteristic of the base field.
The natural action for the Weyl Algebra An on a polynomial f in K[x1; : : : ;xn]
is as follows:
¶i  f = ¶ f¶xi ; xi  f = xi f
Since K[x1; : : : ;xn] is a subring of An, the symbol  helps distinguish the above
action from the product An An ! An. For example, if K = Q, then ¶ 21  x31 =
6x1 but ¶ 21  x31 = x31¶ 21 + 6x21¶1 + 6x1. With this action of an element ¶i  xi 2 A
on a polynomial f 2 K[x1; : : : ;xn] and using the product rule of differentiation we
immediately get the last relation, ¶i xi = xi ¶i+ 1, of the definition 2.1.1 of An. In
fact, we have
(¶i  xi) f = xi¶i f¶xi + f ) ¶i  xi = xi ¶i+1
It is easy to describe a basis for the Weyl algebra as a K-vector space by using the
multi-index notation. Let xa and ¶ b respectively denote xa11   xann and ¶ b11   ¶ bnn .
Further, for a;b 2 Nn with a = (a1; : : : ;an) and b = (b1; : : : ;bn), we write
jaj= a1+   +an and jb j= b1+   +bn
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Definition 2.1.2. In the above notation, the elements of the form xa ¶ b in the Weyl
algebra An are called (Weyl) terms.
We denote by Bn, the set of all terms in An. That is, for n 1, we let
Bn = fxa ¶ b j a; b 2 Nn g
Proposition 2.1.3. The elements of the set Bn, as given above, form a K-vector
space basis of An.
Proof. See Ch. 1 Proposition 2.1 in [12].
In view of Proposition 2.1.3, it is natural to write every non-zero element f 2 An
as a K-linear combination of elements in the basis Bn. This way of writing elements
in some unique form will be useful to perform explicit calculations with the Weyl
polynomials.
Definition 2.1.4. A non-zero element f in a Weyl algebra An written as a K-linear
combination of the elements in the K-vector space basis Bn is called an element in
standard form.
So, every element f 2 An has a unique standard form:
f = å
(a ;b )2E
ca ;b x
a¶ b (2.1)
where xa = xa11   xann ; ¶ b = ¶ b11   ¶ bnn ; ca;b 2 Knf0g, and where E is a finite
subset of N2n.
Hence, there is a natural K-vector space isomorphism between the commutative
polynomial ring in 2n variables fx1; : : : ;xn;x1; : : : ;xng and the Weyl algebra An.
Explicitly,
Y : K[x;x ] = K[x1; : : : ;xn;x1; : : : ;xn] ! An
xax b 7 ! xa¶ b (2.2)
Using the defining relations of Def. 2.1.1, one can convert every element of the
Weyl algebra An into its standard form in a straightforward way. The following
result proves to be useful for writing a Weyl polynomial in its standard form and
hence, can be used to perform effective multiplication of Weyl polynomials.
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Proposition 2.1.5. (a) Let i 2 f1; : : : ;ng, and let k; ` 2 N. Then we have
¶ ki x`i =
minfk;`g
å
j=0
j!

k
j

`
j

x`  ji ¶
k  j
i
(b) Assume that char(K) = 0, and let t = xa¶ b and t 0 = xa 0¶ b 0 be two terms
in An. Write a 0 = (a 01; : : : ;a
0
n) and b = (b1; : : : ;bn). Then the representation
of t t 0 in the basis Bn consists of
n
Õ
i=1
(minfa 0i ;big+1)
summands.
(c) If K is a field of positive characteristic, then the number of summands in the
product of the terms t and t 0 of part (b) becomes
Õni=1 (minfa 0i mod p;bi mod pg+1)
Proof. (a) We can derive the formula from the relation ¶i xi = xi ¶i + 1 and by
induction on k. For k = 1, we have
¶i x`i = (¶i xi)x` 1i
= (xi ¶i+1)x` 1i
= xi(¶i x` 1i )+ x
` 1
i
= xi(xi ¶i+1)x` 2i + x
` 1
i
= x2i ¶i+2x` 1i =    = x`i ¶i+ `x` 1i
=
1
å
j=0
j!

1
j

`
j

x`  ji ¶
1  j
i
Hence the formula is true for k = 1. We shall now prove that the formula is
true for k+1 when it is true for k.
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(1) Case (` k)
¶ k+1i x
`
i = ¶ ki (¶i x`i )
= ¶i(¶ ki x`i )
= ¶i(
`
å
j=0
j!

k
j

`
j

x`  ji ¶
k  j
i )
= ¶i(x`i ¶ ki + k `x` 1i ¶
k 1
i +   +(k  `)¶ k `i )
= (x`i ¶i+ `x` 1i )¶
k
i + (k`x
` 1
i ¶i+ k `(` 1)x` 2i )¶ k 1i +
  +(k  l)¶ k+1 `i
= x`i ¶
k+1
i +(k+1)`x
` 1
i ¶
k
i +   +(k  `)¶ k+1 `i
=
`
å
j=0
j!

k+1
j

`
j

x`  ji ¶
k+1  j
i
Hence the formula is true for k+1.
(2) Case (` > k)
¶ k+1i x
`
i = ¶ ki (¶i x`i ) = ¶i(¶ ki x`i )
= ¶i(
k
å
j=0
j!

k
j

`
j

x`  ji ¶
k  j
i )
= ¶i(x`i ¶ ki + k `x` 1i ¶
k 1
i +
k(k 1)`(` 1)
2!
x` 2i ¶
k 2
i
+    + (`  k)x` ki )
= (x`i ¶i+ `x` 1i )¶
k
i + (k `x
` 1
i ¶i+ k `(` 1)x` 2i )¶ k 1i
+    + ((k+1)k `(` 1)
2!
x` 2i ¶i+(` 2)x` 3i )¶ k 2i
(`  k)(x` ki ¶i+ x` k 1i
= x`i ¶ k+1i +(k+1)`x
` 1
i ¶
k
i +
(k+1)k `(` 1)
2!
x` 2i ¶
k 1
i
+   +(`  k)x` (k+1)i
=
k+1
å
j=0
j!

k+1
j

`
j

x`  ji ¶
k+1  j
i
Again, the formula is true for k+1.
(b) From part (a), it follows that for each i 2 f1; : : : ;ng the number of terms in
the standard form of ¶ ki x`i is (minfk; `g+1). Hence the result follows.
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(c) For char(K)> 0 we have to replace the summation bound minfk; `gin part (a)
by minfk mod p; ` mod pg and hence the result follows.
We have used part (a) of this proposition to implement an algorithm for comput-
ing the product of two Weyl polynomials f and g in standard form for the computer
algebra system ApCoCoA. One of the motivational factors of using Weyl polynomi-
als for designing a secure cryptosystem is part (b) of this proposition which means
that the supports are going to expand greatly with every multiplication, even if it is
only the multiplication by a term. We illustrate this by the following example.
Example 2.1.6. Let m1 = x21x
2
2x3¶
3
1 ¶
4
2 ¶
4
3 and m2 = x
4
1x
3
2x
5
3¶1¶
2
2 ¶
5
3 be terms of the
Weyl algebra A3 =Qhx1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3i: Then the number of terms in the product
m1m2 is (3+1)(3+1)(4+1) is 80. If we replace the base field byZ7, then the num-
ber of terms in the product is (minf4 mod 7; 3 mod 7g+1)(minf3 mod 7; 4 mod
7g+1)(minf4 mod 7; 5 mod 7g+1) = (3+1)(3+1)(4+1) = 80, whereas for the
field Z5, this product will have 4 4 1= 16 terms.
2.2 Basic Properties
In this section, we will describe the basic properties of Weyl algebras and explain
how the Weyl algebras over a field K of characteristic zero are different from the
ones that are defined over a field of positive characteristic.
Definition 2.2.1. Let t = xa ¶ b be a Weyl term of An. Then the degree of t is given
by deg(t) = jaj+ jb j.
Definition 2.2.2. Let f = c1t1+   + csts be a Weyl polynomial in standard form,
where ci 2 K n f0g and ti 2 Bn. For i = 1; : : : ;s, the element ti is called a term of
f and ci is called the coefficient of f corresponding to the term ti. The summand
citi in this representation of f is called a monomial of f . We denote by Supp( f ) =
ft1; : : : ; tsg, the set of all terms of f and call it the (standard) support of f .
Definition 2.2.3. Let f = c1t1+   + csts be a Weyl polynomial in standard form,
where ci 2 K n f0g and ti 2 Bn. The degree, deg( f ) of the polynomial f 2 An is
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then defined as
deg( f ) =maxfdeg(t) j t 2 Supp( f )g
Note that here f 6= 0 and the degree of a zero-polynomial is not defined.
Definition 2.2.4. Let f = c1t1+   + csts be a Weyl polynomial in standard form,
where ci 2 K nf0g and ti 2 Bn. We define the degree form, DF( f ), of a polynomial
f 2 An to be the sum of all monomials of f having degree equal to deg( f ). That is,
DF( f ) = få
j
c jt j j t j 2 Supp( f ) and deg(t j) = deg( f )g
Example 2.2.5. Consider the Weyl algebra A2 =Q[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] and
f = 3x31x
2
2¶1¶
2
2 + 7x
3
1x
3
2¶
2
2   2x32¶ 41 ¶2  2x21¶ 21 + ¶1¶ 22 + x1x2  2x2+ x1  5. Then
we have
deg( f ) = 8,
DF( f ) = f3x31x22¶1¶ 22 +7x31x32¶ 22  2x32¶ 41 ¶2g, and
Supp( f ) = fx31x22¶1¶ 22 ; x31x32¶ 22 ; x32¶ 41 ¶2; x21¶ 21 ; ¶1¶ 22 ; x1x2; x2; x1; 1g.
Proposition 2.2.6. For Weyl polynomials f ; g 2 An n f0g, the degree satisfies fol-
lowing the properties:
(1) deg( f +g)maxfdeg( f ); deg(g)g, where f +g 6= 0.
(2) deg( f g) = deg( f ) + deg(g)
(3) deg( f g) deg(g f ) deg( f )+deg(g) 2
Proof. see [12], Ch. 2, Theorem 1.1.
Recall that a ring is said to be simple if it does not have any non-trivial two-
sided ideals. For a commutative ring to be simple, it has to be a field. This in not
true in general for non-commutative rings. In fact, for Weyl algebras we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.2.7. Let An be the Weyl algebra of index n over K. If char(K) = 0
then An does not have any non-trivial two-sided ideals, i.e. An is simple.
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Proof. Consider a non-zero two-sided ideal I of An. Let 0 6= f 2 I be such that d =
deg( f ) =minfdeg( f 0) j f 0 2 Inf0gg. If d= 0, then f 2K, hence I=An and there is
nothing to prove. We, therefore, assume that d > 0. Suppose t = xa ¶ b 2 Supp( f )
be such that deg(t) = d and bi 6= 0 for some i = 1; : : : ;n. Since, ¶i xi = xi ¶i+ 1,
and by the supposition f has a summand t = xa ¶ b with deg(t) = deg( f ) = d and
bi 6= 0, we have (xi f   f xi) 6= 0 (because f xi = xi f + h with h 6= 0) and part (3)
of Proposition 2.2.6 implies that deg(xi f   f xi)  d  1. Since I is a two-sided
ideal, the element xi f   f xi 2 I. This contradicts our assumption that d is minimal.
Hence bi = 0, for all i. Since d > 0, there exists an i 2 f1; : : : ;ng such that ai 6= 0.
Now the element ¶i f   f ¶i 6= 0 belongs to I and has degree d  1 and again we
have a contradiction. Therefore the ideal I = f0g and hence An is simple.
From this proposition, one can immediately infer that every endomorphism of
An is injective.
Proposition 2.2.8. Let An be the Weyl algebra of index n over K. If char(K) = 0
then An is a domain, i.e. it has no left or right zero-divisors.
Proof. As in the case of commutative polynomial ring over a field, the proof follows
from part (2) of Proposition 2.2.6.
Proposition 2.2.9. Let An be the Weyl algebra of index n over K. If K is a field of
positive characteristic p then the center Cn of An is given by
Cn = K[x
p
1 ; : : : ;x
p
n ;¶
p
1 ; : : : ;¶
p
n ]
It is a commutative polynomial ring in 2n indeterminates over K. Moreover, An is a
free Cn-module of rank p2n and an Azumaya algebra of rank pn over Cn.
Proof. These claims are proved in [52], Lemma 3.
In view of Propositions 2.2.7, 2.2.8, and 2.2.9, most of the time we will be using
mainly left ideals in Weyl algebras over a field K of positive characteristic.
Proposition 2.2.10. An is a left Noetherian ring. That is, every left ideal is finitely
generated.
Proof. See [12] (Ch. 8, x2).
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After giving a brief introduction to Weyl algebras and their basic properties, we
are now ready to describe the Gro¨bner basis theory for these algebras.
2.3 Left Gro¨bner Bases in Weyl Algebras
In this section, we will see how one can compute Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl
algebras. In [24] a Gro¨bner basis theory for algebras of solvable type was intro-
duced. Weyl algebras are special cases for these algebras (see [24], 1.9.b). Teo
Mora, established in [39] a unified Gro¨bner basis theory for both commutative and
non-commutative algebras which was further considered by H. Li in his book [33]
and then by Levandovskyy in his Ph.D thesis [30]. For a computational introduction
to Weyl algebras, we refer to chapter one of the book [45]. Using this approach and
following the notation and terminology of the books [27] and [28], we shall now
present the methods for computing Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl algebras. The
main ingredients of the theory are term orderings and the division algorithm. In this
section, we define term orderings on the set Bn of all terms in the Weyl algebra An
and then describe the left division algorithm for Weyl algebras. From now on by an
ideal we mean a left ideal of the Weyl algebra An, until specified otherwise.
Definition 2.3.1. A complete ordering s on Bn is called a (Weyl) term ordering if
it has the following properties.
(1) An inequality xa¶ b <s xa
0¶ b 0 implies
xa+a
00
¶ b+b
00
<s xa
0+a 00¶ b
0+b 00
for all a;a 0;a 00;b ;b 0;b 00 2 Nn.
(2) The ordering s is well-founded, i.e. we have 1<s t for all t 2 Bn nf1g.
Below we define some of the well-known term orderings on Bn  An. Basically,
these are the orderings induced by corresponding well-orderings on N2n.
Definition 2.3.2. We define the lexicographic order (Lex) on the terms in Bn as
follows. For two terms t1 = xa¶ b and t2 = xa
0¶ b 0 in Bn we say that t1 >Lex t2 if and
only if the left-most non-zero entry in
(a;b )  (a 0;b 0) = (a1 a 01; : : : ;an a 0n;b1 b 01; : : : ;bn b 0n)
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is positive.
Example 2.3.3. Using Lex, the indeterminates are ordered decreasingly, that is,
x1 >Lex x2 >Lex   >Lex xn >Lex ¶1 >Lex   >Lex ¶n
Now consider the Weyl algebra A2 = K[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] and let the terms t1; t2 2 B2 be
such that t1 = x1x22¶2 and t2 = x
3
2¶
4
1 ¶
2
2 . Then t1 >Lex t2, since the difference of the
exponent vectors (a;b )  (a 0;b 0) = (1; 1; 4; 1); has a positive first non-zero
component.
Definition 2.3.4. We define the degree lexicographic order (DegLex) on the terms
in Bn as follows. For two terms t1 = xa¶ b and t2 = xa
0¶ b 0 in Bn we say that
t1 >DegLex t2 if and only if deg(t1)> deg(t2) or if deg(t1) = deg(t2) and t1 >Lex t2.
Example 2.3.5. Note that, using DegLex we have
x1 >DegLex x2 >DegLex   >DegLex xn >DegLex ¶1 >DegLex   >DegLex ¶n
For example, consider the Weyl algebra A2 = K[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] and let the terms
t1; t2 2 B2 be as given in Example 2.3.3. Then t2 >DegLex t1, since deg(t2) = 9 >
deg(t1) = 4. Moreover, if t3 = x21¶
2
2 then deg(t1) = deg(t3) but t3 >Lex t1 therefore
t3 >DegLex t1.
Definition 2.3.6. For the terms in Bn  An we define the degree reverse lexico-
graphic order (DegRevLex) as follows. For two terms t1 = xa¶ b and t2 = xa
0¶ b 0
in Bn we say that t1 >DegRevLex t2 if and only if deg(t1) > deg(t2) or if deg(t1) =
deg(t2) and the right-most non-zero entry in
(a;b )  (a 0;b 0) = (a1 a 01; : : : ;an a 0n;b1 b 01; : : : ;bn b 0n)
is negative.
Example 2.3.7. Again we have
x1 >DegRevLex   >DegRevLex xn >DegRevLex ¶1 >DegRevLex   >DegRevLex ¶n
For the terms t1; t2; t3 as in Example 2.3.5, we have
t2 >DegRevLex t1 and t1 >DegRevLex t3 since in the difference of exponent vectors
(1;2;0;1)  (2;0;0;2) = ( 1;2;0; 1) the right-most non-zero entry is negative.
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Definition 2.3.8. A term ordering s on Bn is called degree compatible if t1 s t2
for t1; t2 2 Bn implies deg(t1) deg(t2).
For instance, DegLex and DegRevLex are degree compatible term orderings.
After fixing a term ordering s , we now define the following.
Definition 2.3.9. Consider a non-zero Weyl polynomial f = c1t1+   + csts with
ci 2 K nf0g and ti 2 Bn, where t1 >s   >s ts. Then we write
LTs ( f ) = t1; the leading term of f ;
LCs ( f ) = c1; the leading coefficient of f ;
LMs ( f ) = c1 t1 the leading monomial of f :
Definition 2.3.10. In the setting of Example 2.2.5, let s = DegRevLex. Then we
have LCs ( f ) = 3, LTs ( f ) = x31x
2
2¶1¶
2
2 , and LMs ( f ) = 3x
3
1x
2
2¶1¶
2
2 .
Remark 2.3.11. For Weyl algebras, if a term ordering s satisfies only the condition
(1) of the Definition 2.3.1, then it need not be compatible with multiplication. That
is, we do not have LTs ( f g) = LTs ( f )LTs (g) for all f ;g 2 An. For instance, let t
be a complete ordering defined by
xa¶ b <t xa
0
¶ b
0
if and only if b  a < b 0 a 0 or b  a = b 0 a 0 and a > a 0:
This is not compatible with multiplication. Here we have x¶ <t 1 and LTt(¶ x¶ ) =
LTt(x¶ 2+ ¶ ) = ¶ . Thus in case of Weyl algebras, for a complete ordering s on
Bn to be compatible with multiplication, in addition to condition (1), it must also
satisfy that 1<s xi ¶i for all i= 1; : : : ;n. Hence a well founded ordering s together
with condition (1) automatically becomes compatible with multiplication.
Let us collect some properties of leading terms in Weyl algebras.
Proposition 2.3.12. Let s be a term ordering on Bn. Let f ;g 2 An n f0g be such
that LTs ( f ) = xa¶ b and LTs (g) = xa
0¶ b 0 with a;a 0;b ;b 0 2 Nn. Then we have
LTs ( f g) = LTs (g f ) = xa+a
0
¶ b+b
0
Proof. First note that from Proposition 2.1.5 it follows that for any Weyl polynomi-
als f g 2 An nf0g, we have f g= f g+h with h<s f g and the polynomial h 2 An
23
2.3. Left Gro¨bner Bases in Weyl Algebras
is uniquely determined from f and g. Here ‘’ means the commutative multiplica-
tion of the polynomials f and g, that is assuming that all the indeterminates of An
are commuting. Now
LTs ( f g) = LTs ( f g) = xa+a 0¶ b+b 0
and similarly,
LTs (g f ) = LTs (g  f ) = LTs ( f g) = xa+a 0¶ b+b 0
This completes the proof.
Definition 2.3.13. For two terms t = xa¶ b and t 0 = xa 0¶ b 0 in Bn we say that t
pseudo-divides t 0 if ai  a 0i and bi  b 0i for all i= 1; : : : ;n.
Definition 2.3.14. Let t = xa¶ b and t 0 = xa 0¶ b 0 be two terms in Bn. For each i 2
f1; : : : ;sg, let mi=max(ai;a 0i ), ni=max(bi;b 0i ) and (m;n)= (m1; : : : ;mn;n1; : : : ;nn).
We define the pseudo-lcm of t1 and t2 as lcm(t1; t2) = xm ¶ n .
Definition 2.3.15. Let s be a term ordering on An and consider a left ideal I  An.
Let G be a finite subset of I. The set G is called a left s -Gro¨bner basis of I if
and only if for any f 2 I nf0g there exists g 2 G such that LTs (g) pseudo-divides
LTs ( f ).
Definition 2.3.16. Let F be a subset of the Weyl algebra An. The span of leading
terms of F is defined to be the K-vector subspace spanned by the set fLTs ( f ) j f 2
Fg  Bn. We denote it by hLTs (F)iK = hfLTs ( f ) j f 2 FgiK  An.
Remark 2.3.17. Here we should remark that the standard definition of Gro¨bner
bases via leading term ideals in commutative settings cannot be transferred directly
to the case of Weyl algebras. For example consider the Weyl algebra A1 = K[x;¶ ],
and the set F = fx¶+1;xg. Let I be the ideal generated by F . Then I is a proper left
ideal of A1 with reduced Gro¨bner basis G = fxg and I = hxi. The K-vector space
hLTs (F)iK = hLTs ( f ) j f 2 IiK is equal to the vector space hxi, whereas, the ideal
generated by the set LTs (F) = hfx¶ ;xgi= h1i= A.
However, we have a well established theory of Gro¨bner bases of ideals in some
general non-commutative rings where Weyl algebras can be considered as special
cases. For instance see [24], [30], [33], and [39] . A computational introduction
to the theory of Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl algebras is also sketched in [45].
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In particular, for Weyl polynomials, there exist natural definitions of S-polynomials
and an analogue of the Buchberger algorithm for computing left s -Gro¨bner bases
of ideals in Weyl algebras.
We are now ready to give left division algorithm for Weyl algebras. Just like di-
vision of polynomials in commutative polynomial rings, we can divide the standard
form of aWeyl polynomial f 2A by a tuple G = (g1; : : : ;gs) ofWeyl polynomials in
standard form. With this division, we get a representation f = q1 g1+   +qs gs+ r
with r;q1; : : : ;qs 2 An. The polynomial r 2 An has certain extra properties and is
called the normal remainder of the polynomial f with respect to the tuple G . This
representation and hence the normal remainder r depends not only on the term or-
dering s on Bn but also on the order of the elements in the tuple (g1; : : : ;gs). The
procedure of getting this representation is known as left division algorithm which is
the main ingredient of the Buchberger’s Algorithm 2.3.24. We now present the left
division algorithm for Weyl algebras in pseudo-code.
Algorithm 2.3.18. The Left Division Algorithm
Input: f ; g1; : : : ;gs 2 An nf0g, with G = (g1; : : : ;gs) An
Output: The tuple (q1; : : : ;qs) 2 Asn and a Weyl polynomial r 2 An such that
f = q1 g1+   +qs gs+ r
1) q1 := 0: : : : qs := 0; r := 0, and f 0 := f
2) while ( f 0 6= 0) do
3) while ( 9 smallest i 2 f1; : : : ;sg such that
4) LTs ( f 0) is pseudo-divisible by LTs (gi)) do
5) qi := qi+
LMs ( f 0)
LMs (gi)
6) f 0 := f 0  LMs ( f 0)LMs (gi) gi
7) end while
8) r := r+LMs ( f 0)
9) f 0 := f 0 LMs ( f 0)
10) end while
11) return (q1; : : : ;qs; r)
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Proposition 2.3.19. The Algorithm 2.3.18 terminates and returns polynomials
q1; : : : ;qs and r 2 An such that
f = q1 g1+   +qs gs+ r
and such that the following conditions are satisfied
(a) Either r = 0 or no element of Supp(r) is pseudo-divisible by any of the ele-
ment in the set fLTs (g1); : : : ;LTs (gs)g
(b) For each i 2 f1; : : : ;sg, if qi 6= 0 then we have LTs (qi gi)s LTs ( f ).
(c) For all i 2 f1; : : : ;sg, we have qi LTs (gi) =2 hLTs (g1); : : : ;LTs (gi 1)i.
The polynomials r;q1; : : : ; qs satisfying above conditions are uniquely determined
by the tuple G and the polynomial f 2 An.
Proof. First we note that the equation
f = q1 g1+   +qs gs+ f 0+ r
holds at each point in the Algorithm 2.3.18. This is clearly true for the starting
values of q1; : : : ;qs; f 0 and r. To show that the equation holds at each step after
initializing, we note that one of two things can happen. If the next step is from the
inner while-loop, that is, some LTs (gi) divides LTs ( f 0), then the lines 5) and 6) in
the loop ensure from the equality
qi gi+ f 0 = (qi+
LMs ( f 0)
LMs (gi)
)gi+( f 0  LMs ( f
0)
LMs (gi)
gi)
that qi gi+ f 0 remains unchanged and hence the above equation holds in this case.
On the other hand, if the next step is outside this loop, then again from the lines 8)
and 9) of the main while-loop, we see that although r and f 0 are changed but their
sum r+ f 0 is unaltered because we have
r+ f 0 = (r+LMs ( f 0))+( f 0 LMs ( f 0))
Thus in any case our claim remains true.
Next, we claim that the algorithm eventually terminates. To prove the claim,
note that at the jth step of the second while-loop, we are replacing f 0j by f 0j 1 
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LMs ( f 0j 1)
LMs (gi)
 gi. Since LTs ( f 0j) < LTs ( f 0j 1), we obtain a set fLTs ( f 0j)g of leading
terms of f 0j, where for all j we have LTs ( f 0j)< LTs ( f 0j 1). Since s is well founded,
this set has a minimum and hence the inner while-loop terminates. Similarly at line
(9) f 0 is replaced by f 0 LM( f 0) at each step of the outer while-loop and hence f 0
becomes 0 after finite number of steps of outer while-loop. Therefore termination
of the algorithm follows and after termination we have
f = q1 g1+   +qs gs+ r
and the polynomial r in the above representation will satisfy the property (a), since
each time the line 8) is executed, we are adding LMs ( f 0) to r only when there does
not exist an i 2 f1; : : : ;sg such that LTs ( f 0) is a multiple of LTs (gi).
Further, note that each time the line 5) is executed and the old and new qi are
not zero, we always have the inequality
LTs

(qi+
LMs ( f 0)
LMs (gi)
) gi

s max

LTs (qi gi);LTs ( f 0)
	s LTs ( f )
The same is trivially true if the old value of qi was zero. Thus, throughout the
algorithm, property (b) holds.
Now we prove property (c). For i 2 f1; : : : ;sg, note that at line 3) of the algo-
rithm, the index i is chosen minimally. Therefore, property (c) follows from the fact
that LTs ( f 0) =2 hLTs (g1); : : : ;LTs (gi 1)i, where LTs ( f 0) = 1LCs (gi) qi LTs (gi).
Finally, to prove uniqueness, suppose there exist other polynomials q01; : : : ; g
0
s
and r0 which satisfy conditions (a), (b), and (c) such that f = q01 g1+   +q0s gs+ r0.
Then we have
0= (q1 q01)g1+   +(qs q0s)gs+(r  r0) (*)
Now condition (a) implies that LTs (r  r0) =2 hLTs (g1); : : : ;LTs (gs)i, and condi-
tion (c) implies that for each i 2 f1; : : : ;sg,
LTs ((qi q0i)gi) =2 hLTs (g1); : : : ;LTs (gi 1)i with qi 6= q0i:
Thus the leading term with respect to s of the summands in (*) are pairwise dif-
ferent from those of smaller index. This is possible only when (q1  q01) =    ;=
(qs q0s) = (r  r0) = 0. This completes the proof.
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Definition 2.3.20. Let f ; g1; : : : ;gs 2 An nf0g, and let G be the tuple (g1; : : : ; gs).
Let the representation
f = q1 g1+   +qs gs+ r
be obtained by applying left Division Algorithm on the polynomial f and the tuple
G . Then the Weyl polynomial r 2 An is called the left normal remainder of f with
respect to G and is denoted by NRs ;G ( f ), or simply by NRG ( f ) if no confusion
can arise. Moreover, we have NRG (0) = 0.
The normal remainder r of a polynomial f 2 An with respect to an s-tuple G =
(g1; : : : ;gs) of polynomials depends greatly on the ordering of the tuple G . This can
be seen in the following example.
Example 2.3.21. Consider the Weyl Algebra A1 = Q[x1;¶1] and let the term or-
dering be s = DegRevLex. Let g1 = x31 ¶
3
1   5x1 ¶1  1, g2 = x21 ¶ 41 + 2¶ 31 , and
f = x41 ¶
5
1   4x1 ¶ 31   4¶ 31 . Now if G = (g1;g2), then the left Division Algorithm
2.3.18 gives
NRs ;G ( f ) = 17x21¶
3
1  4x1¶ 31  19x1¶ 21  4¶ 31  36¶1
whereas if G = (g2;g1), then NRs ;G ( f ) = 0.
This ordering of the elements in the tuple can also affect the number of steps
required by Algorithm 2.3.18 to complete the computation. But if we follow the
Division Algorithm exactly the way as stated, that is, for a fixed ordered tuple, the
output of the algorithm is uniquely determined as proved in part (d) of Proposition
2.3.19. Of course, the output also depends on the choice of the term ordering s
on An. On the other hand, as in the commutative case, the Division Algorithm has
very nice properties when it is applied to Gro¨bner bases. More precisely, let f be
a Weyl polynomial of a left ideal I  An and let the set G = fg1; : : : ;gsg be a left
Gro¨bner basis of I with respect to a term ordering s on An. Let G = (g1; : : : ;gs).
Then the normal remainder, NRs ;G ( f ) is always unique no matter how the tuple G
is ordered (see Theorem 2.4.1).
Remark 2.3.22. In the above setting, the normal remainder NRs ;G ( f ) of a poly-
nomial f 2 An is referred to as normal form of f with respect to the ideal I and
the term ordering s and is denoted by NFs ;I( f ) or simply by NFs ( f ) if it is clear
which ideal is considered. The normal form NFs ;I( f ) of f 2 An with respect to the
ideal I  An is the unique element of An with the property that f  NFs ;I( f ) 2 I. In
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particular, it does not depend on the particular s -Gro¨bner basis chosen. (see [27]
Proposition 2.4.7).
Definition 2.3.23. Let s be a term ordering on An and let f ;g 2 An be two Weyl
polynomials in standard form. Let LTs ( f ) = xa¶ b and LTs (g) = xg¶ d . Let t f g =
lcm(LTs ( f );LTs (g))
LTs ( f )
2 Bn. We define S-polynomial of f and g to be the standard form
of the Weyl polynomial S f g 2 An given by
S f g =
t f g
LCs ( f )
f   tg f
LCs (g)
g (2.3)
Note that Sg f = S f g and S f g belongs to the left ideal generated by f ;g. Thus,
S f g 2 I where I is a left ideal generated by a set F such that f ; g 2 F .
With these definitions of the term ordering, S-polynomials, and the normal re-
mainder algorithm, the Gro¨bner basis of an ideal I  An can now be obtained in
an analogous way to the well-known commutative case. Below we present the left
Buchberger algorithm for computing Gro¨bner basis of a left ideal I  An with re-
spect to a term ordering s .
Algorithm 2.3.24. The Left Buchberger Algorithm: LWGB(I)
Input: Ideal I := h f1; : : : ; fsi of An and a term ordering s .
Output: A Gro¨bner basis for I with respect to s
B := f( fi; f j) j1 i< j  sg
G := ( f1; : : : ; fs)
while (B 6= /0) do
Take any pair ( f ; f 0) from the set B
B := Bnf( f ; f 0)g
h := S f f 0
r := NRs ;G (h)
if (r 6= 0) then
B := B[f(g;r) jg 2 G g
G := G [frg
end if
end while
return G
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Theorem 2.3.25. Let G= fg1; : : : ;gsg be a finite subset of the Weyl algebra An
and let s be a term ordering.
(1) The set G is a left s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I = hGi if and only if the nor-
mal remainder of every S-polynomial Sgig j (i 6= j) with respect to (g1; : : : ;gs)
is 0.
(2) The Left Buchberger Algorithm 2.3.24 terminates and returns a Gro¨bner basis
of the ideal I with respect to s .
Proof. The proof is similar to the commutative case, for instance see [27] Theorem
2.5.5.
The study of optimizations of Buchberger’s Algorithm for maximum speed
is an active research area both in the commutative and the non-commutative set-
tings. Not all the optimizations of Buchberger’s Algorithm in the commutative ring
P = K[x1; : : : ;xn] are true in the setting of the Weyl algebra An. For example, the
coprimality test (see [27], Cor. 2.5.10) does not hold in general for Weyl algebras.
This test states that, ifG= fg1; : : : ;gsg Pnf0g generates the ideal I = hg1; : : : ;gsi
and if the leading terms of the elements g1; : : : ;gs are pairwise coprime then G is
a s -Gro¨bner basis of I. This is not true in general for Weyl algebras. For exam-
ple, consider the Weyl algebra A1 = Q[x1;¶1] and g1 = x1; g2 = ¶1. Let I be an
ideal generated by the set G= fg1;g2g. Then this criterion would imply that G is a
Gro¨bner basis of I which is of course not true since g2g1 g1g2 = 1. However, for
Weyl algebras, one of the optimizations of the Left Buchberger’s Algorithm is pos-
sible by using a similar criterion which is known as Generalized Product Criterion.
It is explained in [30] (Ch. 2, Lemma 4.11).
Definition 2.3.26. Let I = h f1; : : : ; fri be an ideal of the Weyl algebra An and let s
a term ordering. Let d maxfdeg( f1); : : : ;deg( fr)g. Let H be the output of the left
Buchberger Algorithm, modified so that each computation involving polynomials
of degree higher than d is not performed. The set H then contains polynomials of
degree less than or equal to d and it is called a left partial Gro¨bner basis of the
ideal I with respect to the term ordering s and the degree d is called the degree
bound for this partial Gro¨bner basis H.
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Remark 2.3.27. Note here that if G is a left s -Gro¨bner basis of a left ideal I  An,
then it does not mean that a left partial s -Gro¨bner basis H with degree bound d,
necessarily contains all Gro¨bner basis elements g 2 G such that deg(g)  d. It
should be clear from the above definition that H is computed by interrupting the
left Buchberger Algorithm to skip any operation involving polynomial of degree
higher than d. That is, if the process is allowed to continue from the interruption
point, then it might be possible that new Gro¨bner basis elements have degree less
than or equal to the degree bound d of the partial Gro¨bner basis H.
2.4 Left Ideal Membership
Among many applications of Gro¨bner bases of ideals, we are mainly interested in
the left ideal membership problem. That is, given a left ideal I  An and a Weyl
polynomial f 2 An, the ideal membership problem is to decide whether f 2 I. Even
in the commutative setting, the ideal membership problem is EXPSPACE-hard. In
particular, this implies that it is in neither NP nor co-NP (see [36] or [53]). Just like
in the commutative case (see [27]), the solution to this problem for left ideals in
Weyl algebras is provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.1. Let I be a non-zero left ideal of a Weyl algebra An =K[x;¶ ] and
let G= fg1; : : : ;grg be a finite subset of An. Let s be a term ordering on An and let
G = (g1; : : : ;gr). Then the following are equivalent
(1) G is a left s -Gro¨bner basis for I.
(2) For f 2 An, we have f 2 I if and only if NRs ;G ( f ) = 0
(3) Every f 2 I has a standard (left) representation with respect to G. That is,
there exist `1; : : : ; `r 2 An such that f = `1g1+   + `rgr and
LTs (` jg j) LTs ( f ) for all j such that ` j g j 6= 0.
(4) For any Weyl polynomial f 2 An, the normal remainder NRs ;G ( f ) agrees
with NFs ;I( f ). In particular, the normal remainder does not depend on the
order of elements g1; : : : ;gr.
Proof. For parts (1) – (3), see [30], Theorem 1.16. Part (4) is similar to the com-
mutative case, see [27], Corollary 2.4.9.
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The part (2) of this theorem provides us a way of deciding left ideal membership
in two steps. That is, given a left ideal I  An and a Weyl polynomial f 2 An, we
can decide ideal membership of f as follows:
(a) Compute a left s -Gro¨bner basis G = fg1; : : : ;gsg of the ideal I and let G =
(g1; : : : ;gs)
(b) Compute the normal remainder NRs ;G ( f ) by using the normal remainder
algorithm with respect to G . If NRs ;G ( f ) = 0, then f 2 I, otherwise f =2 I.
Remark 2.4.2. Here we note that the complexity of deciding left ideal member-
ship depends on the complexity of the computation of Gro¨bner bases of left ideals
in Weyl algebra and secondly on the computation of normal remainders of Weyl
polynomials. The degree bound for Gro¨bner bases in Weyl algebras is established
to be doubly-exponential (see [5] for details). Regardless of possible optimizations
of Buchberger’s Algorithm (2.3.24) for computing Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl
algebras, we observe that Weyl multiplication (see 2.1.5) makes the computation
harder by increasing the size of polynomials and hence memory consumption for
storing intermediate results during the computation. In fact this slows down the re-
duction process of computing the normal remainder (see Algorithm 2.3.18) with re-
spect to a tupleH ofWeyl polynomials, especially whenH is not a Gro¨bner basis.
The following proposition will be useful in choosing a polynomial in an ideal I of
An.
Proposition 2.4.3. Consider a Weyl algebra An = K[x1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶n] and a
term ordering s . Let I be a left ideal of An and let G = fg1; : : : ;gsg be its left
s -Gro¨bner basis. For an arbitrary polynomial f 2 An, the polynomial g = f  
NRs ;G ( f ) belongs to the ideal I, where G = (g1; : : : ;gs).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Theorem 2.4.1.
This concludes our brief overview. Further results about Gro¨bner bases in Weyl
algebras will be recalled as needed.
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2.5 Constructing Gro¨bner Bases of Left Ideals of An
Because of the relation ¶x = x¶ + 1, it is very likely that an ideal generated by a
set of randomly chosen Weyl polynomials contains 1 and hence has a Gro¨bner basis
equal to f1g. For example, in the Weyl algebra A1 = Q[x;¶ ], the following ideals
are trivial ideals:
hx;¶ i, h2x2+¶ ;¶ i, hx2+ x¶  ¶ ;x3¶ + x¶  1i, hx4¶ 7+ x4;x9¶ 3+ x2¶ 2 1i
Likewise, in A2 = Q[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] the ideals hx41¶ 71   1;x32¶ 32 + x1¶1+ 1i, hx31¶ 71 +
¶1  1;x32¶ 32 + x1¶1+ 1i, hx22¶ 21   1;x1¶1+ ¶1i, and h¶ 32 + x1¶2  1;x1¶1+ ¶1i are
trivial ideals. Similarly in An; n > 1, it is very likely that after a large amount of
computation, the Gro¨bner basis of an ideal generated by a set of randomly chosen
Weyl polynomials turns out to be f1g. In this section, we propose some ways of
finding non-trivial left ideals of the Weyl algebra An. For this, let us collect some
useful observations.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let s be a term ordering on Bn. Let g 2 An nf0g and let I = hgi
be the left principal ideal generated by g. Then G = fgg is a left s -Gro¨bner basis
of I.
Proof. This claim is an immediate consequence of the Proposition 2.3.12.
Claim in this Proposition means that for a Weyl polynomial g 2 An n f0;1g
the left principal ideal I = hgi is a non-trivial ideals of the Weyl algebra An. The
following proposition gives us a way of constructing non-trivial ideals of the Weyl
algebra An that are not principal.
Proposition 2.5.2. Let An =K[x1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶n] be Weyl algebra of index n over
a field K and let s be a term ordering on An. Let G = fg1; : : : ;grg be such that
gi is a Weyl polynomial in the indeterminates xi and ¶i for i = 1; : : : ;r. Then the
ideal I = hg1; : : : ;gri is a non-trivial left ideal of An. In fact, the set G is a left
s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I.
Proof. Note that for all i; j, we have gi g j = g j gi, i.e. gi and g j commute for all i; j.
Moreover, by construction, the leading terms of the elements g1; : : : ;gr are pairwise
coprime. Therefore, the claim follows from the commutative Product Criterion (see
[27], Corollary 2.5.10).
33
2.5. Constructing Gro¨bner Bases of Left Ideals of An
Using this proposition, we can construct non-trivial ideals in Weyl algebras as
follows:
Example 2.5.3. Consider the Weyl algebra A2 =K[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] of index 2 over the
base field K = F31 and let the term ordering be s = DegRevLex. Let I = hg1;g2i
be given by
g1 = 17x31¶
4
1 +21x
2
1¶
3
1  3x21 2¶ 21 +14x1¶1+12x1 13¶1 21
g2 = 11x32¶
4
2 +21x
2
2¶
2
2 +25x
2
2 30¶ 22 +21x22 7x2¶2 3
Then the ideal I is a left ideal of An and the setG= fg1;g2g is its left s -Gro¨bner basis.
Example 2.5.4. Consider the Weyl algebra A4 = K[x1;x2;x3;x4;¶1;¶2;¶3;¶4] of in-
dex 4, over the base field K = F3, and let the term ordering be s = DegRevLex. Let
I = hg1;g2;g3i be given by
g1 = x61¶
5
1 +2x
2
1¶
4
1   x21 ¶1 1
g2 = x52¶
6
2 + x
2
2¶
4
2 +¶
2
2   x2+¶2+1
g3 = x33x
3
4¶
2
3  2x4¶3+¶3¶4+ x3  x4+¶4+1
Then the ideal I is a left ideal of An and G = fg1;g2;g3g is a left s -Gro¨bner basis
of I.
Remark 2.5.5. Recall that Weyl a polynomial f 2 Cn commutes with every ele-
ment of the Weyl algebra An when the base field K has positive characteristic p.
Now consider the Weyl algebra A1 = K[x;¶ ] with the base field K = Fp of positive
characteristic p and let s be a term ordering on B1. We can now create a non trivial
left ideal I of A1 generated by two Weyl polynomials f1 and f2 as follows: Choose
a polynomial f1 2Cn nf1;0g and set f2 2 A1 nCn such that NRs ; f2( f1) =2 Fp nf0g.
Then there is a very high probability that the ideal I = h f1; f2i is a non-trivial left
ideal of A1. That is, I constructed this way will rarely be a trivial ideal. Moreover, if
for the generating polynomial f2, LTs ( f2) = xa ¶ b is such that both a;b  2, then
it will be very likely that minimum number of elements in any left s -Gro¨bner basis
are more than 2. Here it does not mean that if the polynomials f1; f2 are not selected
as suggested above then the ideal I cannot be a non-trivial ideal of An. For instance,
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the ideal I = hx7 + 1; x¶ 2 + x2 + x+ 1i of A1 = F2[x;¶ ] with the term ordering
s = DegRevLex is a non trivial left ideal of A1 and its reduced left Gro¨bner basis G
contains 3 polynomials as given below,
G= f¶ 6+ x4+¶ 4+ x3; x5+¶ 4+ x2+1; x¶ 2+ x2+ x+1g;
whereas if I = hx7+ 1; x2¶ + x2+ x+ 1i then we have G = f1g. In fact, we sug-
gested above technique to minimize the probability of getting a trivial Gro¨bner basis
G= f1g of a properly chosen ideal I.
We illustrate the technique described in Remark 2.5.5 in the following example.
Example 2.5.6. Consider the Weyl algebra A1 = F7[x;¶ ] over the field F7 of char-
acteristic 7 and let s = DegRevLex. Take f1 = ¶ 7 1; f2 = x3¶ 3+x2¶  ¶  1 then
I = h f1; f2i is a non-trivial left ideal of A1 and a left Gro¨bner basis G of the ideal I
consists of 7 polynomials1 respectively having 19, 21, 19, 18, 17, 17, and 4 terms .
Note here that f1 2C1 = F7[x7;¶ 7].
Using the technique described in Remark 2.5.5, we can construct non-trivial
ideals of Weyl algebras of any index n > 1. We illustrate this by the following
example.
Example 2.5.7. Consider the Weyl algebra A2 = K[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] of index 2 over
the field K = F3 and let s = DegRevLex. Let I be the ideal of A generated by the
following Weyl polynomials
f11 = x31¶
3
1  1
f12 = x21¶1+ x1 ¶1+1
f21 = x62¶
6
2 + x
3
2¶
3
2 +¶
3
2  1
f22 = x22¶
2
2   x2¶ 22 + x22+1
Then the ideal I is a non-trivial ideal of A2 and its reduced s -Gro¨bner basis is the
set G= fg1; : : : ;g8g of 8 Weyl polynomials where
g1 = ¶ 72   x2¶ 52 + x52  x42¶2  x42  x2¶ 32 +¶ 42 + x32+ x22¶2+ x2¶ 22  ¶ 32  
x22+ x2¶2+¶
2
2 +1;
1These Gro¨bner basis elements are given in the Appendix C.1
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g2 = x62  x52  x2¶ 42 +¶ 52 + x32¶2  x2¶ 32   x32  x2¶ 22  ¶ 32 + x22+¶ 22  
x2+¶2 1;
g3 = x2¶ 62   x52  x2¶ 42  ¶ 52   x2¶ 32  ¶ 42   x22¶2+¶ 32 + x22+ x2¶2  x2 
¶2+1;
g4 = x31+ x
2
1  x1¶1  x1+¶1+1;
g5 = ¶ 31 + x
2
1  x1¶1  x1+¶1+1;
g6 = x1¶ 21 + x
2
1 ¶ 21  ¶1 1;
g7 = x22¶
2
2   x2¶ 22 + x22+1;
g8 = x21¶1+ x1 ¶1+1:
Note that the polynomials f11 and f21 belong to the center of the Weyl algebra A2.
Similarly, a left s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal generated by f11 = x31¶
3
2   1, and
f12 = x21¶
2
1 + x2+¶2+1 consists of the following 5 polynomials:
g1 = x32¶
6
2 +¶
9
2   x22¶ 62 + x2¶ 72  ¶ 82 + x2¶ 62 +¶ 72 +¶ 61  ¶ 62 ;
g2 = x1¶ 41   x22¶ 32 + x2¶ 42  ¶ 52   x2¶ 32  ¶ 42 +¶ 31  ¶ 32 ;
g3 = x1x2¶ 32 + x1¶
4
2 + x1¶
3
2 +¶
2
1 ;
g4 = x31¶
3
2  1;
g5 = x21¶
2
1 + x2+¶2+1:
Later, in chapter 4, we shall use these simple ways of creating ideals in Weyl
algebras for constructing hard instances of our proposed cryptosystem.
2.6 Computer Algebra Systems
In order to present our work on Gro¨bner Bases cryptosystems, we have to perform
explicit calculations with Weyl polynomials and to compute Gro¨bner bases of cer-
tain classes of ideals in Weyl algebras. For this purpose and to conclude our work,
we have to rely on available computer algebra systems that are designed for compu-
tations in Weyl algebras. Most of the time we need an efficient implementation of
Buchberger Algorithm 2.3.24 to compute complete as well as partial Gro¨bner bases
of some interesting ideals of Weyl algebras and the Division Algorithm 2.3.18 to
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compute the normal remainders of Weyl polynomials of very large size with re-
spect to these Gro¨bner bases. These algorithms and many of their applications have
been implemented in several readily available computer algebra systems (CAS).
The most important CAS available for performing efficient computations with Weyl
algebras are presented below:
(1) Singular
The CAS Singular [22] is designed for polynomial computations both in
commutative and non-commutative algebras and can also be used for work-
ing with algebraic geometry and singularity theory. Its powerful package
Plural, written by V. Levandovskyy (see [30, 31]), provides many algo-
rithms for efficient computations with certain non-commutative algebras.
Many of its non-commutative functions are available for computations in
Weyl algebras. In particular, we are interested in the following functions
for carrying out calculations related to this work:
Weyl(), groebner(), slimgb(), std(), twostd(),
NF(), options()
For the parameters, syntax and examples related to these functions, we refer
to the Singular online manual and to [22].
(2) Macaulay2
Macaulay2 is a software system developed by Daniel R. Grayson andMichael
E. Stillman [21], for computations in commutative algebra and algebraic ge-
ometry. Its package Dmodules [32], written by A. Leykin and H. Tsai,
contains efficient implementations for working with Weyl algebra and D-
modules. Among many, some of the functions that we found useful for our
work are: ideal(), gb(), and ‘%’ (an operator used for computing
normal remainders).
(3) Risa /Asir
Risa/Asir is an open source general computer algebra system written by Noro
et. al. [40]. Besides commutative rings, it also provides functions for com-
puting Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl algebras.
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(4) CoCoA /ApCoCoA
This CAS [4] is developed and maintained by the teams of L. Robbiano in
Genova (Italy) and M. Kreuzer in Passau (Germany). It was initially designed
to perform special computations in commutative algebra like computation of
border bases and Gro¨bner bases in commutative rings. ApCoCoA is based on
the computer algebra system CoCoA [11]. The ApCoCoA library contains sev-
eral packages for working with non-commutative algebras and group rings.
Our own package Weyl has been especially designed to carry out the re-
search work presented in this thesis and to perform many computations in
Weyl algebras. The functions available in this package for working with the
Weyl algebras are explained in Appendix A.
Note. Through out the thesis, we will refer to one or some of the above CAS for
describing our computational results obtained on our ‘computing machine’, that
is, the computer system with 24 GB of RAM, and having Processor: AMD Dual
Opteron 2.4 GHz. All computations are performed on this computing machine and
therefore all the timings are given accordingly.
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Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
This chapter is about some preliminary material on cryptography with emphasis
on a class of public key cryptosystems known as Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems. In
particular, we shall discuss an algebraic public key cryptosystem, the Polly Cracker
and its generalization, the commutative Gro¨bner bases cryptosystem. We describe
various known standard attacks for the cryptanalysis of these cryptosystems in the
commutative setting. We conclude the chapter by describing a more general class
of such cryptosystems that are based on Gro¨bner bases of modules over certain
non-commutative rings and hence develop a base and motivation for our new alge-
braic public key cryptosystem that is based on Gro¨bner bases in Weyl algebras and
introduced in Chapter 4
3.1 Cryptography
In this section we briefly describe cryptography and the basic components of a
modern cryptosystem with emphasis on public key cryptography. There are many
good references on the subject and among them we refer to [38], [9], and [25].
Cryptology is the science of secret communication. Using the science of cryptol-
ogy, the two parties, usually known as Alice and Bob, can share information on a
public network. That is, it is all about secret and secure communication through
insecure channels. This process of secret communication means converting origi-
nal messages or data into secret codes for transmission over a public network. The
3.1. Cryptography
original message is called ‘plaintext’ and the corresponding converted message is
known as ‘ciphertext’. When Alice wants to send a ‘plaintext’ to Bob, she con-
verts it into the corresponding ‘ciphertext’ via an encryption algorithm. After Bob
has received the ‘ciphertext’ through a public network, he decrypts it back to the
‘plaintext’ via a decryption algorithm.
This science is classified into the following two main areas:
(1) Cryptography is the part that deals with the designing of a system, known
as a cryptosystem, for the encryption and decryption of the data.
(2) Cryptanalysis is the part that deals with the breaking of such a cryptosystem
and hence checking its security from various directions.
Cryptosystems have been in use since ancient times. In fact, Julius Caesar is said to
have used the ‘shift cipher’ for secret communication with his generals. In modern
times, such cryptosystems have ‘no security’. One can use computers to break the
encryption scheme by trying all ‘possible shifts’ in a very short time. Therefore,
for designing a truly secure cryptosystem, we should have to consider an other
important third character in the process of secret sharing, the eavesdropper usually
known as Eve. That is, a cryptosystem that Alice and Bob are using for secret
communication should be such that Eve is unable to break the system by using her
complete potential. The process of an attempt for breaking a system will be called
an attack on the system.
A typical cryptosystem has following four basic components:
(1) The message space M, is the set of all possible ‘plaintext’ messages.
(2) The ciphertext spaceC, is the set of all possible encrypted messages, ‘cipher-
texts’.
(3) The encryption algorithm E, a function that maps ‘plaintext’ into its ‘cipher-
text’.
(4) The decryption algorithm D,a function that maps ‘ciphertext’ back to its cor-
responding ‘plaintext’.
Following are the two major cryptographic methods that have been used in mod-
ern cryptosystems:
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plaintext m - -ciphertext c
E D
Alice Bob
plaintext m
Figure 3.1: cryptosystem
(1) Secret Key Cryptography (SKC)
where both parties share a common secret key for encryption and decryption
processes (such as DES and AES).
(2) Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
where each party has its own secret key (such as RSA (Rivest - Shamir -
Adleman) and El Gamal)
Cryptosystems in SKC and PKC are respectively known as Symmetric Systems and
Asymmetric Systems. Although symmetric systems are usually more efficient and
faster, they have many drawbacks like security and key-management. The major
drawback of these methods is the ‘sharing of secret key’, that is, SKC requires the
prior communication of the secret key between Alice and Bob. Moreover, if Alice
has to communicate with n independent parties, she would have to take care of n
different ‘secret keys’ from all the parties. All these keys need to be shared through
a trusted and secure channel and should be saved properly. In practice, this may be
very difficult to achieve in the modern world of computers. In order to resolve such
issues, the introduction of PKC, or asymmetric systems have played an important
role in modern cryptography.
The idea of public key cryptography was first put forward by Whitfield Diffie
and Martin Hellman [14] in 1976. They introduced an encryption scheme based on
the intelligent idea of not using ‘one’ single secretly shared key for both encryption
and decryption and opened the doors of new world of modern cryptography. In the
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world of PKC, the recipient Bob has a key with two parts, namely, a public key
Q which is published to use by every one and a secret key which is kept secret.
When Alice wishes to send data to Bob, she uses Bob’s public key to encrypt the
‘plaintext’ via an encryption rule eQ and then Bob uses his secret key to decrypt
the ‘ciphertext’ via a decryption rule dQ. The idea behind a public key cryptosys-
tem is that it might be possible to find a cryptosystem where it is computationally
infeasible to determine dQ given eQ.
At the heart of this concept is the idea of using one-way function for encryption.
Recall that, a function that is easy to compute but hard to invert is often called a
one-way function. That is, a one-to-one function f : X ! Y is “one-way” if it is
easy to compute f (x) for any x 2 X but hard to compute f 1(y) for most randomly
selected y in the range of f . Although there are many injective functions that are
believe to be “one-way”, unfortunately, currently there do not exist such functions
that can be proved to be one-way. Of course, the encryption rule eQ, should not
have to be one-way from Bob’s point of view because he has to decrypt (invert) the
the ciphertext message that he receives in an efficient way. To make the inversion
process easier for Bob, we use the concept of a trapdoor function. A trapdoor
function is a function that is easy to compute in one direction, yet believed to
be difficult to compute in the opposite direction (finding its inverse) without some
special information, called the “trapdoor”.
Thus it is necessary that Bob possesses a trapdoor, that is, secret information
that permits an easy inversion of eQ for a given ciphertext. In other word, PKC is
based on a trapdoor one-way function, that is, a one-way function but it becomes
easy to invert with the knowledge of certain trapdoor (the “secret” key).
Many public-key cryptosystems have already been proposed and implemented
since 1976. Among them, the most important are, RSA, Elliptic-Curve Cryptogra-
phy (ECC), and the El Gamal cryptosystem. The two most commonly used cryp-
tosystems mentioned here, namely RSA and El Gamal, are respectively based on
integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Both problems are consid-
ered to be hard to solve for chosen parameters for the corresponding cryptosystem.
The drawback of these cryptosystems is that, with the increase in computing power
and development of modern computers, the parameters of these cryptosystems need
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to be modified for achieving a reasonable level of security. The NP-completeness
or NP-hardness of these problems has not been proven yet. In fact, in 1999, Peter
Shor has discovered a polynomial time algorithm for both the integer-factorization
and the discrete logarithm on ‘quantum computers’. This motivates researchers to
search for cryptosystems that are based on computationally infeasible problems. In
the next section, we shall describe a general public-key cryptosystem Polly Cracker
that is introduced by Fellows and Koblitz [25] (Chapter 5, x3). The security of this
cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of solving a system of algebraic equations.
Note that, the problem of ‘polynomial system solving’ over some finite field is in
general an NP-hard problem (see for instance [29]).
3.2 The Polly Cracker Cryptosystems
Before we describe the multivariate algebraic cryptosystem Polly Cracker, and in
general, the commutativeGro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem, let us first fix some notation
for subsequent use: Let P = Fq[x1; : : : ;xn] be polynomial ring in n indeterminates
over a finite field Fq with q = pe for some prime number p and e > 0. Let xa
denote xa11   xann , and for a = (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Nn, we write jaj = a1 +   +an.
The elements of the form xa in P are called terms. Let Tn be the monoid of all
terms in P, i.e. Tn = fxa j a = (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Nng. For the basic form of Polly
Cracker cryptosystem (PCC), as introduced by Fellows and Koblitz, we assume that
the plaintext units are represented as elements of the field Fq. In order to receive
a message m 2 Fq from Alice, Bob chooses his secret key by selecting a random
element (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Fnq and his public key is the ideal J generated by a set Q =
fp1; : : : ; psg of polynomials in P such that p j(a1; : : : ;an) = 0; for all j = 1; : : : ;s.
For sending a messagem, Alice chooses a random element å
j
p j q j of the ideal J and
sends an element c = m+å
j
p j q j to Bob. Finally, Bob recovers m by evaluating c
at (a1; : : : ;an). To sum up we have the following:
Cryptosystem 3.2.1 (Polly Cracker). Let K = Fq be a finite field, where q = pe
with a prime number p and e > 0. Let P = K[x1; : : : ;xn] be a commutative poly-
nomial ring. Choose a point (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Fnq. Let I be the ideal generated by
fx1  a1; : : : ;xn  ang. Choose polynomials p1; : : : ; ps 2 I, i.e. for all i = 1; : : : ;s,
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pi(a1; : : : ;an) = 0. The basic Polly Cracker cryptosystem is then constructed as
follows:
(1) Public key: A set Q= fp1; : : : ; psg of polynomials in P.
(2) Secret key: A common zero (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Fnq of polynomials in Q.
(3) Message Space: The message space isM = Fq, i.e. plaintext units are ele-
ments of Fq.
(4) Ciphertext Space: The ciphertext units are polynomials in P.
(4) Encryption: For encrypting a plaintext message m in Fq, the ciphertext c is
computed as:
c= m+h1p1+   +hsps;
with suitably chosen h1; : : : ;hs in P.
(5) Decryption: The Evaluation of c at the common zero (a1; : : : ;an) yields m,
i.e. c(a1; : : : ;cn) = m.
Remark 3.2.2. It is easy for Bob to construct a pair (a;Q), where a = (a1; : : : ;an)
is the secret key in Fn and Q is the public key. For example, he can randomly
choose an a 2 Fn and arbitrary polynomials h j, and sets q j = h j  h j(a). On the
other hand, for the security of the secret key a, it should be hard to find out common
zero of public polynomials in Q. Constructing a pair (a;Q) for a secure system is
a non trivial matter. If attacker knows the Gro¨bner basis G = fg1; : : : ;grg of the
ideal J generated by the polynomials in the set Q, he can break the cryptosystem by
computing normal form of ciphertext c with respect to G = (g1; : : : ;gs).
In [25], Koblitz suggested some concrete instances of Cryptosystem 3.2.1 for
some combinatorial problems like Graph 3-Coloring and Graph Perfect Code. The
Polly cracker based on such NP-hard problems are also known as combinatorial-
algebraic cryptosystems. In the next section we shall explain the cryptanalysis of
PCC.
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3.3 Cryptanalysis of Polly Cracker
Although the Cryptosystem 3.2.1 is based on the NP-hard problem of polynomial
system solving over a finite field, it turned out that constructing practically hard
instances is very difficult and is an involved task. Note here that, for encrypting
a message m, Alice has to randomly choose polynomials h1; : : : ;hs 2 P such that
the resulting ciphertext c, should be ‘random-looking’. This choice of polynomials
should be such that:
 the ciphertext c should be random-looking
 the message m should be well hidden in the sum m+ p1 h1+   + ps hs.
 monomials/terms used in h1; : : : ;hs should not ‘shine-through’ the cipher-
text c.
For building a concrete instance of the Polly cracker cryptosystem 3.2.1, all these
tasks are rather involved. Therefore, a weakly constructed ciphertext can be broken
easily with the standard attacks proposed by the cryptanalysts. For details, we refer
to ([25], Chapter 5), [48], [49], [23], and [50]. Here, we describe these attacks
briefly and later we shall refer to these attacks again to discuss the security of our
proposed cryptosystem against these attacks.
3.4 The Chosen Ciphertext Attack
In [48], Steinwandt and Geiselmann describe this attack for the basic Polly Cracker
scheme to reveal the secret key and hence completely compromising the security of
the encryption scheme. The main assumption of the attack is that the attacker, Eve,
has temporary access to Bob’s decryption black box i.e. Eve is able to decrypt the
finite number of ciphertext messages that she sends, without actually knowing Bob’s
secret key. This attack is most serious in the sense that it recovers the complete
secret key and hence the attacker can successfully decrypt any stolen ciphertext
message. The idea is to send a fake ciphertext to the decryption black box and
recover the Bob’s original secret key. The attack works as follows:
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Attack 3.4.1. The Chosen Ciphertext Attack
Assume that, instead of a ciphertext polynomial c = m+
s
å
j=1
h j p j, Alice sends to
Bob, a “fake ciphertext”,
c0i = xi+
s
å
j=1
hi j p j with i= 1; : : : ;s , and hi j 2 Fq[X ]
Then, the specification of Polly Cracker gives no hint on how Bob can distinguish
such a “fake” ciphertext from a correct one, i.e., from a ciphertext of the form
c= m+
s
å
j=1
h j p j with m 2 Fq and h1; : : : ;hs 2 P= Fq[X ]
Now, the decryption of this fake ciphertext is the evaluation of c0i at the common
zero (a1; : : : ;an), i.e.
c0i(a1; : : : ;an) = xi(a1; : : : ;an)+
s
å
j=1
hi j p j(a1; : : : ;an) = ai:
Hence, learning the plaintext corresponding to c0i determines the i-th coordinate of
the Bob’s secret key a2Fnq. Hence learning the plaintexts corresponding to n chosen
“fake” ciphertexts c01; : : : ;c
0
n is enough for Alice to reveal the Bob’s complete secret
key a.
To defeat this attack, it has been suggested to design a decryption algorithm that
can recognise “fake” ciphertext messages. For the basic Polly Cracker encryption
scheme, there seems to be no straightforward way to recognise fake ciphertext poly-
nomials c0i as they are valid ciphertexts. Therefore, this encryption scheme is not
secure against such kind of attacks.
3.5 The Linear Algebra Attack
In [25], Koblitz explained a linear algebra attack for breaking Cryptosystem 3.7.2
and all its special cases. Basically, the attacker looks for the weaknesses in the con-
struction of the ciphertext c and success of the attack will recover the corresponding
plaintext m that Alice has sent to Bob. The idea of the attack is to reconstruct the
polynomials h1; : : : ;hs that Bob has used for the encryption. The attack works as
follows:
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In the equation
c= m+h1 p1+   +hs ps;
the eavesdropper, Eve, regards the polynomial coefficients h1; : : : ;hs, respectively,
as the polynomials h01; : : : ;h
0
s of P = K[X ] of degree less than or equal to d =
deg(c)  dp , where dp = maxfdeg(pi); i = 1; : : : ;sg and regards the message con-
stant m as an unknown constant m0 2 Fq. She then formulates a linear system of
equations using
c0 = m0+h01p1+   +h0sps
and then equating the coefficients in c and c0. Let do be the initial guess for the
degree dh of the polynomials h01; : : : ;h
0
s that Bob has used for the encryption. To
break the Polly Cracker, an attacker has to implement the following attack.
Attack 3.5.1. The Linear Algebra Attack
For an instance of the basic Polly Cracker cryptosystem, the linear algebra attack
works as follows:
Input: c 2 P, Q= fp1; : : : ; psg  P.
Output: m 2M = Fq, the element of the message spaceM .
(1) Initialize, d := (deg(c) dp).
(2) For i = 1; : : : ;s, write the polynomials h0i = Sjajd bi jxa 2 P with indetermi-
nate coefficients bi j, where xa = x
a1
1   xann and jaj = a1+   +an. Let m0
be the unknown message m, and compute c0 = å
i
h0ipi+m0.
(3) By equating monomial terms in c and c0 formulate a system of linear equa-
tions in unknowns bi j; and m0.
(4) Solve the above system of linear equations for finding the values of bi j and
m0.
Case-1 If the system has a solution then return m0.
Case-2 If system has no solution then
(i) Replace d by (d+1),
(ii) go to Step (2).
We illustrate the attack by the following example.
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Example 3.5.2. Let us now consider an instance of Polly Cracker with P=F19[x1;x2].
Let the public key be Q= fp1; p2g with
p1 = 7x31x2+6x
2
1+4x1x2+ x
2
2+8x1+2x2 3
p2 =  5x31x2+7x21x2+4x1x22 5x1x2+6x22+9x1+4x2+5
For encrypting the message m= 8, let us choose
h1 =  2x1x2+2x1+5; h2 = x1+ x2+7:
We compute the ciphertext c= h1p1+h2p2+m and get the polynomial
c = 5x41x
2
2 5x31x22 5x21x22+2x1x32 7x31+8x21x2 4x1x22+6x32  x21 6x22 
3x1+5x2+9
Now, for reconstructing the polynomials h1;h2 and recovering the message m = 8,
the attacker, Eve, can apply the Attack 3.5 as follows:
By setting d = 2 as the initial degree for the polynomials h01 and h
0
2 and by setting
these polynomials as
h01 = b11x
2
1+b12x1x2+b13x
2
2+b14x1+b15x2+b16
h02 = b21x
2
1+b22x1x2+b23x
2
2+b24x1+b25x2+b26
she obtains the general ciphertext polynomial c0 = h01p1+h
0
2p2+m0 as
c0 = 7b11x51x2   5b21x51x2 + 7b12x41x22   5b22x41x22 + 7b13x31x32   5b23x31x32 + 7b14x41x2  
5b24x41x2+7b21x
4
1x2+7b15x
3
1x
2
2 5b25x31x22+7b22x31x22+4b21x31x22+7b23x21x32+4b22x21x32+
4b23x1x42+6b11x
4
1+7b16x
3
1x2+6b12x
3
1x2+4b11x
3
1x2 5b26x31x2+7b24x31x2 5b21x31x2+
6b13x21x
2
2+4b12x
2
1x
2
2+b11x
2
1x
2
2+7b25x
2
1x
2
2+4b24x
2
1x
2
2 5b22x21x22+6b21x21x22+4b13x1x32+
b12x1x32+4b25x1x
3
2 5b23x1x32+6b22x1x32+b13x42+6b23x42+6b14x31+8b11x31+9b21x31+
6b15x21x2+4b14x
2
1x2+8b12x
2
1x2+2b11x
2
1x2+7b26x
2
1x2 5b24x21x2+9b22x21x2+4b21x21x2+
4b15x1x22+b14x1x
2
2+8b13x1x
2
2+2b12x1x
2
2+4b26x1x
2
2 5b25x1x22+6b24x1x22+9b23x1x22+
4b22x1x22 + b15x
3
2 + 2b13x
3
2 + 6b25x
3
2 + 4b23x
3
2 + 6b16x
2
1 + 8b14x
2
1   3b11x21 + 9b24x21 +
5b21x21+4b16x1x2+8b15x1x2+2b14x1x2 3b12x1x2 5b26x1x2+9b25x1x2+4b24x1x2+
5b22x1x2 + b16x22 + 2b15x
2
2   3b13x22 + 6b26x22 + 4b25x22 + 5b23x22 + 8b16x1   3b14x1 +
9b26x1+5b24x1+2b16x2 3b15x2+4b26x2+5b25x2 3b16+5b26+m0
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Equating the corresponding coefficients with the original ciphertext c, she then gets
the following system of linear equations in the unknowns b11; : : : ;b16; b21; : : : ;b26;m0
7b11 5b21 = 0; 7b12 5b22 = 5; 7b13 5b23 = 0;
7b14+7b21 5b24 = 5;
7b15+4b21+7b22 5b25 = 5;
4b22+7b23 = 0;
4b23 = 0; 6b11 = 0;
4b11+6b12+7b16 5b21+7b24 5b26 = 0;
b11+4b12+6b13+6b21 5b22+4b24+7b25 = 5;
b12+4b13+6b22 5b23+4b25 = 2;
b13+6b23 = 0;
8b11+6b14+9b21 = 0;
 3b14+8b16+5b24+9b26 = 3;
2b11+8b12+4b14+6b15+4b21+9b22 5b24+7b26 = 0;
2b12+8b13+b14+4b15+4b22+9b23+6b24 5b25+4b26 = 6;
2b13+b15+4b23+6b25 = 6;
 3b11+8b14+6b16+5b21+9b24 = 2;
 3b12+2b14+8b15+4b16+5b22+4b24+9b25 5b26 = 4;
 3b13+2b15+b16+5b23+4b25+6b26 = 6;
 3b15+2b16+5b25+4b26 = 5;
 3b16+5b26+m0 = 9:
By solving this system, she then gets
b11 = 0; b12 = 2; b13 = 0; b14 = 2; b15 = 0; b16 = 5;
b21 = 0; b22 = 0; b23 = 0; b24 = 1; b25 = 1; b26 = 7;
andm0= 8. This recovers the original messagem=m0= 8 and also the polynomials
used for the encryption.
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The linear system of equations obtained this way can be easily made infeasible
to solve by choosing various parameters as suggested in Notation 3.7.4. For ex-
ample, as stated in [25] (see Ch. 5 x6), if c and pi are “sparse” polynomials then
method in this general form is exponential time. However, Koblitz [25] cited a pri-
vate communication with H. W. Lenstra Jr. and proposed a modified form of Attack
3.5.1 and call it “intelligent” linear algebra attack.
3.6 Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack
The “intelligent” linear algebra attack was roughly suggested by H.W. Lenstra Jr
([25], Chapter 5). The attack is based on a simple technique of reducing the number
of unknowns in the linear system of equations obtained by the linear algebra attack.
To explain the attack, we define a set
D= ft 2 Tn j 9 tp 2
s[
i=1
Supp(pi); s.t. t  tp = tc for some tc 2 Supp(c)g:
Roughly speaking, D is the set of all terms that Bob can potentially use for the poly-
nomials h1; : : : ;hs in the encryption process. Using this refined form, the attacker
proceeds as follows:
Attack 3.6.1. The “Intelligent” Linear Algebra Attack
Input: c 2 P, Q= fp1; : : : ; psg  P.
Output: m 2M = Fq, the element of the message spaceM .
(1) Initialize, d := (deg(c) dp).
(2) Compute the set of candidate terms of degree at most d in h1: : : : ;hs
D= ft 2 Tn j 9 tp 2
s[
i=1
Supp(pi) s.t. t  tp = tc
for some tc 2 Supp(c) and deg(t) dg:
(3) Let h0i = å
t2D
bi j t 2 P with unknown coefficients bi j and let m0 2 Fq be the
unknown message m, and compute c0 = å
i
h0i pi+m0.
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(4) By equating monomial terms in c and c0 formulate a system of linear equa-
tions in unknown coefficients bi j, and the unknown m0.
(5) Solve the above system of equations by using linear algebra.
Case-1 If the system has a solution then return the plaintext message m= m0.
Case-2 If the system has no solution then replace d by d+1 and go to Step 2.
Remark 3.6.2. Note that the Linear Algebra Attack 3.5.1 will not be feasible if the
ciphertext and public polynomials are of very large degree, whereas the intelligent
linear algebra attack is very efficient when we have high degree and sparse input
polynomials. We also remark here that, the denser the ciphertext polynomial c is,
the more difficult the intelligent linear algebra attack will be to apply since this
would increase the size of the set D in the Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack 3.6.1.
Therefore, we expect to have more unknowns in the linear system obtained in this
case.
We illustrate Attack 3.6.1 in the following example using our implementation
of the attack in ApCoCoA (see B.2).
Example 3.6.3. Let us apply the intelligent linear algebra attack to the instance of
Polly Cracker given in Example 3.5.2, Since deg(c) = 6, we have d = 6  4 = 2,
and the set D turns out to be
D= fx21; x1x2; x22; x1; x2; 1g;
containing 6 candidate terms for the polynomials h01 and h
0
2. Therefore, by setting
h01 = b11x
2
1+b12x1x2+b13x
2
2+b14x1+b15x2+b16;
h02 = b21x
2
1+b22x1x2+b23x
2
2+b24x1+b25x2+b26;
and representing the unknown message by m0, we compute c0 = h01 p1+h
0
2 p2+m
0.
As explained in Example 3.5.2, by equating monomials terms in c and c0, we obtain
a linear system of 22 equations in 13 unknowns. By solving this system, we recover
the messagem=m0= 8 by using the package LinBox of the CAS ApCoCoA in 0.15
seconds of CPU time on our computing machine.
51
3.6. Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack
Note that, the Linear Algebra Attack applied to this instance of Polly Cracker
was resulted in a linear system of size 2813, (see Example 3.5.2) which is almost
the same size as we have obtained now by applying the intelligent attack. This is
what we have explained in Remark 3.6.2, that when the input polynomials for the at-
tack are dense then the ‘intelligent’ technique of reducing the number of unknowns
for the resulting system of linear equations is not much effective. As we have seen
in this example, the set D contains all the terms of degree less than or equal to
d = deg(c) dp = 2 and therefore, the above linear system has 13 unknowns, 6 for
each of h01 and h
0
2 and one is m
0 for the message.
To see the effectiveness of this attack, let us now check how the attack works
when the input polynomials are sparse. For instance, if we use h1 = 2x211 + 5 and
h2 = x211 +7 for encryption, then the ciphertext polynomial c= h1 p1+h2 p2+8
has degree 24 and # Supp(c) = 14. Therefore, the expected degree d = 24 4= 20
for the polynomials h01; h
0
2 and hence, now the following set
D= fx201 ; x191 x2; x191 ; x181 x2; x21x2; x1x22; x21; x1x2; x22; x1; x2; 1g
contains 12 candidate terms for each polynomial hi. Hence, after executing Step (3)
and (4) of ‘intelligent’ Attack 3.6.1, we get a linear system of 43 equations in 25
unknowns. This system has no solution, as the degree d = 20 is not sufficient
for the polynomials h01 and h
0
2, since both of the polynomials actually used for the
encryption are of degree 21 and there is highest degree term has cancelled in c. As
suggested in Step (5-ii), we replace d by d+1 = 21 and this results in addition of
three more terms in the set D. That is, this time
D= fx211 ; x201 x2; x191 x22; x201 ; x191 x2; x191 ; x181 x2; x21x2; x1x22; x21; x1x2; x22; x1; x2; 1g;
contains 15 candidate terms for each h01 and h
0
2. Hence, again after Step (3) and (4),
we now get a system of linear equations of size 50 31 and recover the message
m = m0 = 8 in 0:74 seconds of CPU time on our computing machine using CAS
ApCoCoA.
In contrast, if we apply the Linear Algebra Attack, as explained in Example
3.5.2, to this instance of Polly Cracker, with d = 20, we get a linear system of
equations of size 325463. After replacing d by d+1= 21, the resulting system of
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linear equations has size 351507 and this time we recover the messagem=m0= 8
in 62:3 seconds of CPU time on our computing machine using CAS ApCoCoA.
Remark 3.6.4. In [25], to defeat Attack 3.6.1, the cited private communication also
suggested that Bob must carefully build at least one term t 0 into at least one h j such
that t 0 times any term in p j is cancelled in the entire sum åh j p j. Moreover, terms
t 0 with this property should not be too few or easy to guess, since otherwise the
cryptanalyst would simply adjoin those terms to D.
The cryptanalysis of some special instances of Polly Cracker cryptosystems is
also possible by several other methods of attacks. These attacks are either variants
of linear algebra attacks or rely on the structural weaknesses of the Polly Cracker
encryption schemes, like evaluation of the polynomials at a common zero. That
is, evaluation of polynomials can also leak significant information about the secret
key. We refer to [49], [23], and [35] for details on these attacks. In the next section
we will describe the generalised form of the Polly Cracker cryptosystem and study
its security against these standard attacks.
3.7 Commutative Gro¨bnr Basis Cryptosystems
The PCC has soon been generalised to Commutative Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
by replacing the underlying NP-hard problem of polynomial system solving by the
EXPSPACE-hard problem of computing Gro¨bner bases of ideals in a commutative
polynomial ring. For the theory of Gro¨bner basis of ideals in commutative polyno-
mial rings we refer to [27].
Let K be a finite field and let P = K[x1; : : : ;xn] be a polynomial ring in n inde-
terminates over the field K. Using the notation of Section 3.2, let Tn be the set of
all terms in P which form the K-vector space basis of the ring P. The term ordering
on Tn is defined as follows in the setting of P.
Definition 3.7.1. A complete ordering s on Tn is called a term ordering if it has
the following properties:
(1) An inequality xa <s xa
0
implies
xa+a
00
<s xa
0+a 00
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for all a;a 0;a 00 2 Nn.
(2) The ordering s is well-founded, i.e. we have 1<s t for all t 2 Tn nf1g.
Then, in the Gro¨bner basis setting, the secret key is replaced by the Gro¨bner
basis G = fg1; : : : ;gtg of an ideal I  P and the public key is the ideal J = hQi
generated by the set Q = fp1; : : : ; psg  I. Further, we denote the complement of
the set of leading terms of the ideal I by Os (I). The message space M is then
either entire set Os (I) or a subset of it. That is, messages are polynomials in P that
cannot be reduced modulo the Gro¨bner basis G. With these ingredients, we define
the commutative Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem (CGBC) as follows:
Cryptosystem 3.7.2. Commutative Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem: Let P be a com-
mutative polynomials ring over a field K and let s be a term ordering on Tn. Let
I  P be an ideal of P having a Gro¨bner basis G = fg1; : : : ;grg with respect to s
and let G = (g1; : : : ;gr) . Then a CGBC is constructed as follows:
1. Public key: The set Q= fp1; : : : ; psg of polynomials in the ideal I  P such
that the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hQi is infeasible to compute.
2. Secret key: Gro¨bner basis G= fg1; : : : ;grg of the ideal I  P.
3. Message Space: The setM of all polynomials that cannot be reduced mod-
ulo the Gro¨bner basis G.
4. Encryption: The ‘plaintext’ message m 2M  Os (I) is encrypted as:
c= m+h1p1+   +hsps
with suitably chosen h1; : : : ;hs in P.
5. Decryption: The normal remainder of the polynomial c with respect to the
tuple G = (g1; : : : ;gr) yields m. That is, NRs ;G (c) = m
Remark 3.7.3. In this setting, again it is very easy for Bob to choose a pair (G;Q)
for constructing an instance of a CGBC. For example, after choosing a Gro¨bner
basis G of an ideal I  P, in order to choose the set Q= fp j j j = 1; : : : ;sg of poly-
nomials in the ideal I, he can choose for each j = 1; : : : ;s, an arbitrary polynomial
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h j 2 P and set p j = h j NRG(h j). His public key is then the set Q I of polyno-
mials p1; : : : ; ps. On the other hand, for the security of CGBC he has to make sure
that a Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J generated by the polynomials in the public key Q
should be hard to compute. Of course, it is not the only thing on which the security
of CGBC relies. Later we shall see that, as in the case of Polly Cracker cryptosys-
tems, the cryptanalysis of CGBC is also possible by using the attacks where the
attacker does not have to compute a Gro¨bner basis or a complete Gro¨bner basis.
Notation 3.7.4 (CGBC Parameters:). The Polly Cracker cryptosystem 3.2.1 is
a special case of CGBC. In order to use a CGBC, one has to consider following
parameters for its construction:
 p, the characteristic of the field K,
 n, the number of indeterminates of the ring P,
 s, the number of polynomials in the public key Q,
 dp =maxfdeg(pi) j pi 2 Qg, and
 dh =maxfdeg(hi) j1 i sg, and
 dc, the degree of the ciphertext c.
Although the security of the Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems relies on the fact that
the computation of Gro¨bner bases of ideals in commutative polynomial rings is,
in general, EXPSPACE-hard (see [53] x21.7 ). Unfortunately, the cryptanalysis
of these cryptosystems can be carried out not only by using the attacks where an
attacker does not need to compute a Gro¨bner basis, but also by using another attack,
proposed by T. Mora et. al. [8], where the attacker can compute a successful partial
Gro¨bner basis. We describe this attack in the next section. The existence of these
attacks prompted T. Mora and others to conjecture that the ideal membership cannot
be used to construct a public key cryptosystem. Let us now study the security issues
of CGBC against known standard attacks.
Remark 3.7.5. (Linear Algebra Attacks on CGBC) For an instance of a CGBC,
the Basic Linear Algebra Attack 3.5 and the Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack 3.6
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work exactly the same way as for the basic Polly Cracker cryptosystem with one
exception. In this case, instead of representing the plaintext message by an unknown
constant m0 2 Fq, we let m0 = åmixa as a polynomial m0 of the message space
M with indeterminate coefficients mi. We can then create the linear system of
equations in the unknowns bi j and mi and recover the plaintext message m= m0 by
solving that linear system of equations. Again, the basic linear algebra attack can
be easily made infeasible to work by appropriately setting the CGBC-parameters n
and dc. Therefore, the only serious linear algebra attack is the “intelligent” Attack
3.6.1. To defeat the attack various suggestions have been proposed (see for instance
Remark 3.6.4 and [51]) but there do not exist concrete instances of CGBC where
infeasibility of this attack can be checked.
3.8 Attack By Partial Gro¨bner Basis
In [8], an other attack was proposed for the standard Polly Cracker cryptosystem
3.2.1 and its generalised form CGBC 3.7.2. The idea of the attack is based on
a result from [13], cited in [8]. It states that if a polynomial is constructed by
adding multiples h j p j of elements in an ideal, where the degree of h j p j is known
to be bounded by D, then in testing Ideal Membership by means of a Gro¨bner basis
one can ignore steps in the algorithm involving polynomials of degree greater than
D. This, essentially means the following: Let I = hp1; : : : ; psi be the ideal in the
commutative polynomial ring P and let s be a degree compatible term ordering on
Tn. If the polynomial f 2 P be such that deg( f ) D and f = å j h j p j+NRs ;G ( f )
with deg(h j p j)D holds. Then for deciding the ideal membership of f in the ideal
I, do not compute a Gro¨bner basis of I, but run Buchberger Algorithm modified to
compute H such that each computation involving polynomials of degree higher
than D is not performed. Then the NRs ;G ( f ) can be computed by reduction of f
via the partial Gro¨bner basisH .
This idea of using a partial Gro¨bner basis for computing normal remainder can
be used for trying to break an instance of CGBC and to reveal the plaintext message
m. First, note that the attacker, Eve knows the public polynomials p1; : : : ; ps, the
ciphertext polynomials c 2 P, the message spaceM and the fact that m= NRG (c)
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where G = (g1; : : : ;gr) is secret. Moreover, because of the uniqueness of NRG (c),
she does not need to find out actual polynomials h1; : : : ;hs which are used by Alice
for encrypting the plaintext message m. In fact, any other choice of polynomials
h01; : : : ;h
0
s 2 P for which c=m+åh0i pi holds is equally fine for her. Therefore, she
can think for the representation c= NRG(c)+åh0i pi and hence has to estimate the
maximal degree
d =maxfdeg(h0i pi) j i= 1; : : : ;sg:
This estimation could be dc, the degree of the ciphertext polynomial c. If there is no
cancellation in the top part of the sum åhi pi then this will be the right estimation
otherwise, d will be some number greater than dc. We now summarize the method
of this attack as follows:
Attack 3.8.1. The Partial Gro¨bner Basis Attack
Given an instance of CGBC, with public polynomials p1; : : : ; ps and the ciphertext
polynomial c 2 P. Let J be the ideal generated by fp1; : : : ; psg and let the term
ordering s be degree compatible. Then for the partial Gro¨bner basis attack, the
attacker, Eve performs the following steps to reveal the corresponding plaintext
message m 2M .
(1) Estimate the maximal degree d =maxfdeg(h0ipi)g of the summands in a rep-
resentation c= NRs ;G (c)+åsi=1 h0ipi for which deg(h0i pi) deg(c) holds.
(2) Run the Buchberger Algorithm on fp1; : : : ; prg modified such that all oper-
ations involving polynomials of degree larger than d are not performed. The
output will be a partial Gro¨bner basisH of the ideal J.
(3) Using the Division Algorithm, compute the normal remainder, r = NRs ;H (c).
If r 2M then r is the required plaintext message m. Otherwise, increase d
by one and repeat steps (2) and (3).
In step (1) of the above attack, the representation
c= NRs ;G(c)+
s
å
i=1
h0i pi for which deg(h
0
i pi) deg(c)
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always exist (see [27] Proposition 2.1.1). Further, in the commutative setting, for
the element c in the polynomial ideals, most of the times, it is not so difficult to
generate enough Gro¨bner basis elements for the desired representation of c to ex-
ist. Therefore, theoretically, this attack seems to be very serious for the security of
CGBC. In [8], where this attack was introduced, it has been described theoretically
with the assumption that ‘the polynomials in the public key are low-degee dense
polynomials’. No experimental data is given to realize the effectiveness and the
success of this attack when applied to some concrete cases. How the attack will
work when these polynomials are not dense or when the degree bound for comput-
ing a partial Gro¨bner basis is very large? Is it always feasible to compute a partial
Gro¨bner basis for a degree bound that is necessary for the success of this attack?
In order to answer such questions and to examine the effectiveness and the success
of this attack against a concrete instance of CGBC, it would be helpful to have a
concrete public key and some ciphertexts available. Later, in Chapter 5, we shall ex-
amine the feasibility of this kind of attack when applied to some concrete instances
of our proposed cryptosystem.
3.9 Chosen Ciphertext Attack and CGBC
The chosen ciphertext attack of Section 3.4 also applies to the case of CGBC. As ex-
plained earlier, to use the attack and to to break the cryptosystem, an attacker should
have temporary access to the decryption algorithm. That is the attacker, Eve should
be able to decrypt a limited number of “fake” ciphertext messages that she sends,
without actually knowing Bob’s secret key. The attack in the setting that we are go-
ing to describe here was originally introduced by Bulygin [10] for attacking Rai’s
non-commutative Polly Cracker cryptosystem [41] but it also applies to CGBC. It is
based on the fact that, given an ideal I of a polynomial ring P= K[x1; : : : ;xn] and a
term ordering s on Tn, if G = (g1; : : : ;gr) is a s -Gro¨bner basis of I then we always
have
NRs ;G (LTs (gi)) = LTs (gi) gi:
Further, we assume that Eve knows or able to guess the leading terms of the secret
polynomials in G = (g1; : : : ;gr). She then setup some “fake” ciphertext messages
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c0i of the form å j h0i j p j +LTs (gi). Using her temporary access to the decryption
algorithm, she can then reveal complete secret key by decrypting each c0i. For the
sake of completeness, below we describe this attack in the setting of CGBC.
Attack 3.9.1. Chosen Ciphertext Attack For CGBC
Let P = K[x1; : : : ;xn] be a polynomial ring and let s be a term ordering on Tn.
Consider an instance of a CGBC with the secret keyG= fg1; : : : ;grg and the public
key Q= fp1; : : : ; psg. For i= 1; : : : ;r, let gi = ti+hi; with ti = LTs (gi) and note
that ti does not divide any monomial in hi. Suppose that the attacker, Eve knows
or can guess these leading terms of the polynomials g1; : : : ;gr 2 G and that she
has temporary access to the decryption black box and can decrypt finite number of
encrypted messages of her choice. Now she can recover the original secret key G
by using the chosen ciphertext attack as follows:
For each i= 1; : : : ;r, she prepares “fake” ciphertext messages c0i of the form
c0i = ti+å
j
h0i j p j
by randomly choosing the polynomials h0i j 2 P. Then the basic set up of CGBC can
give Bob no idea on how he can distinguish this fake ciphertext from the original
one, i.e. from c= m+h1 p1 +    +hs ps.
Now by using her access to the decryption algorithm, she decrypts these fake
ciphertext polynomials c0i. For each i= 1; : : : ;r, we have NRs ;G (å j h0i j p j) = 0. As
a result, for each i, she gets
NRs ;G (ci) = hi:
And then by recombining, she recovers gi = ti+hi.
Note that the success of this attack completely reveals the Bob’s secret key and
hence the attacker can then decrypt any ciphertext c = m+ h1 p1 +   + hs ps to
recover the plaintext message m. The attack in this form also remains valid for the
general non-commutative Gro¨bner basis Cryptosystem presented in [1].
In [42], T. Rai and S. Bulygin have proposed certain countermeasures to de-
feat Attack 3.9.1. We will come to these countermeasure while discussing security
issues of our proposed cryptosystems in Chapter 5. The idea is not to make the
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complete set Os (I) = PnLTs (I) public. That is, the message space,M should not
equal to Os (I) rather it should be a small subset of Os (I). In this way, it will not
be difficult for Bob to detect fake ciphertext polynomials c0i by publishing a subset
M Os (I) such that the set
(Os (I)nM )\Supp(gi) 6= /0 for all i= 1; : : : ;r:
Then modify the decryption algorithm to return an error message whenever
NRs ;G (c) =2M :
For further details we refer to [42].
3.10 General Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
The successful cryptanalysis of specific instances of the Polly Cracker encryption
scheme has put the security of CGBC in a great doubt. Except for the linear al-
gebra attack, most of the other attacks are known to work only in the special case,
that is, Polly Cracker. We call it a special case in the sense that the secret key is
a tuple (a1; : : : ;an) 2 Kn, where K is a finite field and decryption is achieved by
evaluating the ciphertext at this tuple which is supposed to be common zero of the
polynomials in the public key (see Section 3.2). No further concrete hard instances
of CGBC have been investigated or presented to confirm the failure of such cryp-
tosystems. This, motivates researchers in this area to investigate other algebraic
structures for constructing Gro¨bner basis type cryptosystems that might be secure
against standard attacks or to use different strategies for encryption to make these
attacks impossible to work. Among these tries, most prominent are the following
attempts:
 Le Van Ly’s Polly Two (see [35], an invariant of Polly Cracker scheme with
the advantage that the usual linear algebra attacks do not work. Sine the at-
tacks based on linear algebra (see 3.5 and 3.6) appeared to be most serious
attacks on both the Polly Cracker cryptosystem and CGBC, it seems that in
Polly Two, the only choice left for the attacker, Eve is to compute a possibly
hard Gro¨bner basis. In [34] some concrete hard instances of Polly Two are
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given that are assumed to be difficult to break but, unfortunately, these in-
stances have been successfully broken by R. Steinwandt using a side channel
attack [47].
 T. Rai’sNon-commutative Polly Cracker Cryptosystems, where to prevent
linear algebra attacks, it has been suggested to construct Gro¨bner basis cryp-
tosystems based on two-sided ideals in non-commutative polynomial rings
(see [41]). In its original setting, non-commutative Polly cracker cryptosys-
tems are vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks described in Section 3.4.1.
To defeat this attack, various countermeasures are suggested in [42]. More-
over, the explicit instances of this cryptosystem given in [41] are based on
principal ideals of free non-commutative associative algebras. It has been
argued that the Gro¨bner basis of such principal non-commutative ideals can
be infinite but, it is easy to compute and describe, and that the principal ide-
als might allow the easy recovery of the secret key by using the ‘factoring
attack’.
 The Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems (GBC) introduced by Ackermann and
Kreuzer. This is a most general class of Gro¨bner basis type cryptosystems.
These cryptosystems are based on the theory of Gro¨bner basis of modules
over general non-commutative rings.
Remark 3.10.1. The security of this general class of GBC is strongly based on the
difficulty of computing Gro¨bner bases of modules over non-commutative rings (see
[1]). In general, the computation of Gro¨bner basis is EXPSPACE-hard. The advan-
tage of using modules instead of ideals of the ring is that one can encode hard com-
binatorial or number theoretic problems in the action of the terms on the canonical
basis vectors. Following well known cryptosystems are contained as special cases
in this general class of GBC:
 RSA (Rivest-Shamir- Adelmann) cryptosystem,
 ElGamal cryptosystem,
 Polly Cracker and (commutative) GBC,
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 Polly 2,
 Braid group cryptosystem (see [3]), and
 Rai’s non-commutative Polly cracker cryptosystem.
In [1] the security issues of general Gro¨bner bases cryptosystems are also addressed
and it is claimed that GBC are secure against various known standard attacks de-
scribed in Section 3.3.
Being described in a “general” setting, it is important to construct a “Spe-
cial Class” of such GBC with specific hard instances. Here we will not describe
the complete theory of Gro¨bner basis of modules over general non-commutative
monoid rings nor we explain GBC in this general setting. Instead we refer to [1] for
details and use the idea of GBC to propose a new cryptosystem. For the design and
implementation of this special class of cryptosystems we shall use Weyl Algebras
(see Chapter 2) as base rings. In the next chapter, we will describe these “Weyl
Gro¨bner basis Cryptosystems (WGBC)”.
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Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
In this chapter we will introduce cryptosystems which are special cases of the fol-
lowing Cryptosystem 4.1.1. This class of new cryptosystems is adapted from the
very general setting of Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems 3.10, by using the Weyl alge-
bra as the base ring. We have described Weyl algebras and their basic properties in
Chapter 2. This special class of general GBC will be called “Weyl Gro¨bner Basis
Cryptosystem (WGBC)” and will be described in Section 4.1 of this chapter. In
Section 4.2 , we will introduce procedures for WGBC key generation and in Sec-
tion 4.3 , we describe explicit instructions for constructing concrete instances of
WGBC.
4.1 The WGBC
Using the notation from Chapter 2, let K be a field, and consider the Weyl algebra
An = K[x1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶n] of index n over K. The set of all standard terms of An
is given by the set
Bn = fxa¶ b j a;b 2 Nng:
Let s be a term ordering on Bn. Further recall that, given a set of Weyl polynomials
G = fg1; : : : ;grg  An n f0g, we can use the left Division Algorithm to find out a
normal remainder NRs ;G ( f ) of any polynomial f 2 An with respect to the tuple
G = (g1; : : : ;gr) (see Algorithm 2.3.18 and Definition 2.3.20). Moreover, if G is a
left s -Gro¨bner basis of an ideal I, then every Weyl polynomial f has a unique nor-
mal remainder NRs ;G ( f ) (see Theorem 2.4.1), and that if f 2 I then NRs ;G ( f ) = 0
4.1. The WGBC
(Theorem 2.4.1, Part (2)). With these ingredients, we are now ready to introduce
the following class of cryptosystems.
Cryptosystem 4.1.1. Given a Weyl algebra An of index n over K, let I be a non-
trivial left ideal of An and let G = fg1; : : : ;grg be its left s -Gro¨bner basis. We
set G = (g1; : : : ;gr) and Os (I) = Bn n fLTs ( f ) j f 2 I n f0gg. Then a left Weyl
Gro¨bner basis cryptosystem (WGBC) consists of the following data.
(1) Public Key A set Q of Weyl polynomials fp1; : : : ; psg contained in I n f0g
and a subsetM of Os (I) are known publicly.
(2) Secret Key: The left s -Gro¨bner basis G= fg1; : : : ;grg of the ideal I and the
set Os (I) are kept secret.
(3) Message Space: The message space is the K-vector subspace hM iK of An
generated byM Os (I).
(4) Ciphertext Space: The ciphertext units are Weyl polynomials in A.
(5) Encryption: For encrypting a plaintext message m 2 hM iK , choose Weyl
polynomials `1; : : : ; `s and compute the standard form of
c= m+ `1 p1+   + `s ps:
to get the ciphertext polynomial c.
(6) Decryption: Given a ciphertext unit c 2 An, compute NRs ;G (c). If the result
is contained in hM iK , return it. Otherwise, return c.
Note here that, since G is a s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I and the polyno-
mials p1; : : : ; ps are contained in I, it follows that for each i = 1; : : : ;s, we have
NRs ;G (pi) = 0 (see Theorem 2.4.1.2 ). This implies that
NRs ;G (m+ `1 p1+   + `s ps) = m;
which in turn implies the correctness of this system.
Note. From now onwards, we abbreviate a left Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystem
as WGBC if no confusion can arise.
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The security of WGBC strongly depends on the difficulty of computing Gro¨bner
bases in Weyl algebras. That is, if an attacker can compute G, he can break the
cryptosystem. Together with the subset of Os (I) the attacker only knows the Weyl
polynomials fp1; : : : ; psg in the public key Q  I. Therefore, they have to be cre-
ated in a way that hides all the information about the system of generators of I. The
attacker might try to compute a left s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hQi gener-
ated by the set of polynomials in the public key. In fact, in the settings of Weyl
algebra, we can make this task difficult by suitably constructing the public polyno-
mials fp1; : : : ; psg such that the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hp1; : : : ; psi is hard
to compute. To show the existence of such ideals in Weyl algebras, below we give
three examples using Weyl algebras over a field of characteristic 7, 3, and 0.
Note. Throughout the thesis whenever we write ‘our computing machine’, we mean
a computer system with 24 GB of RAM, and having the processor AMD Dual
Opteron 2.4 GHz. All computations are performed on this computing machine and
therefore all the timings are given accordingly.
Example 4.1.2. Consider the Weyl Algebra A3 = F7[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] of index
3 over the finite field F7 of characteristic 7 and let s=DegRevLex. Choose the
following Weyl polynomials of A3,
f1 =  ¶ 31 ¶ 53 ¶ 52 + x53;
f2 =  3x3¶ 53 ¶ 52 + x3¶ 31 ;
f3 =  2¶ 41 ¶ 53   x1¶ 73 + x32¶ 52 :
Let I= h f1; f2; f3i be the left ideal of A3 generated by f f1; f2; f3g. Then the reduced
left s -Gro¨bner basis of I is the set G= fg1; : : : ;g35g consisting of the following 35
polynomials in standard form
f¶ 51 ; x53; x3¶ 41 ¶3+3¶ 41 ; x33¶ 31 ; x2x23¶ 31 ¶2¶3+3x2x3¶ 31 ¶2+3x23¶ 31 ¶3+2x3¶ 31 ;
x32¶
5
2   x1¶ 73 ; x2¶ 41 ¶ 32  2¶ 41 ¶ 22 ; x1x32¶ 41  3x32x3¶ 31 ¶3 3x32¶ 31 ; ¶ 41 ¶ 53 ;
x32x
2
3¶
3
1 ¶3+3x
3
2x3¶
3
1 ; ¶
3
1 ¶
7
3 ; x3¶
3
1 ¶
5
2 ¶3+3¶
3
1 ¶
5
2 ; ¶
19
3 ;
x22x3¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 ¶3 x2¶ 21 ¶ 73  2x1x2¶ 41 ¶ 22 +x22¶ 31 ¶ 32  3x2x3¶ 31 ¶ 22 ¶3 x1¶ 41 ¶2 3x2¶ 31 ¶ 22 +
3x3¶ 31 ¶2¶3+3¶
3
1 ¶2; x
2
2x3¶
3
1 ¶
4
2 +3x3¶
2
1 ¶
7
3  3x2x3¶ 31 ¶ 32  3x3¶ 31 ¶ 22 ;
x22¶
3
1 ¶
5
2  3x2x3¶ 31 ¶ 42 ¶3+3¶ 21 ¶2¶ 73  3x2¶ 31 ¶ 42 +3x3¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3+3¶ 31 ¶ 32 ;
x1x22x3¶
4
1 ¶
2
2  2x32x3¶ 31 ¶ 32 +x1x2x3¶ 41 ¶2+3x22x3¶ 31 ¶ 22  2x1x3¶ 41  x2x3¶ 31 ¶2+2x3¶ 31 ;
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x3¶ 21 ¶
8
3 +3¶
2
1 ¶
7
3 ; x
3
3¶
10
3 + x
2
3¶
9
3  3x3¶ 83  3¶ 73 ; x22¶ 21 ¶ 52 ¶ 53 ;
x2¶ 21 ¶2¶
7
3  2x2x3¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3+2¶ 21 ¶ 73  2x2¶ 31 ¶ 32  3x3¶ 31 ¶ 22 ¶3 3¶ 31 ¶ 22 ;
x2x3¶ 21 ¶
7
3 +2x1x2x3¶
4
1 ¶
2
2 +2x22x3¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 + x1x3¶
4
1 ¶2+ x2x3¶
3
1 ¶
2
2   x3¶ 31 ¶2;
x22¶
2
1 ¶
7
3 +3x1x
2
2¶
4
1 ¶
2
2  2x22x3¶ 31 ¶ 22 ¶3+2x1x2¶ 41 ¶2 2x22¶ 31 ¶ 22 +x2x3¶ 31 ¶2¶3 2x1¶ 41 +
x2¶ 31 ¶2  x3¶ 31 ¶3 ¶ 31 ; x3¶ 52 ¶ 53 +2x3¶ 31 ; x33¶ 52 ¶ 33 + x23¶ 52 ¶ 23  3x3¶ 52 ¶3 3¶ 52 ;
x42x3¶
3
1 ¶
3
2   x1x22x3¶ 41 ¶2 2x32x3¶ 31 ¶ 22  3x1x2x3¶ 41 + x22x3¶ 31 ¶2+3x2x3¶ 31 ;
x33¶
2
1 ¶
7
3 ; x2x3¶
3
1 ¶2¶
6
3  x2¶ 31 ¶2¶ 53 +3x3¶ 31 ¶ 63  3¶ 31 ¶ 53 ; ¶1¶ 123 ; x3¶ 123 +2x32x3¶ 41 ;
x32x3¶
3
1 ¶
6
3  x32¶ 31 ¶ 53 ; ¶ 31 ¶ 52 ¶ 53 ; x2¶ 21 ¶ 52 ¶ 63  3x3¶ 21 ¶ 42 ¶ 73  2x2x3¶ 31 ¶ 72 +3x3¶ 31 ¶ 62 ;
x2x23¶
3
1 ¶
8
2  3x2¶ 21 ¶ 62 ¶ 53 +3x23¶ 31 ¶ 72 ;
x23¶
2
1 ¶
4
2 ¶
7
3 +3x2x
2
3¶
3
1 ¶
7
2  2x2¶ 21 ¶ 52 ¶ 53   x23¶ 31 ¶ 62 g:
From the polynomials f f1; f2; f3g, let us now create polynomials p1 and p2 as fol-
lows:
p1 = h11 f1+h12 f2+h13 f3 and p2 = h21 f1+h22 f2+h23 f3
By choosing
h11 =  2¶1+¶ 52 ¶ 53 ; h12 =  2x43; h13 = ¶ 52 ;
h21 =  2¶1+ x3; h22 = ¶ 31 ; h23 = ¶ 52 ;
we then have,
p1 =  ¶ 31 ¶ 102 ¶ 103 + x32¶ 102  3x43¶ 52 ¶ 43   x1¶ 52 ¶ 73 + x22¶ 92  3x33¶ 52 ¶ 33  3x2¶ 82  
2x23¶
5
2 ¶
2
3  2x53¶ 31  3¶ 72  2x3¶ 52 ¶3 2x53¶1+¶ 52 ;
p2 = 3x3¶ 31 ¶
5
2 ¶
5
3 + x
3
2¶
10
2   x1¶ 52 ¶ 73 + x22¶ 92  3x2¶ 82 + x3¶ 61  3¶ 72 + x63 2x53¶1:
Let J = hp1; p2i be the left ideal generated by the polynomials p1 and p2. We
claim that the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J is very hard to compute using current
resources and implementation of algorithms for the computation of Gro¨bner bases
of ideals in Weyl algebras. We were unable to compute this Gro¨bner basis using the
implementation of these algorithms on Singular, ApCoCoA, and Macaulay 2 on our
computing machine.
Note. It has been observed that this claim remains valid if we change the charac-
teristic p to 3 and 5 in the above Example 4.1.2. Moreover, the ideal I becomes a
trivial ideal for characteristic p 13. That is, for p 13, we have G= f1g.
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Below we give another example by considering the Weyl algebra A3 over the
prime field of characteristic 3.
Example 4.1.3. Consider the Weyl algebra A3 = F3[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] of index 3
over the field K = F3, and let the monomial ordering on A be s =DegRevLex.
Choose the following Weyl polynomials of A3
f1 = ¶ 31 ¶ 52 ¶ 53 + x52; f2 = x2¶ 53 +¶ 31 , and f3 = ¶ 41 ¶ 52   x1¶ 72 :
Let I = h f1; f2; f3i be the left ideal generated by f1; f2, and f3. Then the reduced
left s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I is the set1 G consisting of 26 Weyl polynomials
in standard form.
Let us now construct an ideal J = hp1; p2i, where
p1 = h11 f1+h12 f2+h13 f3 and p2 = h21 f1+h22 f2+h23 f3
and where we let
h11 = x2+¶1; h12 = ¶ 42 ¶
5
3 +¶
3
1 ¶
5
2 ; h13 = ¶
5
3  ¶ 21 ;
h21 = ¶1¶2¶3; h22 =  ¶ 41 ¶ 52 ; h23 = ¶2¶ 63 + x2¶ 53 :
We get
p1 = x2¶ 42 ¶
10
3   x1¶ 72 ¶ 53 +¶ 32 ¶ 103 + x1¶ 21 ¶ 72  ¶1¶ 72 + x62+ x52¶1;
p2 =  x1¶ 82 ¶ 63   x1x2¶ 72 ¶ 53 +¶ 41 ¶ 42 ¶ 53  ¶ 71 ¶ 52 + x52¶1¶2¶3  x42¶1¶3:
Again, based on experiments carried out on our computing machine, we claim that
the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J is hard to compute. For instance, the implemen-
tation of the Buchberger Algorithm 2.3.24 on Macaulay2 took 7,924 minutes of
CPU time on our computing machine after which we interrupted the process to ter-
minate without an output. At the time of interruption, we still had untreated 1777
S-polynomials with a total number of 59;196;454 monomials.
In the above Examples 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 we have considered the Weyl Alge-
bra A over a field of positive characteristic. We have seen in this case that given
a non-trivial left ideal I  A, it is possible to construct an ideal J  I such that
Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J is hard to compute. Our next example shows that such
ideals can also be created for Weyl algebras over a field of characteristic zero.
1This set G is given in Appendix C.2.
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Example 4.1.4. Consider the Weyl algebra A3 =Q3[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] of index 3
over the field Q of characteristic 0, and let the term ordering be s = DegRevLex.
Choose following Weyl polynomials
f1 = 2x32¶
3
2 +3x
3
1¶
2
1 ; f2 = x22¶ 53 +¶ 31 , and f3 = x33¶ 33   x21¶ 31 :
Le I = h f1; f2; f3i be the left ideal generated by these polynomials. Then a left
s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I is given by the set
G= f¶ 21 ; ¶ 33 ; x32¶ 32 g:
Let us now construct an ideal J = hp1; p2i, where
p1 = h11 f1+h12 f2+h13 f3 and p2 = h21 f1+h22 f2+h23 f3
and where we let
h11 = ¶ 53 ; h12 = x
2
3+2x2¶
3
2 ; h13 = x
2
2¶
2
3 ;
h21 = x33¶
3
3 +¶2¶
5
3 ; h22 = 6¶
3
2 ; h23 =  2x32¶ 32 :
We get
p1 =  x22x33¶ 53 +3x31¶ 21 ¶ 53  12x22¶ 22 ¶ 53 + x42¶ 43 +2x2¶ 31 ¶ 32  12x2¶2¶ 53 + x33¶ 31 ;
p2 = 2x32¶
4
2 ¶
5
3 +2x
2
1x
3
2¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 +3x
3
1x
3
3¶
2
1 ¶
3
3 +3x
3
1¶
2
1 ¶2¶
5
3  36x2¶ 22 ¶ 53 +6¶ 31 ¶ 32  
36¶2¶ 53
With these settings, the left Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hp1; p2i turned out to
be very hard to compute. In this case we fail to compute the Gro¨bner basis due
to very fast growth of memory required for the computations. For instance, using
the CAS Macaulay2 on our computing machine, we terminated the process of
Gro¨bner basis computation of the ideal J after 4004 minutes of CPU time. At the
time of interruption, the intermediate results had grown enough to consume 18:7 GB
of system memory. The same computation also fails to complete on the computer
algebra systems ApCoCoA and Singular.
Note. In Examples 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and 4.1.4, the intermediate results during computa-
tion show that, the computation of Gro¨bner bases of carefully constructed ideals in
Weyl algebras fails to complete because of the following reasons:
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 the memory required to store the intermediate results grows too fast,
 due to the increase in the size of the polynomials during the computation,
the reduction process (Division Algorithm 2.3.18) gets very slow. That is,
reduction of S-polynomials slows down as the computation grows.
Now an obvious question arises: ‘Can we use such ideals for the construction
of practical concrete instances of WGBC?’ As explained in Chapter 3, successful
cryptanalysis of Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems might be possible by using certain
attacks where the attacker does not need to compute the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal
J  I. For example, the chosen ciphertext attack and the attacks based on linear
algebra can be applied. Moreover, instead of computing a complete Gro¨bner basis
of the ideal J, the attacker can also try using partial Gro¨bner bases of J for the
partial Gro¨bner basis attack. Therefore, choosing an ideal J  I such that Gro¨bner
basis of the ideal J is hard to compute is not sufficient for constructing a secure
instance of a WGBC. Together with this condition, we also have to make sure that,
on a particular instance of WGBC that we construct, the above standard attacks
cannot be successful to break the system. To achieve this goal, we have to fix certain
parameters of the WGBC and the way of constructing polynomials p1; : : : ; ps 2 I
for the public key Q.
Notation 4.1.5. Parameters of a WGBC: In order to make Cryptosystem 4.1.1
usable, we have to quantify certain parameters for the key generation and the way
of choosing the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s for the encryption process. Here are the
various parameters that we have to consider for constructing an instance of WGBC
that might be hard to break:
* p: the characteristic of the base field K,
* n: the index of the Weyl algebra A,
* s : the term ordering on A,
* s: the size of the public key Q,
* dg: the maximum degree of the polynomials g1; : : : ;gr in the secret key G,
* dp: the maximum degree of the polynomials p1; : : : ; ps 2 Q,
* d`: the maximum degree of the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s used for the encryp-
tion.
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The efficiency and the security of Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems greatly
depends on the right choice for these parameters. For example, we shall see in
the coming sections that the degree d` and number of terms in the polynomials
`1; : : : ; `s can make the size of the resulting ciphertexts too large and result in a bad
data-rate for transmissions. The large size of the ciphertext might also decrease the
efficiency by increasing the time taken by the decryption process. Moreover, we
need to specify the values for the degree d` for a guaranteed security against partial
Gro¨bner basis attacks.
In the next section, we describe in detail the key generation and implementation
in order to construct a practical instance of a WGBC. This parameter consideration
is also important to defeat the attacks based on linear algebra.
4.2 WGBC Key Generation and Implementation
The aim of this section is to introduce a step-by-step procedure for generating a
pair (G;Q) for constructing a secure instance of WGBC. Keeping in mind the ob-
servations and the experimental results from the examples of the last section, we
introduce following procedure for the way of creating a secure secret key and a
presumably hard to break ciphertext c.
Procedure 4.2.1. In the above setting of Cryptosystem 4.1.1 perform the following
steps.
(1) Choose a set of Weyl polynomialsG= fg1; : : : ;grgwhich form a reduced left
s -Gro¨bner basis of the left ideal I = hGi  An.
(2) For i= 1; : : : ;s and j= 1; : : : ;r, choose the polynomials hi j 2An and compute
the standard form of the Weyl polynomials
pi = hi1 g1+   +hir gr:
While choosing the polynomials hi j, make sure that following properties
hold.
(a) The degree forms DF(hi jg j) of highest degree cancel. The other degree
forms DF(hi jg j) cancel or their coefficients are changed in pi by the
process of converting the remaining hikgk to standard form.
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(b) There are sufficiently high powers of ¶1; : : : ;¶n in the terms of the sup-
port of hi j such that, after bringing hi jg j to standard form, no informa-
tion about Supp(g j) is leaked in Supp(pi). In particular, the leading
terms LTs (g1); : : : ;LTs (gr) should be well hidden.
(c) In verifying properties (a) and (b) above, make sure that there are no
gaps in the degrees of various terms in Supp(pi). That is, for each i,
if deg(pi) = dpi , then Supp(pi) should contain a sufficient number of
terms of each degree between dpi and 1. In fact, this reduces the sparsity
of the polynomials p1; : : : ; ps.
(3) Let J = hp1; : : : ; psi be the left ideal generated by the polynomials in the
public key Q. Make sure that not only the complete left s -Gro¨bner basis of
the ideal J is hard to compute, but also partial Gro¨bner bases are infeasible
to compute for large degree bounds.
(4) Choose a small enough subsetM  Os (I) for the message space hM iK in
such a way that every gi contains at least one term in Os (I)nM .
(5) For constructing a ciphertext polynomial
c= `1 p1+   + `s ps+m;
choose the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s such that the following properties hold:
(a) Make sure that Supp(`1p1+   + `sps) contains all terms of Supp(m)
and many terms ofM . In this way, the monomials of m will be either
cancelled or their coefficients will be changed in the lower-degree part
of the polynomial c.
(b) Ascertain that the degree forms DF(`ipi) of highest degree cancel in c,
and that the other degree forms DF(`ipi) cancel or their coefficients are
changed in c by the process of converting the remaining `ipi to standard
form.
(c) Again, in meeting properties (a) and (b) above, use sufficiently high
powers of ¶1; : : :¶n in the terms of the support of `i such that, after
bringing `i pi to standard form, there are no wide gaps in degrees of
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various terms in Supp(c). This means that the sparsity of the ciphertext
polynomial will be reduced.
(6) Make sure that the above choices of the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s make the de-
gree, dc, of the ciphertext c high enough such that no partial Gro¨bner basis of
the ideal J can be computed up to the degree bound dc. Moreover, ifH is a
partial Gro¨bner basis of J up to a degree bound d < dc, then NRs ;H (c) 6=m.
Remark 4.2.2. We have seen in Chapter 2, that due to the structure of Weyl mul-
tiplication, the product of Weyl polynomials in standard form blows up to include
many terms. In fact, in the Weyl algebra An, we can have t; t 0 2 Bn such that the
product tt 0 is a polynomial having many terms in its standard form. Therefore, by
including powers of ¶1; : : : ;¶n in the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s, we can make the lower
and the middle part of the ciphertext polynomial c = `1p1+   + `sps+m dense
enough to hide the message m, and to accomplish the steps (5) and (6) of Proce-
dure 4.2.1. With the same strategy, we can fulfil the above requirement (2).(b) of
Procedure 4.2.1.
In the next chapter, we shall explain why we believe that, by completing the
steps of Procedure 4.2.1, we can make the standard attacks infeasible. In fact,
step (2) makes sure that the polynomials in the secret keyG are well concealed. The
step (5) ensures that not only the plaintext messagem is well hidden in the ciphertext
polynomial c, but by reducing the sparsity of the polynomial c and removing gaps
in the degrees of the terms in the support of c we are also, making linear algebra
attacks harder to apply. Similarly, by completing the steps (3) and (4), we are,
respectively, making the chosen ciphertext attack and the partial Gro¨bner basis
attack infeasible.
Remark 4.2.3. In Step (4) of Procedure 4.2.1, we have suggested to use the re-
duced s -Gro¨bner bases of the ideal I considered for constructing an instance of a
WGBC. By definition of WGBC in Cryptosystem 4.1.1, Bob, can take any left s -
Gro¨bner basis of I for such construction, but, for all our experimental results and
instances of WGBC that will be presented in this thesis, most of the time we will
be using the reduced Gro¨bner bases unless otherwise specified.
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4.3 Construction of Hard Instances
For constructing concrete hard instances of Weyl Gro¨bner Bases Cryptosystems,
the structure of Weyl algebras is very useful in satisfying the requirements of Pro-
cedure 4.2.1. In the next procedure, we shall provide an explicit suggestion how
this can be done. The idea is based on Proposition 2.5.2 for constructing non-trivial
left ideals of An (see Example 2.5.3).
Procedure 4.3.1. Let K = Fp be a finite field of characteristic p, let n  2, and
consider the Weyl algebra An of index n over K. Let s be a term ordering on Bn.
Then the following instructions define a WGBC which satisfies Conditions (1) – (6)
of Procedure 4.2.1.
(1) For i= 1; : : : ;r, with 2 r n, choose a (random) polynomial gi 2K[xi;¶i]
An such that:
(a) deg(gi) d0,
(b) the number of terms in support of each gi is at least N.
LetG= fg1; : : : ;grg be the set of these polynomials, and let I= hGi be the left
ideal generated byG. By Proposition 2.5.2, the setG is a left s -Gro¨bner basis
of I.
(2) For the message space, choose the setM  Os (I) such that every gi has at
least one term from Os (I)nM in its support.
(3) Now create Weyl polynomials p1; : : : ; ps of the form pi = hi1g1+   + hirgr
such that Conditions (2a)– (2c) of Procedure 4.2.1 are satisfied. In particular,
choose the degree forms of the polynomials hi1; : : : ;hir such that they are a
syzygy of DF(G), at least in the top-degree.
Remark 4.3.2. In Step (1) of the above procedure, the lower bounds D and N are
suggested, respectively, for the degree and number of terms in the support of each
gi. Based on our experimentations and computations, it turns out that D = 10 and
N = 5 are good choices for meeting the requirements of Procedure 4.2.1.
In the next chapter we shall see that if we establish an instance of WGBC by
following the instructions in the above procedure, then such a system will be secure
against standard known attacks.
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Let us now use the instructions of this procedure to formulate a concrete case of
WGBC.
Example 4.3.3. Let us take the Weyl algebra
A2 = K[x1;x2;¶1;¶2]
over the finite field K = F13 of characteristic 13. Let the term ordering on the set
B2 of all terms of A2 be DegRevLex. With these ingredients, we introduce the
following WGBC:
(1) Secret Key:
Let G= fg1;g2g be given by
g1 = 7x71¶
7
1 +2x
6
1¶
6
1 +4x
2
1¶
2
1 +3x
3
1 ¶ 31 + x21 3x1¶1 2¶ 21 +5x1 7¶1+1
g2 = 4x52¶
5
2 +3x
4
2¶
4
2 +5x
4
2+¶
4
2  3x32 4¶ 32 + x22  x2¶2+2¶ 22  3
and let I = hg1;g2i be the left ideal generated by G. The secret key is now the
set G and let G = (g1;g2).
(2) Public Key:
Compute the standard form of the Weyl polynomials
p1 = h11 g1+h12 g2 and p2 = h21 g1+h22 g2;
where
h11 = 4x31x
11
2 ¶
3
1 ¶
9
2 +5x
3
1x
10
2 ¶
3
1 ¶
8
2 +2x1x
5
2¶
5
2 +2x
5
2¶1¶
5
2 +5x1 3x2+
2¶1 6¶2+3;
h12 = 6x101 x
6
2¶
10
1 ¶
4
2  6x91x62¶ 91 ¶ 42  4x81¶ 71 +3x71¶ 81 +4x2+2¶2+4;
h21 = 5x21x
14
2 ¶
6
1 ¶
16
2  4x21x132 ¶ 61 ¶ 152  7x1+2x2+4;
h22 = x91x
9
2¶
13
1 ¶
11
2 +7x
8
1x
9
2¶
12
1 ¶
11
2 +6¶1 3¶2+1:
Then the Weyl polynomial p1 has degree 36 and its standard form consists
of 170 terms. Note here that, as suggested in Part (3) of Procedure 4.3.1, our
choice of the polynomials h11 and h12 is such that the degree form DF(h11g1)
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and DF(h12g2) cancel in p1 and many other terms are cancelled or their co-
efficients are changed in p1. For instance, since LMs (g1) =  6x71¶ 71 , we
choose a random term t1 = 4x31x
11
2 ¶
3
1 ¶
9
2 of degree 26 for h11. Now the lead-
ing monomial of the product t1 g1 is 2x101 x
11
2 ¶
10
1 ¶
9
2 and to cancel it in p1,
we choose the monomial t 01 = 6x
10
1 x
6
2¶
10
1 ¶
4
2 for h12. If required, we pro-
ceed the same way for cancelling the terms in DF(t g1). Note that we have
DF(t 01 g2) =  2x101 x112 ¶ 101 ¶ 92 and it will not appear in p1. In order to make
lower part of p1 dense enough, we make use of Weyl multiplication by in-
serting lower-degree terms both in h11 and h12. For instance, we choose a
monomial t2 = 5x1 for h11 and to cancel the leading term of the product t2 g1
we insert the monomial t 02 = 3x
8
1¶
7
1 in h12 and again for the cancellation insert
t3 = 2x1x52¶
5
2 in h11. Continuing this way, we keep on adding and setting vari-
ous terms for h11; and h12 and finally compute p1 as above. The degree of p1
is 36 which means that all the terms of degree greater than 36 are cancelled
in p1. In this way, many terms in p1 are either cancelled or their coefficients
are changed. This can be easily seen by observing the number of terms in the
homogeneous components of h11 g1, h12 g2, and h13 g4 and comparing them
with the number of terms of the homogeneous components of p1, for instance,
by using a CAS. Similarly, to compute p2 we choose the above polynomials
h21 and h22. The Weyl polynomial p2 has degree 48 and there are 128 terms
in its standard form. Again, the highest degree terms cancel in p2. The set
Q= fp1; p2g is now our public key2.
(3) Message Space:
For the message space, we choose the K-vector space generated by the set
M = fxa¶ b j jaj  11; jb j  7g:
There are 132808 different possible plaintext units. Moreover, both secret
polynomials g1 and g2 have terms from Os (I)nM in their support.
(4) Encryption:
To encrypt a messagem2 hM iK , we choose sparse polynomials `1; `2 of suf-
2These polynomials p1 and p2 are given in Appendix C.2.(2).
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ficiently high degree and compute the standard form of the ciphertext poly-
nomial
c= m+ `1 p1+ `2 p2:
For instance, let us encrypt
m= 6x42¶ 32 +6¶ 62 +5x42 ¶ 42 +6x32+6¶ 32 +x21+x2¶2 3¶1¶2+2x1+2¶1 5
By choosing
`1 =  5x101 x162 ¶ 121 ¶ 192  2x81x182 ¶ 101 ¶ 212  ¶1+1;
`2 = 4x111 x
13
2 ¶
9
1 ¶
12
2  6x91x152 ¶ 71 ¶ 142 +2¶2+ x2+2;
in the above representation of c, we obtain the ciphertext polynomial c of de-
gree 91 and its standard form consists of 2954 terms. Considering the size
of the message space, the message expansion is rather moderate. The poly-
nomials `1; `2 are chosen such that the degree forms of `1 p1 and `2 p2 are
cancelled in c and to make the degree dc high enough to meet the require-
ment (6) in Procedure 4.2.1. This can be achieved for instance in the same
way as described the way of choosing h11 and h12 in the above key genera-
tion process. Moreover, lower-degree terms in `1; `2 are selected to make the
message m well-hidden.
(5) Decryption:
Since m = NRs ;G (c), therefore to decipher c, it suffices to compute the nor-
mal remainder of the ciphertext polynomial c with respect to the secret key
G . In the present case, an efficient implementation of the Division Algorithm
2.3.18, recovers m in a couple of seconds.
The reason why we had to go up to rather high degrees in this example is clearly
the fact that we used the Weyl algebra of index 2. As soon as we add a few more
indeterminates, i.e. for n> 2, we gain additional freedom for the message space and
the usual attacks on the Gro¨bner basis type cryptosystems become more difficult to
carry out.
Note. For the instance of WGBC given in Example 4.3.3, observe that Supp(c) n
Supp(`1p1+ `2p2) contains only 2 terms. This indicates that the message m is well
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hidden in the ciphertext c. Moreover, the number of terms in the homogeneous
components of the ciphertext c are distributed as follows
f(91;7);(90;2);(89;17);(88;8);(87;26);(86;11);(85;31);(84;20);(83;38);
(82;30);(81;42);(80;43);(79;55);(78;52);(77;61);(76;60);(75;71);(74;79);
(73;78);(72;92);(71;88);(70;94);(69;94);(68;96);(67;87);(66;92);(65;84);
(64;84);(63;72);(62;84);(61;82);(60;81);(59;75);(58;63);(57;57);(56;47);
(55;39);(54;28);(53;18);(52;12);(51;6);(50;16);(49;22);(48;33);(47;39);
(46;30);(45;36);(44;25);(43;28);(42;20);(41;24);(40;19);(39;22);(38;19);
(37;17);(36;13);(35;12);(34;11);(33;12);(32;11);(31;13);(30;13);(29;14);
(28;14);(27;15);(26;13);(25;12);(24;11);(23;10);(22;7);(21;3);(20;6);
(19;8);(18;14);(17;10);(16;14);(15;9);(14;13);(13;8);(12;11);(11;5);(10;5);
(9;3);(8;2);(7;2);(6;16);(5;28);(4;27);(3;19);(2;9);(1;4);(0;1)g
where the tuple (n1;n2) indicates that the total number of terms of degree n1 is n2.
This shows that the highest degree terms are cancelled in c and that the ciphertext
contains many terms from the message space hM iK .
In the next chapter, we shall come back to this instance of WGBC for further
investigations and discuss the resistance of this system with respect to several stan-
dard attacks.
Our next procedure for the key generation of WGBC is based on the idea of
using a randomly chosen left ideal of a Weyl algebra An. That is, we choose an
ideal of An whose generators are selected as random Weyl polynomials. In order to
proceed this way one has to be extra careful in choosing generating polynomials of
such an ideal I  A (see Section 2.5 for details). The selection of these polynomials
is not purely random as we have to make sure that the ideal generated should have
a non-trivial Gro¨bner basis.
Remark 4.3.4. Recall from Section 2.5, choosing a non-trivial ideal I= h f1; : : : ; fqi
of Weyl algebras is not a trivial task when generating polynomials f1; : : : ; fq are ran-
domly chosen elements of An. From our experiments and computations, we have
observed that higher the degree and number of terms in Supp( fi), more time con-
suming and difficult will be the computation of a left s -Gro¨bner basis of I (see also
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note at the end of Example 4.3.6). On the other hand, we also do not want the left
Gro¨bner basis G of such ideals contains very few elements or, is very easy to guess
from the public information. After all, we are interested in those ideals, such that
a practical instance of WGBC can be built on them by meeting the requirements of
Procedure 4.2.1. Therefore, based on our computational results, in order to choose
a polynomial fi 2An for the generating system of a left ideal I, we suggest to choose
fi such that deg( fi) 6 and the number of terms in Supp( fi) is at least 3. It will be
very likely that the ideal constructed this way will be a non-trivial ideal of An and
that it can be used to make a practical instance of a WGBC satisfying requirements
of Procedure 4.2.1. We will use these suggestions in the following procedure.
Procedure 4.3.5. Consider the Weyl algebra An = K[x1; : : : ;xn; ¶1; : : : ;¶n] of index
n over a prime3 field K = Fp of characteristic p. Let n  3 and let s be a term
ordering on Bn. Then the following instructions define a WGBC which satisfies the
requirements of Procedure 4.2.1.
(1) For i = 1; : : : ;u, choose a random Weyl polynomial fi 2 An nK, such that
deg( fi) 6 and #Supp( fi) 3. Moreover, these polynomials should be such
that the left ideal I = h f1; : : : ; fui is a non-trivial ideal of An. Let the set
G= fg1; : : : ;grg be a left s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I. Make sure that the
size of this secret key is at least 8, i.e. r  8.
(2) For the message space, choose the set M  Os (I) such that at least 80
percent of polynomials in G are such that they have at least one term from
Os (I)nM in their supports.
(3) For i= 1; : : : ;s, create Weyl polynomials pi of the form
pi = hi1 g1 +   + hir gr
where hi j 2 An are chosen such that the computation of a left s -Gro¨bner basis
of the ideal J = hp1; : : : ; psi is infeasible and such that Conditions (2a)– (2c)
3We have also performed experiments with K =Q, it turns out that in this case, firstly, choosing
a random non-trivial ideal of our interest is rather involved task, and secondly, it is very difficult to
control the sizes of polynomials in Q and growth of the ciphertext c.
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of Procedure 4.2.1 are satisfied. Make sure that if some g j 2 G does not
satisfy Condition (2), then set the corresponding hi j = 0 in the above rep-
resentation of pi. That is, use a g j 2 G for the construction of polynomials
p1; : : : ; ps only when it fulfils Condition (2).
Note. In the above procedure, the requirement of ‘80 percent’ in Step (2) is based on
our experimental results. As we will be using these polynomials in the construction
of polynomials in Q, therefore, we want most of them to be such that the chosen
ciphertext attack of Section 5.4 can be defeated.
Let us now use the instructions of this procedure to establish the following con-
crete example of a WGBC.
Example 4.3.6. Let n= 3 and consider the Weyl algebra
A3 = F3[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2; ¶3]
over the field of characteristic 3 and let the term ordering on Bn be s = DegRevLex.
We now introduce the following WGBC:
(1) Secret Key:
Choose the following polynomials of A3
f1 =  ¶ 31 ¶ 52 ¶ 53   x21x32+ x52+1;
f2 = x2¶ 53 +¶
3
1  1;
f3 = ¶ 41 ¶
5
2 + x
5
1¶
7
2   x21¶2:
Let I = h f1; f2; f3 i be the ideal generated by these polynomials. Then the
s -Gro¨bner basis G of I is the set fg1; : : : ;g11g where
g1 = ¶ 31 ¶
3
2 ; g2 = x
4
2¶
3
1  ¶ 53 + x21x22  x42;
g3 = x21¶
5
3   x41x22+ x62+ x2; g4 = x21¶ 31 ;
g5 = ¶ 32 ¶
5
3   x21x22¶ 32 + x42¶ 32 ; g6 = x51¶ 62   x21;
g7 = x92¶
6
2 + x
4
1¶
6
2 + x
2
1x
2
2¶
6
2 + x
4
2¶
6
2   x1x52  x1;
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g8 = x1x72¶
6
2 + x
3
1¶
6
2 + x1x
2
2¶
6
2   x52 1;
g9 = ¶ 103 + x
3
2¶
6
1 + x
3
2¶
3
1   x21x2+ x32;
g10 = x21x
3
2  x52 1;
g11 = x2¶ 53 +¶
3
1  1:
The setG is our secret key and let G =(g1; : : : ;g11). Note that, to fulfil Condi-
tion (2) in the above procedure we can use g2; g3; g5; g7; g8; g9; g10; g11 2 G
for setting the message space and for creating the polynomials in the follow-
ing public key.
(2) Public Key:
Let us now create public polynomial p1; p2; p3 by choosing
h11 =  x51¶ 72 + x32¶ 21 ¶ 53  ¶ 41 ¶ 52 +¶2¶ 53  ¶ 53 + x21¶2 1;
h12 = x22¶
5
1 ¶
5
2 ¶
5
3 + x2¶
5
1 ¶
4
2 ¶
5
3  ¶ 52 ¶ 53 +¶ 22  ¶2;
h13 =  ¶ 31 ¶ 52 ¶ 53  ¶1+1;
h21 = x2x23¶2¶
5
3 + x
2
1x
5
2¶2+ x
2
1x
3
2x
2
3¶2 ¶2¶ 53   x42  x32+ x21¶2  x23¶2;
h22 = x41¶2¶
5
3 + x
4
1¶2  x43¶2+¶ 53 +1;
h23 =  x21x23¶2¶ 53   x61x22¶2  x62x23¶2+ x21x32+¶2;
h31 = x72¶
4
1 ¶
7
2   x21x42¶1¶ 62 ;
h32 =  x1x72x43¶1¶ 92   x52x43¶1¶ 32   x1x32¶ 32 ;
h33 =  x31x43¶1¶ 62   x22¶ 71 ¶2  x1x42¶ 53 + x43¶1+ x1x32  x23¶1+ x3¶1;
h34 = x43¶1¶
6
2 ¶
5
3 + x
4
2x
4
3¶1¶
6
2 + x
6
2¶
5
3 + x1x2¶
4
1 + x2¶
5
3   x52  x1x23¶2+
x1¶2+ x3¶2 1;
and then computing the standard forms of
p1 = h11 f1+h12 f2+h13 f3;
p2 = h21g3+h22 g10+h23g11;
p3 = h31 g2+h32 g5+h33 g7+h34 g8:
The polynomial p1 has degree 20 and consists of 46 terms in its standard
form. The polynomial p2 has degree 14 and 51 terms and p3 has degree 28
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and 120 terms in its standard form. The polynomials hi j are chosen such that
the degree forms of the summands during the computation of the polynomials
pi cancel. In fact, the polynomials hi j are chosen in the same way as described
in (2) of Example 4.3.3. Moreover, the leading terms of the polynomials in G
are not possible to guess from the polynomials p1; p2; and p3 of the public
key Q. These public polynomials are given in the Appendix C.2.
We set the public key Q= f p1; p2; p3 g.
(3) The Message Space:
For the message space we choose
M = fxa ¶ b j jaj+ jb j  3g
That is, hM iK is the vector space of all polynomials in A3 of degree less than
or equal to 3. With this M , we can have 384 possible plaintext messages.
This message space is also known publicly.
(4) Encryption:
Suppose that the plaintext messagem2 hM iK is given by the following poly-
nomial
m = x21x2  x21¶1 ¶ 21 ¶2+ x2¶ 22 +¶ 33 + x1x2  x2x3  x1¶1+ x3¶1+
x2¶2 ¶1¶2  x3¶3+¶2¶3  x1  x2+¶1 ¶3+1
For the encryption, choose
`1 =  x61x92x63¶ 51 ¶ 82 ¶ 43   x61x72x63¶ 92 ¶ 93   x72x93¶ 72 ¶ 73 + x1x102 x43¶ 112   x62x53¶ 21 ¶ 72
+x1x102 ¶1¶
6
2 + x
6
2x
5
3¶
7
2 + x3¶1  x2+¶1
`2 =  x1x42x43¶ 71 ¶ 222 ¶ 53 + x1x62x23¶ 81 ¶ 162   x82x23¶1¶ 122 +¶ 21 ¶ 52 ¶ 53 +¶ 21 +
¶1¶2 ¶1¶3  x2 ¶3;
`3 = x61x
4
2x
2
3¶
13
1 ¶2¶
4
3   x71x42¶ 71 ¶ 112 + x31x82¶ 71 ¶ 112   x71x22x23¶ 71 ¶ 112 +
x31x
6
2x
2
3¶
7
1 ¶
11
2 + x1x
5
2¶
5
1 ¶
4
2 + x
2
2x
5
3¶
7
3   x21x2¶1¶ 53 + x2x3¶ 21  
x2x3 ¶1¶2  x1¶3 ¶1¶3+¶1;
and compute the ciphertext c as
c= `1 p1+ `2 p2+ `3 p3+m:
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Then the polynomial c has degree 57 and there are 4289 terms in its standard
form. We have selected the polynomials `1; `2, and `3 in such a way that the
highest degree terms cancel and many other terms are either cancelled or their
coefficients are changed in the middle and lower parts of the resulting cipher-
text. For instance, choosing  x61x92x63¶ 51 ¶ 82 ¶ 43 for `1 and then x61x42x23¶ 131 ¶2¶ 43
for `3, cancels the term  x61x112 x63¶ 131 ¶ 132 ¶ 93 of degree 58 in c. Similarly, by
choosing x1x42x43¶ 71 ¶ 222 ¶ 53 for `2, we get the leading term of the product `2 p2
as x71x
11
2 x
4
3¶
7
1 ¶
23
2 ¶
5
3 and then inserting  x71x42¶ 71 ¶ 112 in `3 cancels that leading
term in c. To cancel the term  x61x92x63¶ 81 ¶ 142 ¶ 143 of degree 57 so that it does
not appear in c we insert the monomial  x61x72x63¶ 92 ¶ 93 in `1. Continuing this
way, we keep on adding and setting various terms for `1; `2; and `3 and finally
compute c as above. In this way, many terms in c are either cancelled or their
coefficients are changed. The lower degree parts of the ciphertext polynomial
c are dense enough to include many terms from the setM . The monomials of
the plaintext message m are either cancelled or their coefficients are changed
in the ciphertext c. In fact, out of 18 monomials of m, 14 are not present in c.
(5) Decryption:
For recovering the plaintext message m we compute NRs ;G (c), the normal
remainder of c modulo the Gro¨bner basis G . An efficient implementation of
the left Division Algorithm 2.3.18 recovers m within a second.
In the next chapter, we shall discuss the security of this instance of WGBC against
known standard attacks.
Note. With reference to Procedure 4.3.5, note that why we are emphasizing that
one has to be extra careful while attempting to create an instance of WGBC based
on a randomly chosen left ideal of Weyl algebra. In the setting of Example 4.3.6, if
we use the base field K = Fp (p 5) or K =Q, then the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal
I becomes G= f1g. For char(K) = 7, the computation of Gro¨bner basis of the ideal
I = h f1; f2; f3i takes 577:14 seconds on our computing machine and turns out to be
f1g.
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4.4 A WGBC Based on Remark 2.5.5
We shall now use the technique of Remark 2.5.5 for choosing an ideal in a Weyl
algebra. We give an example for an instance of WGBC based on the following
procedure:
Procedure 4.4.1. In the settings of Procedure 4.3.5, perform Step (1) as follows:
Following the suggestions given in Remark 2.5.5, choose a left ideal
I of An. Let the secret key G = fg1; : : : ;grg be the reduced left s -
Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I.
Continue with Step (2) and (3) of Procedure 4.3.5 for choosing a message spaceM
and constructing a public key Q.
We now illustrate this procedure by presenting the following instance ofWGBC.
Example 4.4.2. Over the base field K = F7, we consider the Weyl algebra
A3 = K[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3]
of index 3 and the term ordering s = DegRevLex. Then we introduce the following
WGBC.
(1) Secret Key:
Consider the Weyl polynomials given by
f1 = x71; f2 = x
3
1¶
3
1 + x1;
f3 = x72; f4 = x
2
2¶
2
2 + x2+¶2;
f5 = x73¶
7
3 f6 = ¶
4
3 + x3;
and let I be the left ideal I = h f1; f2; f3; f4; f5; f6i. Then the reduced left s -
Gro¨bner basis G of the ideal I consists of the following 11 polynomials:
g1 = x1¶ 31 +3x
2
1+3x1¶1  x1 3¶1 3
g2 = x31+3x1¶
2
1  2x21 2x1¶1 2x1 3¶1+2
g3 = x21¶1+3x
2
1+ x1¶1 3x1 2
g4 = x103  2x73¶ 23 ; g5 = x93¶3  x83;
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g6 = ¶ 42 +3¶
3
2 +2x
2
2 2x2¶2+¶ 22   x2 3¶2 3
g7 = x73¶
3
3  2x93
g8 = x2¶ 22  ¶ 32  2x22+2x2¶2+2¶ 22 +2x2 3
g9 = x22¶2+3¶
3
2 +2x
2
2 2x2¶2+3¶ 22  2x2 2¶2 3
g10 = x32 ¶ 32 + x22 3x2¶2+3¶ 22  2x2 ¶2 2
g11 = ¶ 43 + x3
(2) Public Key:
For the public key Q, we compute the standard form of the polynomials
p1 = h11g1+h12g6+h13g4;
p2 = h21g2+h22g8+h23g5;
p3 = h31g3+h32g9+h33g7+h34g11;
by choosing
h11 = x1x62¶
3
2 ¶
4
3   x62¶ 32 ¶ 43  2x2¶ 32 ¶3+3x2¶ 32  2x23¶3+ x2¶3 3¶3;
h12 =  x31x62x103 ¶1 3x31x32¶ 32 ¶ 43 +2x1x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 22 ¶ 43 +¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3  x31¶ 43 +3x3¶ 43
 x31 3x32+3x3;
h13 = x31x
6
2¶1¶
4
2 +3x
3
1x
6
2¶1¶
3
2 +2x
3
1x
8
2¶1+ x
3
1x
6
2¶1¶
2
2 +3x1¶1¶
2
2 ¶
3
3 + x3¶
3
3 +
x1¶ 21 + x2¶
2
2  ¶ 32 +2x1¶1+ x1¶2+3¶1;
h21 =  3x113 ¶ 21 ¶ 22 ¶ 23 +3x31x23¶1¶ 23  3x21¶3+2x2¶1  x3 ¶2 2¶3;
h22 =  3x21x2x113 ¶ 32 ¶ 23   x21x22x93¶ 32 + x1x32x23¶ 41 ¶ 33  2x1¶1¶ 22 ¶ 23 + x2x3¶ 21 +
x1¶1 2¶ 22  3x3 ¶3;
h23 = 3x21x
2
2x
2
3¶
5
2 ¶3 3x21x2x23¶ 62 ¶3+ x21x32x23¶ 32 ¶3  x21x22x23¶ 42 ¶3  x21x42¶ 32 +
x21x
3
2¶
4
2 +2x
2
1x
2
2¶
5
2 + x
2
1x
2
2¶
4
2 + x
2
1x
3
2¶
2
2 + x
2
1x
2
2¶
3
2 +3x1x3¶
2
3 +3¶1¶2¶3
 2x2+¶2;
h31 =  3x2x123 ¶2¶3+3x2x103 ¶ 22 ¶3 3x103 ¶ 32 ¶3  x103 ¶ 22 ¶3+ x32x93 
2x2x73¶2¶
3
3 +3x2x
9
3¶2 2x2x73¶ 33 + x1x2x3¶3+¶ 21 ¶2+3x2¶ 23 +
2x1¶3 3x2 2¶3;
h32 =  3x1x103 ¶ 31 ¶3+3x21x73¶ 33 +3x1x73¶1¶ 33 +2x1x33¶ 33 + x43 2x1¶ 22  
¶ 32  3x2¶ 23   x2x3+ x23+3¶1;
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h33 = 2x21x2x
3
3¶1¶2¶3+ x1x
2
2x3¶
3
1   x21x3¶ 22 +3x1x3¶1¶ 22 +2x2x3¶1¶ 22  
3x1x3¶ 32  2x3¶1¶ 32 + x1x3¶3  x3¶2 3x1¶3 2x1;
h34 =  2x21x2x103 ¶1¶2  x1x2¶ 31 ¶2¶3  x1x2¶ 31 ¶3 2x21x2¶ 22 ¶3 
2x1x2¶1¶ 22 ¶3+2x
2
1¶
3
2 ¶3+2x1¶1¶
3
2 ¶3 2x1¶ 31 ¶3 3x21¶ 22 ¶3+
3x1x2¶ 22 ¶3+3¶
2
1  3x2¶2+ x1¶3 3x3:
Then the Weyl polynomial p1 has degree 23 and its standard form consists of
141 terms. The Weyl polynomial p2 has degree 21 and there are 150 terms
in its standard form and the polynomial p3 has degree 18 and 204 terms. The
public key is then the set4 Q= fp1; p2; p3g.
(3) Message Space
For the message space, we choose the K-vector space generated by
M = fxa11 xa22 xa33 ¶ b11 ¶ b22 ¶ b33 j ja1j; ja2j; jb2j  1; ja3j  6; jb1j  2; jb3j  3g:
There are 7672 different possible plaintext units and 10 polynomials in the
secret key G have at least one term from Os (I)nM in their supports.
(4) Encryption:
Let the plaintext message m 2 hM iK be given by
m = x22 2x1¶1 3¶ 21 +2x1¶2 3x2¶2 2¶1¶2+¶ 22  2x1¶3  x2¶3+
x3¶3+2¶1¶3 3¶2¶3+3¶ 23 +2x1 3x2 2¶1+¶2+3:
To encrypt this message m, we choose5 sparse polynomials `1; `2; `3 of suffi-
ciently high degree and compute the standard form of the Weyl polynomial
c= m+ `1 p1+ `2 p2+ `3 p3:
For instance, let us encrypt m by choosing `1; `2 and `3 in the above repre-
4This set of polynomials is given in the Appendix C.2.
5These polynomials are chosen in the same way as described in the encryption part of Example
4.3.6.
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sentation of c as follows
`1 =  3x31x32x33¶ 81 ¶ 52 ¶ 53  2x31x2x33¶ 81 ¶ 72 ¶ 53 +2x51x53¶ 71 ¶ 82 ¶3+3¶ 22 ¶3 3¶2¶3;
`2 =  3x61x52x3¶ 81 ¶ 72 ¶3+ x61x42x3¶ 81 ¶ 52 ¶ 43 +2x61x42¶ 81 ¶ 52 ¶ 43 +3x72x3¶ 31 ¶ 42 +
x3¶ 31 ¶
2
3   x1x22x3¶1 ¶ 31 ¶3  x22;
`3 = 2x51x
7
2¶
6
1 ¶
8
2 ¶
6
3 +3x1x
9
2¶
7
2 +2x
5
2¶
3
2 ¶3+ x1x
2
2¶
3
2 ¶
2
3 +¶1:
The resulting ciphertext c has degree 49 and its standard form consists of 6796
terms. Our choice of the polynomials `1; `2; and `3 has not only cancelled the
degree form of `i pi in c but also the lower part of ciphertext polynomial is
dense enough to hide m completely. In fact, out of 18 monomials of m, 16 are
not present in c.
(5) Decryption:
For recovering m we see that m = NRs ;G(c). Therefore, for decryption, we
have to compute normal remainder of the ciphertext polynomial c with re-
spect to the Gro¨bner basis G. In this case, an efficient implementation of the
Division Algorithm recovers m in a few seconds.
In the next chapter, we will study security issues of the concrete instances of
WGBC presented in Examples 4.3.3, 4.3.6, and 4.4.2. We conclude this chapter by
the following remark.
Remark 4.4.3. All instances of WGBC presented in this chapter are based on Weyl
algebras over a finite field of positive characteristic. Although one can also attempt
to construct an instance of WGBC based on the fieldQ of characteristic zero, based
on the experimental results we recommend to use only the fields of characteristic
p > 0. As we have seen in the observations in Example 4.1.4, the field Q is prone
to coefficient-swell, and the growth of the support of polynomials can result in the
requirement of large amount of memory for storing intermediate results during the
computations. These phenomena may also result in unexpected size of the cipher-
text polynomial and reduce the efficiency of the decryption process.
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Efficiency and Security
In this chapter we will consider the efficiency of theWeyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosys-
tems. We also check the security issues of these systems against known standard
attacks that are described in Chapter 3 and show that the instances of WGBC pre-
sented in Chapter 4 are secure against these attacks. We start by describing the
efficiency of the computations that are involved when using the cryptosystem.
5.1 Efficiency
The efficiency of the WGBC strongly depends on the encryption and the decryption
algorithms of the cryptosystem, that is, on the amount of work to be done by both
Alice and Bob for secret communication over a public network. Therefore, in the
setting of WGBC, both Alice and Bob have to be able to compute efficiently in the
Weyl algebra An of index n over a field K of characteristic p> 0.
The two main operations involved in the encryption and the decryption pro-
cesses of a WGBC are ‘Weyl multiplication’ and the computation of the ‘normal
remainder’ modulo the secret key G. Efficient algorithms are available for perform-
ing these computations in Weyl algebras. These algorithms have been implemented
in various computer algebra systems (see Section 2.6). We have also implemented
these algorithms for the package Weyl of computer algebra system ApCoCoA. They
can be used by calling the functions Weyl.WMul() and Weyl.WNR(), respec-
tively. We refer to Appendix A for the description of these functions.
5.1. Efficiency
Another important operation involved in the process of secret communication
is the transmission of the ciphertext message m over a public network. In the set-
tings of a WGBC, the plaintext and the ciphertext units are the Weyl polynomials
m and c respectively. We define the data-rate for transmitting a ciphertext unit over
a network as the ratio of the size of the support of m to the size of the support of
c. Moreover, the term message expansion refers to the length increase of a mes-
sage when it is encrypted. One can measure the efficiency of Gro¨bner basis type
cryptosystems either by the data-rate or by the message expansion. The message
expansion can become a serious efficiency issue of such cryptosystem if the sup-
port of the resulting ciphertext grows too large as compared to the support of the
plaintext unit m. It does not only affect the data-rate but also the storage and the
decryption of the resulting ciphertext. In practice, it is very likely that, due to the
way encryption is performed in such cryptosystems, the Supp(c) may become very
large if various parameters are not properly restricted. For example, consider the
Koblitz’s “graph perfect code instance” of PCC presented in [25] (Ch. 5, x7), where
the base ring is the commutative polynomial ring P= F2[x1; : : : ;xn] in n indetermi-
nates over the finite field F2. For security considerations, among other parameters,
Koblitz suggested to use nt 500. In [23], the cryptanalysis of this instance of Polly
Cracker is carried out. It is shown that even, by restricting n to 200, one gets a
ciphertext polynomial containing more than 550;000 terms in its support whereas,
there is only one term in the support of m (see [23] for details). This, of course,
results in a very bad data-rate for transmitting c. We shall now discuss the effi-
ciency of WGBC in terms of the time required for the decryption and in terms of
the data-rate for sending a ciphertext unit to its intended recipient.
In Chapter 2, we have noted that the multiplication of Weyl polynomials can
increase the size of the resulting ciphertext given by the expression
c= `1 p1+   + `s ps+m:
This fact can reduce the efficiency of WGBC by decreasing the ‘date-rate’ for trans-
mitting the ciphertext c over a network and also by decreasing the performance of
the decryption process. The larger the size of the support of the ciphertext polyno-
mial, the slower will the computation of normal remainder NRs ;G (c) with respect
to the secret Gro¨bner basis G be. Of course, the efficiency of the decryption pro-
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cess also depends on the size and the number of polynomials in the secret key G .
On the basis of our experimental results, it has been observed that these issues are
controllable in the setting of WGBC. This can be seen in the following table by
observing the time (in seconds on our computing machine) taken by the decryption
process and the data-rate for transmitting c, for our instances of WGBC presented
in Examples 4.3.3, 4.3.6, and 4.4.2.
WGBC Decryption Data-Rate
Ex. 4.3.3 0.79 1/246
Ex. 4.3.6 0.59 1/238
Ex. 4.4.2 0.63 1/377
Table 5.1: WGBC: Decryption Time and Data-Rate
From the above table and many other similar instances of WGBC, we observe that
instances of WGBC can be constructed which are efficient in terms of the time
required by the decryption process. As far as the efficiency in terms of the data-
rate is concerned, from the above table, we believe that the data-rates1 achieved by
instances of WGBC are manageable as compared to the instances of usual CGBC
that have been presented so far. At the same time, as compared to usual CGBC,
this nature of Weyl multiplication also gives WGBC additional security by hiding
the coefficients of various terms of the plaintext in the above representation of c.
Later, we will see that, since in the process of Weyl multiplication many new terms
are introduced, it makes the “intelligent” linear algebra attack harder to apply on an
instance of a WGBC.
Note that, from Proposition 2.1.5, the growth of the product of Weyl polyno-
mials also depends on the characteristic of the underlying field K of An. That is,
for fixed f ;g 2 An, the larger the characteristic of the base field K, the greater will
the size of the support of the product f g be. For characteristic p= 0, for example,
1These data-rates depend on the size of the support of the the message m. Depending on the
size of the message spaceM , the message m could have a larger support and this might result in a
more better or similar data-rate as size of the Supp(c) may also increase for hiding various terms in
Supp(m).
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when K =Q, the size of the support of this product will be a maximum. In partic-
ular, given two Weyl terms t = xa ¶ b and t 0 = xa 0 ¶ b 0 , then from Proposition 2.1.5
it follows that the size of the support of the standard form of t t 0, together with the
exponents b and a 0 also depends on the characteristic p of the underlying field K
of the corresponding Weyl algebra. For fixed b and a 0 this size is maximal when
p = 0. That is why, in the concrete instances of WGBC presented in Section 4.3,
we have not used Weyl algebras over the field K of very large characteristic p.
In the next section we shall now discuss the security of WGBC against known
standard attacks. In particular, we test our instances of WGBC presented in Section
4.3, by applying attacks based on linear algebra, the chosen ciphertext attack and
the partial Gro¨bner basis attack.
5.2 Linear Algebra Attacks
In Section 3.3 we have described two attacks on PCC and CGBC, namely, the basic
linear algebra attack and the “intelligent” linear algebra attack. In this section we
briefly describe these attacks again in the setting of WGBC. We have implemented
Attacks 3.5.1 and 3.6.1 in the setting of WGBC for the computer algebra system
ApCoCoA2. We shall see that the instances of WGBC can be constructed that are
secure against these attacks.
First we consider the basic linear algebra attack for WGBC. It is the same as
Attack 3.5 for CGBC described in Chapter 3. For the sake of completeness, we
rephrase it below in the setting of WGBC.
Attack 5.2.1. Basic Linear Algebra Attack for WGBC
Given an instance of WGBC, recall that the ciphertext polynomial c is constructed
as follows:
c= m+ `1p1+   + `rpr:
In this representation of c, an eavesdropper, Eve knows the public polynomials
p1; : : : ; pr and the stolen ciphertext c. She also knows a setM containing the sup-
2see Appendix B.3 and B.4 for these implementations
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port of m. Therefore, she can perform the following steps to attack the system using
linear algebra.
(1) Fix an initial guess for the degree bound d0 for the coefficient polynomials
`1; : : : ; `s by setting d0 = dc dp.
(2) For i= 1; : : : ;s,
(i) Write down the polynomials `i as `0i =å j ai j t j with indeterminate coef-
ficients ai j, where the sum ranges over all j such that the terms t j are all
terms of degree  d0.
(ii) Write down the message m as m0 = å j b j t j with indeterminate coeffi-
cients b j, where the sum ranges over all j such that the terms t j are the
elements ofM .
(3) Compute the standard form of
c0 = m0+ `01 p1+   + `0r pr
to obtain a general ciphertext representation c0 in the unknowns ai j and b j.
(4) Formulate a linear system of equations for the indeterminates ai j;b j by equat-
ing coefficients of c0 to those of the original ciphertext c.
(5) Solve the above linear system of equations using linear algebra.
Case 1: If the system has a solution then recover the message m using the values
b j obtained from the solution of the system. That is, compute m=m0 =
å j b jt j, and stop.
Case 2: If the system has no solution, then replace d0 by d0 + 1 and go to
Step (2).
As in the case of CGBC, if the polynomials c and pi are sparse, then the diffi-
culty of the resulting problem of polynomial system solving increases as the number
dc dp gets larger. In particular, one has to make the degree bounds dc  dp large
enough, in order to generate linear systems of equations in too many indeterminates
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to be solvable in an acceptable amount of time. At this point the first important dif-
ference between CGBC and WGBC stems from Proposition 2.1.5. As explained in
the last section, the process of bringing c= `1 p1+   +`s ps+m into standard form
creates a large number of terms in the support of c. Hence the indeterminates ai j
appear in many different linear equations, and the linear equations are not sparse.
Therefore, the user of a WGBC can make the resulting linear system of equation
difficult to solve by selecting parameters n;dc;dp and d` appropriately.
By using an implementation of Attack 5.2.1, let us now examine how the in-
stances of WGBC presented in Section 4.3 can be considered as secure against the
basic Linear Algebra Attack.
Example 5.2.2. For the instance of the WGBC of Example 4.3.3, suppose that an
attacker tries to recover the plaintext message m by using an implementation of the
basic linear algebra attack. Note that in this case dc = 91 and the public polyno-
mials p1 and p2, have degrees 36 and 48 respectively. Therefore, the initial degree
bound for the polynomials `01; and `
0
2 is d0 = dc dp = 55. An implementation of
Attack 5.2.1 on our ‘computing machine’ resulted in a dense linear system of size
3;183;545910;967 which could not be solved. Moreover, because of the cancel-
lation of the degree forms DF(`i pi), in c, for the success of the attack, an attacker
has to solve even a larger linear system of equations.
Example 5.2.3. Let us now consider the instance of WGBC presented in Example
4.3.6. Before applying the attack, we determine the size of the linear system of
equations that will be created by the basic linear algebra attack. In this case, we
have dc = 57, and the degrees of the public polynomials p1; p2; and p3 are 20, 14,
and 28 respectively. Therefore, to attack the system by using Attack 5.2.1, we have
to start by assuming that the degrees of the polynomials `01; `
0
2; and `
0
3 are 37, 43,
and 29 respectively. We also write the message m as a polynomial m0 of degree
less than or equal to 3 with indeterminate coefficients. With these informations,
the basic linear algebra attack on this instance of WGBC will result in a linear
system of equations of size 67;945;52121;703;514. We believe that this system
is infeasible to solve using the current known techniques of solving a dense as well
as sparse linear system of equation over some finite field.
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One can also similarly see that an attempt for breaking the cryptosystem pre-
sented in Example 4.4.2 by applying Attack 5.2.1 will be fruitless.
However, as described in Section 3.6, there is a more serious version of the
basic linear algebra attack that is known as the “intelligent” Linear Algebra Attack
[25]. The idea of the attack is to reduce the size of the linear system by reducing
the number of unknowns in the linear system of equations obtained by the basic
Linear Algebra Attack 5.2.1. Below we briefly describe this attack in our setting of
WGBC and explain how WGBC can be made secure against it.
Attack 5.2.4. Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack for WGBC
Consider an instance of WGBC based on a Weyl algebra An. Let Bn be the set of
all terms of An. Recall that, in the setting of WGBC, encryption is achieved by
computing the standard form of
c= m+ `1p1+   + `sps:
For i = 1; : : : ;s, write the coefficient polynomial `i as the polynomial `0i with inde-
terminate coefficients bi j. Instead of using a dense representation of `0i, compute the
following set D.
D= ft 2 Bn j 9 tp 2
s[
i=1
Supp(pi); s.t. t  tp = tc for some tc 2 Supp(c)g:
The set D Bn is the set of all the candidate terms for each `i.
Then use indeterminate coefficients bi j in `0i only for the terms t 2D and mount
a linear algebra attack as described in Attack 5.2.1. That is, with these settings, one
can tries to mount the attack on an instance of WGBC by following all the steps of
Attack 3.6.1.
For the usual CGBC case, this attack might be very serious because of the fact that
multiplication and addition of commutative polynomials rarely cancel terms com-
pletely. Moreover, as explained in Remark 3.6.2, this attack is more efficient when
input polynomials are sparse. In the setting of WGBC, We have already explained
in Section 5.1 that the process of converting `i pi to standard form introduces many
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new terms in the ciphertext c and in turns reduces the sparsity of c. That is, the sup-
port of c becomes rather large and essentially all terms of suitable degrees pseudo-
divide some term in Supp(c). Hence the set D in the Intelligent Linear Algebra
Attack will contain a large number of candidate terms for the polynomial `0i. In
other words, by a suitable choice of WGBC parameters given in Remark ??, the
user of WGBC can make it difficult to solve the linear system of equations obtained
by using this attack.
Let us illustrate our claims with an extremely simple example.
Example 5.2.5. In the Weyl algebra A2 = F31[x1;x2;¶1;¶2], consider the polynomi-
als
p1 = 2x51¶
2
1 +4x
5
2+5x
3
1x2 2x21x22+4x31¶1+4x22+3x2¶1 2;
p2 = 33x31x
3
2¶
2
1 ¶2+ x
3
1x
4
2+4x
2
1¶
2
1 +8x
3
1+8x
2
1x2+2x2+3:
Let us use the coefficient polynomials
`1 =  6x42¶ 31 ¶ 52 +10¶ 41 +9¶ 31 +8¶ 32  ¶ 22 ; and
`2 = 4x21x2¶
3
1 ¶
4
2  6x1¶ 31  12¶ 32 +15¶ 21 +14¶ 22
for the encryption. Notice that the numbers of terms in the supports of p1; p2; `1
and `2 are 8, 7, 5 and 5 respectively. The resulting ciphertext c = m+ `1p1+ `2p2
has degree 11 and there are 184 terms in its standard form. However, in order to
mount the intelligent linear algebra attack in this setting, the number of terms we
have to consider for `1 and `2 is 268 each. This means that we have to solve a
linear system of equations in more than 500 indeterminates. On the other hand,
if the same set of polynomials are considered in the commutative polynomial ring
P = F31[x1;x2;¶1;¶2], then the intelligent linear algebra attack results in a linear
system with 220 unknowns.
We have implemented Attack 5.2.4 for the computer algebra system ApCoCoA
(see Appendix B.4) and tried to break the instances of WGBC presented in Section
4.3. We summarize our observations in the following examples.
Example 5.2.6. Consider the instance of WGBC given in Example 4.3.3 and ap-
ply the intelligent linear algebra attack using the ciphertext c, the public polyno-
mials p1; p2 and the message space M as inputs. Note that, we have dc = 91
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and the public polynomials p1 and p2 have degrees 36 and 48 respectively. The
total number of monomials in the public polynomials is 298. Therefore, the at-
tack will start by initialising the degree d = d0 = 55 for the polynomials `01 and `
0
2
in unknown indeterminates bi j. The next step is then to compute the set D for
the candidate terms that are used for the encryption as explained above in the as-
sumption of Attack 5.2.4. In this way, as compared to the basic linear algebra
attack, the total number of unknowns bi j reduces to 90,634 and we have to perform
(90;634  2808) 298 = 26;172;148 Weyl multiplications of monomials for cre-
ating the general ciphertext c0 in these unknowns. By comparing the coefficients
of c0 to those of c, the attack then results in a linear system of 368;344 equations
in 90;634 unknowns. This task takes about 7 hours of CPU time on our comput-
ing machine. The next step is the setting-up of matrices for using linear algebra
to solve this system. Another time consuming process of creating and filling up a
large matrix of dimension 368;34490;634 then starts. The resulting matrix con-
tains 43,058,100 number of non-zero entries. We were unable to solve the system
using the ApCoCoA package LinBox based on the C++ library of LinBox [16].
On the other hand, in these circumstances, if an attacker somehow is successful
in solving this system by putting additional resources like using high-power com-
puters and implementation of the attacks at lower level, he will learn that the system
has no solution and that degree d0 should be first increased to 56 and then to 57.
Each time he has to try to solve even a larger system with more effort. With these
observations, we believe that the instance of WGBC presented in Example 4.3.3 are
to be hard to break by using intelligent linear algebra attack.
Remark 5.2.7. Because of the requirement (5) of Procedure 4.2.1, we note that,
after bringing c= `1p1; : : : ; `sps+m into standard form, the degree form DF(`i pi)
cancel . An attacker does not know how many terms in the upper part of the cipher-
text polynomial c are cancelled during this process. Therefore, the linear system of
equation obtained by the first iteration of Attack 5.2.4 may not have any solution.
That is depending on the number of terms cancelled in the upper-part of c, the at-
tacker has to try solving more than one systems of linear equation, each time with
more effort and resources. As we have seen in the above example that for recov-
ering the plaintext message m, the attacker has to solve three very large systems of
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equations. Moreover, the users of WGBC can always make more difficult to solve
the resulting linear system of equations. For instance, they can use the polynomials
`1; : : : ; `s in such a way that makes the ciphertext dense in the lower and the middle
parts.
For the instance of WGBC discussed in the above example, let us use the sug-
gestions of choosing `i in the above remark and construct the following example.
Example 5.2.8. Consider again the instance of WGBC given in Example 4.3.3.
Here we have the Weyl algebra A2 = F13[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] and the term ordering s =
DegRevLex. The message m for sending using WGBC is given by
m= 6x42¶ 32 +6¶ 62 +5x42 ¶ 42 +6x32+6¶ 32 + x21+ x2¶2 3¶1¶2+2x1 5
For encryptingm, we now choose different Weyl polynomials `1; `2 2A2 as follows:
`1 =  5x101 x162 ¶ 121 ¶ 192  2x81x182 ¶ 101 ¶ 212   x61¶ 131 +¶ 131  2¶ 132  3x51¶ 51   x51x32 
3x51+ x1¶1 2x2¶2+¶1¶2 ¶1+1;
`2 = 4x111 x
13
2 ¶
9
1 ¶
12
2  6x91x152 ¶ 71 ¶ 142   x61¶ 131 +¶ 131  2¶ 132   x51x32 ¶ 51 +4¶ 21 ¶2+
x1¶1 3x2¶2 4¶1¶2+ x2+2¶2+2:
With these `1 and `2, the new ciphertext polynomial c = m+ `1 p1+ `2 p2 has de-
gree 91 and there are 5278 terms in its standard form. The message m is also
well-hidden, i.e. out of 12 monomials of m, 10 are not present in the ciphertext
c. Again an efficient implementation of the normal remainder algorithm takes 2:7
seconds to decrypt the ciphertext. If an attacker tries to break the cryptosystem by
using the intelligent linear algebra attack, then the attack starts with initial degree
d0 = 55 for the polynomials `01; `
0
2 and results in a linear system 570,356 equations
in 144,470 unknowns. This resulting system of equations is much harder to solve as
compared to the linear system obtained by applying intelligent linear algebra attack
on the ciphertext c of Example 4.3.3.
Remark 5.2.9. Although we were unable to solve the linear system resulting from
the intelligent linear algebra attack on the instance of WGBC in the Example 4.3.3
and its modification in Example 5.2.8, we recommend to use a Weyl algebra of
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index n> 2 and choose the number of public polynomials s> 2 for achieving suf-
ficient level of security against this attack. In fact, the larger the number of polyno-
mials in public key, the larger will the number of unknowns in the resulting linear
system be. This means that the linear system resulting from the intelligent linear
algebra attack can always be made more difficult to solve by increasing the number
of polynomials in the public key Q. This together with the suggestion given in Re-
mark 5.2.7 provides us sufficient flexibility for making an attempt of mounting the
intelligent linear algebra attack impractical.
Let us now observe how this attack behaves for the cryptosystems presented in
Examples 4.3.6, and 4.4.2.
Example 5.2.10. Consider the instance of WGBC of Example 4.3.6. Note that,
here we have the ciphertext polynomial c of degree 57 and its standard form consists
of 4177 terms. In this setting, the attack starts with an initial degree of d0 = 43 for
the polynomials `01; `
0
2; and `
0
3 with unknowns bi j. The set D of candidate terms for
these polynomials contains 101,792 terms and the total number of monomials in all
public polynomials is 217. Therefore, for the general ciphertext polynomial c0 of
degree 57, we have to perform 22;088;864 Weyl multiplications of monomials. An
implementation of this attack determines the size of the linear system required to
solve is 5;872;648 305;460. Without setting up matrices for the corresponding
system of equations, this task, took 47:3 hours of CPU time on our computing
machine. We believe that this linear system of equations is very hard to solve by
using current solving techniques. Therefore, we claim that this instance of WGBC
is hard to break with the intelligent linear algebra attack.
Example 5.2.11. For the instance of WGBC presented in Example 4.4.2, we have
Weyl algebra A3 = F3[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] of index 3 and the term ordering s =
DegRevLex. In this case, we have dc = 49, the degree of the ciphertext c. The
support of c contains 6798 terms. There are 495 total number of monomials in the
polynomials p1; p2; and p3 and their minimal degree is 18. With these ingredients,
the intelligent linear algebra attack fails to succeed for this instance of WGBC.
In fact, in this case an attacker has to start with the initial guess d0 = 31 for the
polynomials `0i with unknowns bi j. For the success of the attack, he has to solve a
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linear system of dimension 6;903;190640;083, which, we believe, is extremely
hard. The number of non-zero entries in the resulting matrix is 356,669,618.
Remark 5.2.12. Here we remark that the linear algebra type attacks, being single-
break attack, have nothing to do with the secret key G. That is, if the attack is
successful, the attacker would only be able to determine the plaintext message m
corresponding to one stolen ciphertext c. The success of breaking one ciphertext
does not reduce the amount of the time and the resources required to break another
ciphertext.
All the above examples show that the instances of WGBC can be constructed
to make them secure against the intelligent linear algebra attack. We believe that
an attempt of trying to break an instance of WGBC by using these attacks is not
practical. Note that the number of non-zero entries in the matrices of the linear sys-
tems of Examples 5.2.10 and 5.2.11 indicate that these matrices are sparse. Further
investigation in this direction could be an attempt of exploiting the sparsity of these
matrices for solving these linear systems in an efficient way. But is this practical?
How difficult is it to accomplish? Are the corresponding matrices sparse enough
that one can easily solve the system by exploiting the number of zero entries in
these matrices? These are the questions that can only be answered by investigat-
ing ‘structure’ of these matrices and by studying all the techniques that have been
developed so for solving ‘sparse linear systems’.
We have not yet performed a detailed investigation for the possibility of such
an attempt by using ‘sparse linear algebra’. The techniques from the sparse linear
algebra are efficient but most of the techniques depend on the structure of the corre-
sponding matrices. In particular, the efficiency depends not only on the number of
non-zero entries but also on their distribution in these matrices. Many techniques
are designed only to work with the square matrices, i.e. with the determined sys-
tems and most of them are efficient for the symmetric matrices. We are interested
in how efficient are the techniques for solving a sparse linear system when applied
to the linear systems of Examples 5.2.10 and 5.2.11. On the other hand, if these
systems are possible to solve by exploiting the sparsity of the system, we can al-
ways use suggestions of Remarks 5.2.7 and 5.2.9 such that mounting the intelligent
linear algebra attack results in a linear system of even a more larger size. In this way
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we can make an attempt of using sparse linear algebra techniques more difficult to
apply for the possibility of solving the resulting linear systems.
We illustrate it by the following example.
Example 5.2.13. Consider again the instance of WGBC of Example 4.4.2. In this
case, the number of polynomials in the public key Q is s = 3 and the secret key G
contains 11 polynomials g1; : : : ;g11. As suggested in Remark 5.2.9, we change the
parameter s to 3 and construct two new polynomials p4 and p5 for the public key
Q. In order to achieve this, let us choose
h41 =  3x22x43¶ 21 ¶ 42 ¶ 33  2x43¶ 21 ¶ 62 ¶ 33 +3x31x23¶1¶ 23   x1x2¶ 31 ¶2¶3 2x21x2¶ 22 ¶3 
2x1x2¶1¶ 22 ¶3+2x
2
1¶
3
2 ¶3+2x1¶1¶
3
2 ¶3 2x1¶ 31 ¶3 3x21¶ 22 ¶3+3x1x2¶ 22 ¶3
 3x21¶3+2x2¶1+3¶ 21  3x2¶2+ x1¶3+3x3 2¶3;
h42 = 3x1x43¶
5
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 + x1x
2
2x3¶
3
1   x21x3¶ 22 +3x1x3¶1¶ 22 +2x2x3¶1¶ 22  3x1x3¶ 32
 2x3¶1¶ 32 + x1x3¶3  x3¶2 3x1¶3 2x1;
h51 =  3x31x32¶ 32 ¶ 43   x31x32x23¶ 32 ¶3+¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3  x31¶ 43 +3x3¶ 43   x31 3x32+3x3;
h52 =  3x21x22x73¶ 32 ¶ 33   x21x22x93¶ 32 + x1x32x23¶ 41 ¶ 33  2x1¶1¶ 22 ¶ 23 + x2x3¶ 21 + x1¶1 
2¶ 22  3x3 ¶3;
h53 = 3x31x
3
2x
3
3¶
3
2 ¶3  x21x3¶ 22 +3x1x3¶1¶ 22 +2x2x3¶1¶ 22  3x1x3¶ 32  2x3¶1¶ 32 +
x1x3¶3  x3¶2 3x1¶3 2x1:
and then compute the standard form of the polynomials
p4 = h41 g1+h42 g9; and p5 = h51 g4+h52 g6+h53 g7:
The polynomial p4 has degree 18 and contains 198 terms in its standard form. The
degree of p5 is 22 and there are 124 terms in its standard form. The public key
is now Q = fp1; p2; p3; p4; p5g. Let the message m be as given in Example 4.4.2.
To encrypt the message m, together with `1; `2; `3 be as given in the above referred
example, we also choose
`4 = x51x
8
2x
9
3¶
4
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
2
3 + x
2
1x2x
3
3¶1¶
2
3 ; and `5 =  ¶ 61  2¶2 2¶3;
and compute the ciphertext c as
c= m+ `1 p1+ `2 p2+ `3 p3+ `4 p4+ `5 p5:
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With these changes, the resulting ciphertext c again has degree 49 and its support
consists of 8410 terms. Moreover, the messagem is well hidden. If we mount the in-
telligent linear algebra attack with the above 5 polynomials in the public key and the
ciphertext c, then the resulting linear system has 1;544;445 number of unknowns.
Note here the difference in the number of unknowns with the corresponding number
in Example 5.2.11. That is what we have explained in Remark 5.2.9 that by increas-
ing the number of polynomials in the public key, one can always make it difficult
to apply the intelligent linear algebra attack to the resulting instance of WGBC.
Moreover, if we choose `4; `5 such that the degree dc also becomes larger than 49,
the degree of the ciphertext in Example 4.4.2, then the resulting linear system will
become more difficult to solve. For instance, by choosing
`4 = x91x
6
2x
6
3¶
3
1 ¶
4
2 ¶
7
3 + x
5
1x
8
2x
9
3¶
4
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
2
3   x21x2¶ 31 ; and
`5 =  x71x52x33¶ 81 ¶ 42 ¶ 43 + x71x42x33¶ 81 ¶ 52 ¶ 43 +2x71x32x33¶ 81 ¶ 62 ¶ 43  2¶2 2¶3;
the resulting ciphertext has degree dc = 52 and 9267 terms in its support. In this
setting, mounting the intelligent linear algebra attack, with the initial guess of d0 =
34, results in a linear system in 2;247;150 number of unknowns. Because of the
cancellation of highest degree terms in c, an attacker will have to solve a very large
linear system in more than 2.2 million indeterminate coefficients for the success of
the intelligent linear algebra attack.
5.3 Partial Gro¨bner Basis Attack
We have described in Section 3.7 the partial Gro¨bner basis attack for the usual com-
mutative Gro¨bner basis cryptosystem. The attack works exactly the same way for
Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems as described in Attack 3.8. The obvious defence
to this kind of attack is to choose the public polynomials p1; : : : ; ps in such a way
that the computation of partial Gro¨bner bases of the ideal J= hp1; : : : ; psi is infea-
sible. In this section, we discuss the security of the instances of WGBC of Section
4.3 against a partial Gro¨bner basis attacks.
Recall that by a partial Gro¨bner basis H of the ideal J = hp1; : : : ; psi  An upto
the degree bound d we mean the output of the left Buchberger’s Algorithm 2.3.24
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modified such that each computation involving polynomials of degree higher than
d is not performed. In the setting of WGBC an attacker can apply the partial
Gro¨bner basis attack as follows:
Attack 5.3.1. Partial Gro¨bner Basis Attack and WGBC
Consider the Weyl algebra An = K[x1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶n] of index n over K. Let s
be a degree compatible term ordering on Bn. Given an instance of WGBC based on
An, let J = hp1; : : : ; psi be the ideal generated by the polynomials in the public key
Q. For the partial Gro¨bner basis attack on WGBC, an attacker performs following
steps.
(1) Choose a number d > dp, where dp =maxfdeg(pi)ji= 1; : : : ;sg.
(2) Compute a partial Gro¨bner basis H of J upto the degree bound d. LetH be
the tuple of polynomials in H.
(3) Compute the normal remainder m0 = NRs ;H (c). If m0 is contained in the
message space then stop otherwise replace d by d+1 and go to Step(2).
The probability of the success of the above Attack 5.3.1 increases with the in-
crement in the degree bound d for H. In fact, it is more likely to succeed if d = dc,
the degree of ciphertext polynomial (see [8]). In [8], it is also suggested to start the
attack by setting d = dc in the setting of CGBC. The question arises here: is this
realistic? or is it always feasible to compute a partial Gro¨bner basis upto the degree
bound d = dc. In our setting of WGBC, the answer is NO. In fact for an instance
of WGBC, there is a strong computational evidence that if the difference dp dc is
greater than 25 then it is very likely that the computation of a partial Gro¨bner basis
of J turned out to be infeasible. This claim is a consequence of Proposition 2.1.5.
Even if we have an ideal I generated by randomly chosen sparse Weyl polynomials
f1; : : : ; fk and plan to compute a partial Gro¨bner basis upto a degree bound d then
at each step of the left Buchberger’s Algorithm there is a considerable expansion in
the supports of the resulting polynomials. This expansion of the supports not only
increases the amount of the memory required to store the intermediate results but
also affects the efficiency of computing the normal remainder of S-polynomials of
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very large sizes with respect to a set of polynomials with very large supports. In
short, these facts slow down the entire computation enormously. We have already
observed this behaviour of Buchberger’s algorithm in Examples 4.1.2, 4.1.3, and
4.1.4.
In Procedure 4.2.1 for constructing a WGBC, we have explicitly requested that
the designer checks that partial Gro¨bner bases of J are hard to compute for large
degree bounds. As explained above, this is very easy to accomplish in the case of
WGBC for a suitable choice of the parameter dp and the polynomials hi j used for
creating the public polynomials p1; : : : ; ps. Of course, our polynomials p1; : : : ; pr
are not entirely random, since they are contained in a larger ideal which has a sim-
ple Gro¨bner basis, namely G. But we have not been able to use this fact to the
benefit of the attacker, and in all cases that we tried, the predicted expansion of
the supports happened indeed. The success of Attack 5.3.1 highly depends on the
successful computation of a partial Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hp1; : : : ; psi for
large degree bounds. From all our experimental results we believe that in the set-
ting of WGBC, if the difference dc  dp is kept greater than 25 then the success
of the partial Gro¨bner basis attack cannot be guaranteed because of the above ex-
planations. In the following examples we examine the security of the instances of
WGBC presented in Section 4.3 against the partial Gro¨bner basis attack.
Example 5.3.2. Consider theWGBC presented in Example 4.3.3 and let J= hp1; p2i
be the ideal generated by the polynomials in the public key. Note that we have
dc = 91 and dp = maxf36;48g = 48 therefore, to start the attack we set the de-
gree bound d = 60 for computing a partial Gro¨bner basis of J. Using the CAS
Singular on our computing machine, we computed a partial Gro¨bner basis H of
the ideal J in 3613.93 seconds of CPU time. The set H contains 108 polynomi-
als consuming 183 MB of memory. The reduction of the ciphertext c modulo H
returns a remainder with 284;745 terms. This process takes 17547.56 seconds of
CPU time on our computing machine. As required by Attack 5.3.1, we replaced d
with d+ 1 = 61 and continue. For d = 65, we were unable to compute a partial
Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J in 546513:6 seconds (151.81 Hours) of CPU time. At
this point, the computation was progressing very slow and the amount of memory
consumed during the computation was 3481:6 MB. For the possible success of the
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attack, one has to compute a partial Gro¨bner basis of J for the degree bound d  91.
With these observations, we claim that the computation of a partial Gro¨bner basis
for the success of the partial Gro¨bner basis attack is infeasible.
Example 5.3.3. Consider now the instance of WGBC presented in Example 4.3.6.
In this case we have dc = 57 and dp = 28. For attacking the system with Attack
5.3.1, let us choose d = 45. Let J = hp1; p2; p3i be the ideal generated by the
polynomials in the public key Q of the cryptosystem under consideration. With
these ingredients, the computation of a partial Gro¨bner basisH of J for d = 45 takes
136;401:80 seconds on our computing machine. The resulting set H contains 195
Weyl polynomials the amount of memory required to store these polynomials grows
to 12.1 GB. Note here the expansion in the supports of the resulting polynomials.
We interrupted the process of computing the normal remainder of c with respect
to H after 18,921 minutes of CPU time to stop without any output. During this
process the the intermediate results had grown enough to consume more than 16
GB of the system memory. We then started to compute a partial Gro¨bner basis
with the degree bound d = 47 and could not compute H. In fact, we interrupted
the computation after more than 7 days of CPU time on our computing machine
to terminate without an output. At the time of interruption, the computations had
already consumed 16.3 GB of memory and was progressing very slow. Hence there
is a significant computational evidence that the partial Gro¨bner basis attack fails for
this instance of WGBC.
In the following we illustrate how the partial Gro¨bner basis attack fails when
applies to the instance of WGBC of Example 4.4.2.
Example 5.3.4. Consider the case of WGBC presented in 4.4.2. The givenWeyl al-
gebra is A3 = F7[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] and the term ordering is DegRevLex. More-
over, we have dc = 49 and dp = 23. Let J = hp1; p2; p3i be the ideal generated
by the polynomials in the public key Q. In this case we fail to compute a partial
Gro¨bner basis of J due to very fast growth of memory required for the computa-
tions. For instance, using the CAS Singular, we set the degree bound d = 32
for computing a partial Gro¨bner basis H of the ideal J. The computation of H takes
38884.19 seconds on our computing machine. The set H contains 326 polynomials
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and fails to reduce the ciphertext c in 15065 minutes of CPU time. We were unable
to compute a partial Gro¨bner basis of J for a degree bound d > 32 using our current
resources. With these observations, we claim that the instance of this WGBC is
secure against the partial Gro¨bner basis attack.
Notice that in all above examples the attempts of trying to break the instances
of WGBC by partial Gro¨bner basis attack fail. In fact, in all these cases the compu-
tation of a partial Gro¨bner basis for a degree bound d = dc is infeasible. Moreover,
if H is a successfully computed partial Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hp1; : : : ; psi
for some degree bound d such that dp < d < dc, then the normal remainder of the
ciphertext c with respect to H is not contained in the message spaceM .
5.4 Chosen Ciphertext Attack and WGBC
Recall the chosen ciphertext attack explained in the Section 3.9 for the usual CGBC.
In the setting ofWGBC, one can apply the chosen ciphertext attack exactly the same
way as described for the CGBC setting in Attack 3.9.1. That is, the attacker Eve,
should have a temporary access to the decryption black box for decrypting a finite
number of ciphertext messages of her choice. For i = 1; : : : ;r, let us write ‘secret’
polynomials gi in the secret key G as:
gi = ti+hi; with LTs (hi)<s ti
In order to attack an instance of WGBC, Eve should also know or be able to guess
the leading terms ti of the polynomials gi 2 G. With this knowledge, she can then
construct a ‘fake’ ciphertext message of the form
c0i = ti+å
j
h0i j p j:
By using her temporary access to the decryption black box, she decrypt the fake ci-
phertext message c0i. As a result, for each i= 1; : : : ;r, she will get NRs ;G (ci) = hi.
Then by recombining she will find all secret polynomials gi = ti+hi. This reveals
the complete secret key G of the corresponding cryptosystem. This attack works
well both on the basic set-up of CGBC and Rai’s basic non-commutative Polly
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Cracker cryptosystem because their decryption processes are not able to distinguish
such fake ciphertext messages from the original one. To defend this attack in the
setting of non-commutative Polly cracker cryptosystem, Rai and Bulygin [42] have
proposed the following countermeasures:
(1) Do not publish the complete set Os (I). Publish only a (small) part M 
Os (I) and useM as a K-basis for the message space.
(2) Ensure that the tail hi of each polynomial gi 2 G contains at least one term
from Os (I) nM in its support. In this way, if the attacker guesses LTs (gi)
and tries to decrypt it, countermeasure (3) will make sure that he fails.
(3) Design the decryption algorithm such that if the normal remainder of the
ciphertext c is not contained in hM iK then either return an error message
or the original ciphertext without reduction. In this way, when the attacker
decrypts a term outside M , the term is returned unchanged and no secret
information is revealed.
These countermeasures are suggesting us a way of recognising illegal or fake ci-
phertext messages and hence the above explained chosen ciphertext attack will not
work. That is, if the decryption algorithm computes a normal remainder which is
not contained in hM iK , it is clear that an illegal ciphertext was used. Therefore the
decryption algorithm does not reveal the normal remainder, but returns the cipher-
text unchanged. It has been argued that countermeasure (1) reduces the efficiency
of the cryptosystem too much. By restrictingM to a proper subset of Os (I) we
can make the probability for a random polynomial to be a valid ciphertext as small
as we like.
The above explained countermeasures can be adapted for any Gro¨bner basis
type cryptosystem. Since WGBC is a special case of GBC, we have already pro-
posed to design a WGBC in a way that its basic set-up automatically recognises
the illegal ciphertext messages. For instance, notice that in the introduction of the
WGBC in Cryptosystem 4.1.1, we have adapted countermeasures (3). The other
two countermeasures are part of the set-up proposed in Procedure 4.2.1.
Note also that all the instances of WGBC presented in Section 4.3 have resis-
tance against chosen ciphertext attack from the procedures on which they are based.
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5.5 Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
In [25] Koblitz described an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack for PCC (see Chapter
5, x3, Exercise 11) which exploits the fact that PCC is homomorphic. That is, if
c;c0 2 P are ciphertext units corresponding to the plaintext messages m and m0 2 K
respectively, then it holds that c+ c0 and c  c0 are ciphertext units for m+m0 and
m m0 respectively. Koblitz described this attack as follows:
Suppose that two companies A (Alice’s company), and C (Cathy’s company) are
communicating with B (Bob’s company) using Bob’s public key. On many ques-
tions, C is cooperating with B, but there is one extremely important customer who
is taking competing bids from a group of companies led by A and B, and from a
different consortium led by C. C knows that A has just sent B the encrypted amount
of their bid, and she desperately wants to know what it is. Suppose that A’s mes-
sage m is sent as the ciphertext c, and that Cathy is able to see it. Cathy creates a
ciphertext, c0 = c0+ c+m0 where c0 =
s
å
i=1
hipi is an encrypting polynomial, and
c0 decrypts to the element m0 of the message spaceM . She sends c0 to B, suppos-
edly part of a message on an unrelated subject. She then informs B that she had
a computer problem, lost her plaintext, and thinks that an incomplete sequence of
bits was encrypted for Bob. Could Bob please send her the decrypted m0 that she
obtained from c0, so that Cathy can reconstruct the correct message and re-encrypt
it? Since c0 vanishes during the decryption process, and c decrypts to m, it follows
that c0 decrypts to m0 = m+m0. Hence m0 can be used to find m= m0 m0. Bob is
willing to give Cathy m0 because he is unable to see any connection between c0 and
c or between m0 and m, and because Cathy’s request seems reasonable when they
are exchanging messages about a matter on which they are cooperating.
Note that the way c0 is constructed makes it a legitimate ciphertext and there
seems to be no straightforward way for Bob’s decryption algorithm to recognize it
as a security threat. Even with the countermeasures presented in Section 5.4 for the
chosen-ciphertext security, one cannot recognize such a fake ciphertext message.
Moreover, the attack in this form is a single-break attack since the message corre-
sponding to only one ciphertext can be recovered at a time and it has nothing to
with the secret key.
In the following we summarise this attack in our setting of WGBC and then
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provide countermeasures for the security of the instances of WGBC against this
attack.
Attack 5.5.1. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack
Let Alice and Cathy be communicating with Bob using a WGBC. Suppose that
Cathy knows the ciphertext c=m+
s
å
i=1
`i pi 2 An that Alice has just sent to Bob. As
explained above, Cathy has decided to cheat Bob to break the ciphertext c. In order
to recover the plaintextm corresponding to c she has to perform the following steps.
(1) Create a fake ciphertext message c0 as c0 = c0+c+m0, where c0 =
s
å
i=1
`i pi 2
hp1; : : : ; psi and m0 2M .
(2) Request Bob to decrypt c0 and send the result m0 to her. Note that
m0 = NFs ;G (c0) = NFs ;G (c0)+NFs ;G (c)+NFs ;G (m0) = m+m0:
(3) Recover the plaintext message m as m= m0 m0.
In [42], Rai and Bulygin have proposed a countermeasure to overcome the above
attack in the setting of Rai’s non-commutative Polly Cracker cryptosystem. Be-
cause of the richness of the WGBC message spaceM , the countermeasure of [42]
(see Countermeasure 4.3) can also be adapted for the security of WGBC against
Attack 5.5.1. This countermeasure works as follows:
(1) Bob’s public key is Q = fp1; : : : ; psg and he sets his secret key G such that
the message spaceM should be large enough to be partitioned into disjoint
subsets.
(2) Bob chooses Alice’s message space asMA M and Cathy’s message space
asMC M such thatMA\MC = /0.
(3) Design the decryption algorithm to recognize the ciphertext by its sender.
In this way, Bob can easily recognize Cathy’s fake ciphertext of the form c0 =
c0+c+m0, where c is the ciphertext used by Alice to encrypt the messagem2MA.
Let m0 2M be the decryption of c0. Since bothMA andMC are publicly known, if
m0 2MC then m0 does not belong toMA as well asMC and decryption algorithm
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will return an error message about the suspicious nature of Cathy’s ciphertext. On
the other hand, if m0 2MA, then m0 will be an element ofMA and again decryp-
tion algorithm will recognize that an invalid ciphertext is sent by Cathy. Hence by
adapting the countermeasures presented in [42], one can overcome Attack 5.5.1. An
other technique to defend the attack is described in L. Van Ly thesis [35](see x4,4).
A similar countermeasure can also be adapted in the setting of WGBC. We, there-
fore, believe that this attack does not appear to be a major threat for the security
of WGBC. Further study of these cryptosystems might also results in other more
interesting and efficient techniques for the chosen-ciphertext security of WGBC.
5.6 Further Security Parameters
In this section we will describe how additional security of WGBC can be achieved.
In [51] it has been pointed out that for sending a message m to Bob by using a
CGBC, Alice has nothing to do with the characteristic p of the underlying field K
and the term ordering s . Therefore, one can achieve additional security by hiding
the characteristic p of the field K and the term ordering s on the terms of the
base ring from the public information of CGBC. For the case of the usual Polly
Cracker cryptosystems, this suggestion has been worked out in detail in [51]. This
suggestion can also be adapted for the case of WGBC for making the cryptosystem
even more secure.
Remark 5.6.1 (Make p and s secret). Here we remark that one can achieve addi-
tional security by hiding the characteristic p of the field K and the term ordering s
on An from the public information ofWGBC. By keeping p and s secret,
 we increase the cost of linear algebra attack.
 the chosen cipher text attack will not be possible in general settings.
 for the Gro¨bner basis computation of the public ideal J, the attacker has to
guess for a true p and the term ordering s on An.
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Two Sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis
Cryptosystems
In Chapter 4, we have presented several concrete instances of our proposed left
Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystems and in Chapter 5, we have discussed the security
of these instances of WGBC against known standard attacks. We have strong com-
putational evidence that these concrete instances of WGBC have resistance against
these attacks. On the other hand, we are also aware of the possibility of modifying
the attacks that are based on linear algebra. Such improvements might be possible
by introducing some more clever strategies or by playing with the statistics of the
terms in the ciphertext and the public key polynomials for reducing the size of the
resulting linear system of equations to solve it in a reasonable time. Success of
these attacks is also based on the current available techniques for solving a system
of linear equations. Although we were unable to break our instances of WGBC by
using the intelligent linear algebra attack, we are still interested in ‘totally’ avoid-
ing the attacks based on linear algebra. This objective can be achieved by choosing
proper two-sided ideals in Weyl algebras and then construct a GBC based on these
ideals. We shall call such a system a Two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystem
(TWGBC).
In this chapter, we describe two-sided ideals of Weyl algebras and explain how
we can compute a two-sided Gro¨bner basis of such ideals. We shall then introduce
TWGBC in Section 6.2. These cryptosystems are based on the difficulty of comput-
6.1. Two-Sided Gro¨bner Bases
ing two-sided Gro¨bner bases in Weyl algebras over fields of positive characteristic.
We shall also present some concrete instances of such cryptosystems and discuss
their security and efficiency issues.
6.1 Two-Sided Gro¨bner Bases
Let us first recall some definitions from non-commutative polynomial ring theory.
Definition 6.1.1. Given a non-commutative ring R, we say that a subset IT  R is a
two-sided ideal of R if IT is closed with respect to addition and for any `;r 2 R and
f 2 IT we have ` f r 2 I.
Definition 6.1.2. Given a subset F  R of a a ring R, we say that hFiT is the two-
sided ideal generated by F if it is of the form
hFiT = få
i2L
`i firi j `i; ri 2 R; fi 2 F;L finiteg
Moreover, a two-sided ideal IT is called trivial if IT = f0g or IT = R and otherwise
it is called non-trivial.
We shall now describe some two-sided ideals of the Weyl algebra An of index
n. Recall that the Weyl algebra An = K[x1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶n] of index n over the
field K is simple when K has characteristic 0. That is, An does not have any non-
trivial 2-sided ideals if char(K) = 0. On the other hand, if char(K) = p > 0, then
this property does not hold anymore. This follows immediately from the following
example.
Example 6.1.3. Consider the Weyl algebra A1 = Fp[x;¶ ] of index 1 over the finite
field Fp of prime characteristic p. Take the element ¶ p 2 A1. For any term t =
xa ¶ b 2 A1, we have, from Proposition 2.1.5 that
¶ pt = (¶ pxa)¶ b
=
 
minfp mod p;a mod pg
å
j=0
j!

p
j

a
j

xa  j ¶ p  j
!
¶ b
=
 
0
å
j=0
j!

p
j

a
j

xa  j ¶ p  j
!
¶ b
= (xa ¶ p)¶ b = xa(¶ p ¶ b ) = (xa ¶ b )¶ p = t ¶ p
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It follows that ¶ p commutes with every term t 2 A. Therefore, I = h¶ pi, the left
ideal generated by ¶ p, is also a two-sided ideal of A1. Hence A1 is not simple.
In fact, for the Weyl algebra An over a field K = Fp of positive characteristic p
we have Proposition 2.2.9. It states that, if An is a Weyl algebra of index n over a
field K of positive characteristic p > 0, then the center Cn of An is a commutative
polynomial ring in 2n indeterminates over K and it is given by
Cn = K[x
p
1 ; : : : ;x
p
n ;¶
p
1 ; : : : ;¶
p
n ]:
In view of this proposition and the above example, we note that, for the Weyl
algebra An = Fp[x1; : : : ;xn; ¶1; : : : ;¶n], if I is the left ideal generated by the elements
in the set fxp1 ; : : : ;xpn ;¶ p1 ; : : : ;¶ pn g, then it is also be a two-sided ideal. In particular,
any non-trivial left ideal I of An whose system of generators is contained in the
center Cn is always a two-sided ideal of An.
From now on, we let K = Fp be a field of positive characteristic p and let An
be the Weyl algebra of index n over the field K. By an ideal we mean a two-sided
ideal of the Weyl algebra An and we denote it by the symbol IT unless otherwise
specified. The K-vector space basis of An as defined in Section 2.1 is the set Bn of
all terms given by,
Bn = fxa ¶ b j a; b 2 Nn; n 1g: (6.1)
Example 6.1.4. Consider the following Weyl algebra
A2 = F13[x1; x2;¶1; ¶2]
of index 2 over the finite field of characteristic 13. Then the centerC2 of A2 is given
by
C2 = F13[x131 ; x
13
2 ;¶
13
1 ; ¶
13
2 ]:
The following are some non-trivial two-sided ideals of A2:
IT1 = hx131 ;x132 ;¶ 131 ;¶ 132 iT
IT2 = hx131  1;¶ 131  3;2¶ 132  5iT ;
IT3 = hx131 x132  1;¶ 131 ¶ 132  5iT
IT4 = hx262  ¶ 131 ¶ 132  3;x131 x132 ¶ 131  3¶ 132  1iT
IT5 = h¶ 132 iT ; a principal two-sided ideal
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Example 6.1.5. For the Weyl algebra A4 = F2[x1;x2;x3;x4;¶1;¶2;¶3;¶4] of index 4
over the field F2 of characteristic 2, the center C2 is given as
C4 = F2[x21;x22;x23;x24;¶ 21 ;¶ 22 ;¶ 23 ;¶ 24 ]:
The following are non-trivial two-sided ideals of A2
IT = hx41x42¶ 43 ¶ 24  ¶ 41 ¶ 23   x24 1; ¶ 41 ¶ 24   x22x23+ x24+¶ 21  ¶4+1iT
JT = hx61¶ 41   x42¶ 62 + x43¶ 23 + x24¶ 24 +1; ¶ 61 ¶ 42  ¶ 63 ¶ 24 +1;
x41x
4
4  x42x24  x23 ¶ 21 +¶ 23  1iT
Note that each term in the support of the generating polynomial of the above ideals
belongs to the center C4.
Remark 6.1.6. For a two-sided ideal IT  An, if its generating system is contained
in the center Cn then it does not mean that all the elements of IT commute. For
instance, in the Weyl algebra A1 = F3[x;¶ ], the ideal hx3iT is a two-sided principal
ideal generated by x3 2 A1. Here x3 2 Cn and the element ¶ (x3)x = x3(¶ x) =
x3(x¶ +1) = x4¶ + x3 belongs to IT but it is not contained in Cn.
We shall now briefly explain the theory of two-sided Gro¨bner bases of two-sided
ideals of theWeyl algebra An by following the approach of [24] or [26] and compute
two-sided Gro¨bner bases using the algorithm presented in [30].
Given a non-empty subset F  An, we denote the left, right and two-sided ide-
als generated by F by hFiL; hFiR; and hFiT respectively. Recall from Section 2.3,
we consider a left-sided generating system as the set of left-sided generators of a
left-sided ideal and compute its left Gro¨bner basis by using left Division Algorithm
2.3.18 and left Buchberger Algorithm 2.3.24. In the same way one can also com-
pute a right Gro¨bner basis of a right ideal by using the right multiplication instead
of the left in these algorithms. The approach used in [24] and [26] for two-sided
Gro¨bner bases is that, unlike the one-sided case, we consider consider a given two-
sided generating system as a left or right sided generating system equivalent to the
given two-sided one. That is, given a two-sided ideal IT , and a term ordering s ,
then IT , being a two-sided ideal is also a left ideal of An. Therefore, from Chap-
ter 2, Section 2.3 it has left s -Gro¨bner basis GL. We can compute GL by using
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the Buchberger Algorithm 2.3.24. Then, for computing a two-sided Gro¨bner basis
of IT , we can for example start from the left Gro¨bner basis GL, and complete it
successively to the right structure, keeping the left one (see [30], Ch. 2 x3).
Definition 6.1.7. Let s be a term ordering on An and consider a two-sided ideal
IT  A. Let GT = fg1; : : : ;grg be a set of generators of IT . We say that GT is a two-
sided s -Gro¨bner basis of IT if it satisfies one of the following three equivalent
conditions:
(1) hGT iL = hGT iT = IT
(2) hGT iR = hGT iT = IT
(3) hGT iL = hGT iR = IT
In fact, from ([24],Theorem 5.4), the above equalities (2) and (3) follow from (1).
Remark 6.1.8. If a finite subset G is a left s -Gro¨bner basis of the left ideal hGiL
and also a right Gro¨bner basis of the right ideal hGiR, then in general hGiL 6= hGiR.
For instance, consider the Weyl algebra A1 = F11[x;¶ ] with s = DegRevLex, then
G= fxg is left Gro¨bner basis of hxiL and is also a right Gro¨bner basis of hxiR. Now,
xy+ 1 2 hxiL, whereas xy+ 1 =2 hxiR. This implies that hxiL 6= hxiR. Therefore, G
is not a two-sided Gro¨bner basis of hxiT , the two-sided ideal generated by fxg. In
fact, hxiT is not proper.
We are now ready to present an algorithm for computing a two-sided Gro¨bner
basis of a two-sided ideal IT  An. As stated above, the algorithm works as follows.
Algorithm 6.1.9. Two-sided Gro¨bner Basis Algorithm: TwoWGB(IT )
Let IT be a two-sided ideal of Weyl algebra An of index n over a field K = Fp.
Input: Ideal IT := h f1; : : : ; fsi of An and a term ordering s .
Output: A two-sided Gro¨bner basis for IT with respect to s
Perform the following sequence of steps.
(1) Compute a left s -Gro¨bner basis GL of IT .
(2) Multiply every element of L form the right side with the 2n indeterminates of
An selecting one at a time.
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(3) If the normal remainder of the above product with respect to GL is non-zero
then add it to the set GL.
(4) After performing Steps (2) and (3) for each indeterminate, stop if GL is not
changed. Otherwise replace GL by a left Gro¨bner basis of the ideal generated
by GL and continue with Step (2).
Proposition 6.1.10. Algorithm 6.1.9 terminates and returns a two-sided Gro¨bner
basis of the ideal IT with respect to the term ordering s .
Proof. For the proof we refer to [30] (Algorithm 3.1).
The following observation will be important for constructing instances of cryp-
tosystems
Proposition 6.1.11. Let IT = h f1; : : : ; friT be a two-sided ideal of the Weyl algebra
An = Fp[x1; : : : ;xn;¶1; : : : ;¶n] and let s be a term ordering on An. If the generating
polynomials f1; : : : ; fr of IT are contained in the centerCn, then the following claims
hold:
(1) The ideal IT , viewed as a left (resp. right) ideal of An, its left (resp. right) s -
Gro¨bner basis GL will be contained in the center Cn.
(2) The two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis GT of IT is contained in Cn.
Proof. Since for i = 1; : : : ;r we have fi 2Cn, therefore, Supp( fi) Cn. In partic-
ular, for each i we have LTs ( fi) 2 Cn. Therefore, for any pair ( fi; f j), we have
lcm(LTs ( fi);LTs ( f j)) 2 Cn and hence the S-polynomial of fi and f j belongs to
the center Cn. Since Cn is a commutative polynomial ring, it follows that all the
intermediate and final results obtained by the left Division Algorithm 2.3.18 are the
elements ofCn. Therefore, the left s -Gro¨bner basis GL obtained as an output of the
left Buchberger Algorithm 2.3.24 will be contained inCn. This completes the proof
of (1).
We can now prove part (2). From Part (1), the left s -Gro¨bner basis GL is con-
tained in Cn. Note that in Algorithm 6.1.9, for computing two-sided Gro¨bner basis
GT , we first compute GL. Let GL be the tuple of polynomials in GL. Then for
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i= 1; : : : ;n, and for every g 2 GL, we have NRs ;GL(gxi) = 0 and NRs ;GL(g¶i) = 0.
This follows from the fact that GL Cn is left Gro¨bner basis and both gxi = xig2 IT
and g¶i = ¶ig 2 IT . Therefore in the Step (3) of Algorithm 6.1.9, nothing will be
added to the set GL. Hence in this case GT = GL and the claim follows.
We shall now provide some examples of two-sided Gro¨bner bases of two-sided
ideals of An.
Example 6.1.12. For theWeyl algebra A1=F7[x;¶ ]with s = DegRevLex, consider
the subset S = fx7y7+ 1;xy2  1g  A1. Then a two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis of the
ideal hSiT generated by S  A1 turns out to be GT = f1g. Hence hSiT is a trivial
two-sided ideal of A1, whereas the reduced left s -Gro¨bner basis of the left ideal
hSiL is fg1; : : : ;g4g where
g1 = y4  y3  x2+2xy  x 2;
g2 = x2y+ y3+ x2 3xy 3x+3;
g3 = x3 3y3+3x2+ xy 2y2+3x+ y 1;
g4 = xy2 1:
Hence hSiL is a proper left ideal of A1.
Example 6.1.13. Consider the Weyl algebra A3 = F3[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] with s =
DegRevLex. Choose polynomials
f1 = x61x
3
2¶
6
1   x32x33¶ 62 + x33¶ 63  ¶ 31 +¶ 33  1;
f2 = x31¶
6
1   x32¶ 32 + x33¶ 33   x31+¶ 32  1
in A3 and consider the two-sided ideal IT = h f1; f2iT generated by these two polyno-
mials. Then the implementation of Algorithm 6.1.9 returns the setGT = fg1;g2;g3g
as the reduced two-sided Gro¨bner basis of the ideal IT , where
g1 = x32x
3
3¶
6
1 ¶
6
2   x92¶ 62   x62x33¶ 32 ¶ 33   x32x63¶ 63   x33¶ 61 ¶ 63   x62¶ 62 + x32x33¶ 62 +
x32x
3
3¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 + x
6
1x
3
2+¶
9
1 + x
6
2¶
3
2   x32¶ 62   x32x33¶ 33  ¶ 61 ¶ 33   x33¶ 63 +¶ 61  
x32¶
3
2   x32+¶ 31  ¶ 33 +1;
g2 = x31x
6
2¶
3
2   x32x33¶ 62   x31x32x33¶ 33 + x61x32  x31x32¶ 32 + x33¶ 63 + x31x32 ¶ 31 +¶ 33  1;
g3 = x31¶
6
1   x32¶ 32 + x33¶ 33   x31+¶ 32  1:
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Note here that GT is also a left s -Gro¨bner basis of the left ideal IT = h f1; f2iT .
Moreover, GT Cn = F3[x31;x32;x33;¶ 31 ;¶ 32 ;¶ 33 ].
6.2 Two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
Keeping in mind the properties and the structure of two-sided ideals in Weyl alge-
bras, we are now ready to introduce two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
(TWGBC). As before, let the field K = Fp be a finite field of characteristic p and
An be the Weyl algebra of index n over K. Let the K-basis Bn of An be as given
in Equation (6.1) and let s be a term ordering on Bn. Further recall that, given
a set of Weyl polynomials G = fg1; : : : ;grg  An n f0g, we can use the left Di-
vision Algorithm to compute the normal remainder NRs ;G ( f ) of any polynomial
f 2 An with respect to the tuple G = (g1; : : : ;gr) (see Algorithm 2.3.18 and Def-
inition 2.3.20). Moreover, if GT is a two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis of the two-sided
ideal IT , then then it will also be a left s -Gro¨bner basis of the left ideal generated
by GT , i.e. hGT iL = hGT iT = IT . It turns out that every Weyl polynomial f 2 An
has a unique normal remainder NRs ;GT ( f ) (see Theorem 2.4.1), and that if f 2 IT
then NRs ;GT ( f ) = 0 (Theorem 2.4.1, Part (2)). With these ingredients, we are now
ready to introduce the following cryptosystems.
Cryptosystem 6.2.1. Given a Weyl algebra An of index n over K = Fp, let IT be
a non-trivial two-sided ideal of An and let GT = fg1; : : : ;grg be its two-sided s -
Gro¨bner basis. We set GT = (g1; : : : ;gr) andOs (IT ) = BnnfLTs ( f ) j f 2 IT nf0gg.
Then a two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystem (TWGBC) consists of the
following data.
(1) Public Key: A set Q of Weyl polynomials fp1; : : : ; psg contained in IT nf0g
and a subsetM of Os (I) are known publicly.
(2) Secret Key: The reduced two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis GT = fg1; : : : ;grg of
the ideal IT and the set Os (IT ) are kept secret.
(3) Message Space: The message space is the K-vector subspace hM iK of An
generated byM Os (IT ).
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(4) Ciphertext Space: The ciphertext units are Weyl polynomials in An.
(5) Encryption: For encrypting a plaintext message m 2 hM iK , choose Weyl
polynomials `i and ri, and then compute the standard form of
c=
s0
å
i=1
`i pki ri; where s
0  s and ki 2 f1; :::;sg;
to get the ciphertext polynomial c 2 An.
(6) Decryption: Given a ciphertext polynomial c 2 An, compute NRs ;GT (c). If
the result is contained in hM iK , return it. Otherwise, return c.
Note here that since GT is a two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal IT and the
polynomials p1; : : : ; ps 2 IT , it follows that we have NRs ;GT (pi) = 0 for each i =
1; : : : ;s, (see Theorem 2.4.1.2 ). This implies that for ki 2 f1; : : : ;sg
NRs ;GT (m+å
i
`i pki ri) = m;
and hence the correctness of the system follows.
Note. From now onwards, we abbreviate a two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryp-
tosystem as TWGBC.
Again the security of TWGBC strongly depends on the difficulty of computing
two-sided Gro¨bner basis in Weyl algebras. That is, if an attacker can compute GT ,
he can break the cryptosystem. Together with the subset of Os (I) the attacker only
knows the Weyl polynomials fp1; : : : ; psg in the public key Q IT . Therefore, they
have to be created in a way that hides all information about the system of generators
of IT . In particular, the leading terms of polynomials in the secret key should be
well hidden. On the other hand, the attacker might also try to compute a two-sided
s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal JT = hQiT generated by the set of polynomials in
the public key. But, in the setting of Weyl algebras, as in the case of WGBC (see
Section 4.1), we can make this task difficult by choosing suitable polynomials in
the public key Q= fp1; : : : ; psg such that a two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis of the ideal
JT = hp1; : : : ; psiT is hard to compute. To show the existence of such ideals in Weyl
algebras, we present an easily construct example below.
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Example 6.2.2. Let the Weyl algebra An, the term ordering s and the two-sided
ideal IT  An be as given in Example 6.1.13. Then a two-sided Gro¨bner basis of
this ideal is the set GT = fg1;g2;g3g, as given in the same example. We choose two
random sparse polynomials p1; p2 2 IT such that deg(p1) = 18 and deg(p2) = 17.
The number of terms in the standard form of the polynomials p1 and p2 are 204 and
198 respectively. It is very easy and straightforward to choose such polynomials
in the ideal IT by using any computer algebra system. For instance, if f is a dense
polynomial in An such that deg( f ) = 18 then Supp( f ) can contain at most 134596
terms. For getting a sparse polynomial in A3, we first randomly choose less than
one percent i.e. between 1000 - 1300 terms in the Supp( f ) and randomly assign
them coefficients from K = F3 to obtain a new random-looking sparse polynomial
f 0 2 A3. Now we can set p1 = f 0 NRGT ( f 0) and get another random-looking poly-
nomial p1 2 IT . The polynomials p1; and p2 are given in Appendix C.3. Now con-
sider the set Q= fp1; p2g and let JT = hQiT be the two-sided ideal generated by Q.
Then there is a significant computational evidence that a two-sided Gro¨bner basis of
the ideal JT is hard to compute. In this case, using the CAS Singular, our com-
puting machine failed to compute not only a two-sided Gro¨bner basis but also the
computation of a left Gro¨bner basis of the ideal hQiL was found to be infeasible.
This claim is based on the observation that our computation has consumed more
than 3 GB of memory when we stopped it after 38,422.8 seconds of CPU time. At
the time of interruption, computations were progressing too slow due to very large
size of the resulting polynomials.
Remark 6.2.3. It is remarkable to point out here that in the above example and
many other similar cases, it is the very slow reduction process that makes the com-
putation of two-sided Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hQiT infeasible. After couple
of hours of computation, the sizes of the resulting intermediate Weyl polynomials
grow too large to compute their normal remainder effectively.
From these computational results, we claim that it is easy to construct a public
key Q for a TWGBC such that a two-sided Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hQiT is
hard to compute. This claim is based on the results obtained by using an implemen-
tation of Algorithm 6.1.9 for computing two-sided Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl
algebras. But this is not sufficient for constructing a secure instance of TWGBC.
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Rather, one also has to make sure that various attacks proposed by the cryptana-
lysts of the Gro¨bner basis type cryptosystems are either not applicable or are not
practical in the setting of TWGBC. As in the case of WGBC, we can achieve this
objective by fixing parameters of our proposed TWGBC and the way of choosing
public polynomials and various other Weyl polynomials required for the encryption
process. In the following remark, let us first observe an important advantage of
using a two-sided Weyl Gro¨bner basis cryptosystem.
Remark 6.2.4. In the encryption process the ciphertext polynomial c is computed
as
c=
s0
å
i=1
`i pki ri; where s
0  s and ki 2 f1; :::;sg:
Note that for computing c, the sender Alice needs two sets of polynomials, namely
the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s0 and the polynomials r1; : : : ;rs0 . That is, for each pki
she needs a polynomial `i for the left multiplication and a polynomial ri for the
multiplication from the right-hand side with pki . Hence one obvious advantage of
using a TWGBC over a WGBC is that the TWGBC is not vulnerable to the very
serious attacks based on linear algebra of Section 5.2. In this setting, the resulting
polynomial system of equations will be quadratic. Such systems are much harder
to solve than systems of linear equations.
The hardness of solving the above mentioned system of equations also depends
on the various parameters of a TWGBC. These parameters are same as the param-
eters given in Notation 4.1.5 for WGBC, except for one additional parameter dr,
the maximum degree of the polynomials r1; : : : ;rs0 used for the encryption. More-
over, unlike WGBC, for TWGBC the field characteristic has to be positive which is
obviously needed for the existence of two-sided ideals of a Weyl algebra An.
In the next section, we shall now provide a procedure for the key generation and
implementation of practical instances of TWGBC.
6.3 TWGBC Key Generation and Implementation
In the following Procedure 6.3.1 we introduce a step-by-step method for generating
a pair (G;Q) for constructing concrete instances of TWGBC. That is, by following
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these steps, one can generate an apparently secure secret key and a presumably hard
to break ciphertext.
Procedure 6.3.1. Let An be a Weyl algebra of index n over the field K = Fp and let
Bn be its set of terms. Let s be a term ordering on Bn. Then, to construct a concrete
hard instance of Cryptosystem 6.2.1, perform the following steps.
(1) Choose a non-trivial two-sided ideal IT of An such that its two-sided Gro¨bner
basis is easy to compute. Let GT = fg1; : : : ;grg be the reduced two-sided
Gro¨bner basis of the ideal IT such that GT Cn. Let dg = maxfdeg(g) j g 2
GTg.
(2) For i = 1; : : : ;s choose random sparse polynomials pi 2 IT of sufficient high
degree as compare to the degree dg. This can be done for instance by follow-
ing (2a) or (2b) below:
(2a) Choose random sparse polynomials f 01; : : : ; f
0
q 2 An of degrees greater
than dg. For i= 1; : : : ;q, compute fi = f 0i  NRs ;GT ( f 0i ). Then, for each
i, fi 2 IT , and Supp( fi) will also contain terms that are not contained
in the center Cn. Keeping these polynomials secret, choose the poly-
nomials hi j and si j in An and compute the standard form of the Weyl
polynomials
pi = hi1 f1 si1+   +hiq fq siq:
While choosing the polynomials hi j and si j, make sure that the degree
forms DF(hi j f j si j) cancel. The other degree terms of hi j f j si j cancel
or their coefficients are changed in pi by the process of converting the
remaining hik fk sik to standard form. In this way, no important infor-
mation about the polynomials in the secret key GT should be visible in
pi.
(2b) Since, g1; : : : ;gr 2Cn, for i= 1; : : : ;s and j = 1; : : : ;r, choose the poly-
nomials hi j 2 An, and compute the standard form of the Weyl poly-
nomials
pi = hi1 g1+   +hir gr:
While choosing the polynomials hi j, make sure that the degree forms
DF(hi jg j) of highest degree cancel.
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Let the set Q= fp1; : : : ; psg be the public key.
(3) Let JT = hp1; : : : ; psiT be the two-sided ideal generated by the polynomials in
the public key Q. Make sure that not only the complete two-sided s -Gro¨bner
basis of the ideal JT is hard to compute, but also a partial Gro¨bner basis is
infeasible to compute for large degree bounds.
(4) Choose a subset M  Os (IT ) for the message space hM iK in such a way
that every gi contains at least one term in Os (IT )nM .
(5) For constructing a ciphertext polynomial
c=
s0
å
i=1
`i pki ri; where s
0  s and ki 2 f1; :::;sg;
choose the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s0 and r1; : : : ;rs0 such that the following prop-
erties hold:
(a) Make sure that Supp(ås
0
i=1 `i pki ri) contains all terms of Supp(m) and
many terms ofM . In this way, the monomials of m will be either can-
celled or their coefficients will be changed in the lower degree part of
the polynomial c.
(b) Ascertain that the degree forms DF(`ipkiri) cancel in c, and that the
other degree forms DF(`ipkiri) cancel or their coefficients are changed
in c by the process of converting the remaining ` jpk jr j to standard form.
(c) Again, in meeting properties (a) and (b) above, use sufficiently high
powers of ¶1; : : :¶n in the terms of the support of `i and high powers
of x1; : : : ;xn in the terms of the support of ri such that, after bringing
`i pki ri to standard form, there are no wide gaps in degrees of various
terms in Supp(c). This means that due to expansion of the ciphertext
polynomial during Weyl multiplication, the sparsity of the polynomial
c will be reduced and it will be more ‘random-looking’.
(6) Make sure that with the above choices of the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s0 and
r1; : : : ;rs0 , the degree, dc, of the ciphertext c becomes high enough such that
no partial two-sided Gro¨bner basis of the ideal JT can be computed for large
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degree bounds. Moreover, ifH is a partial Gro¨bner basis of JT for a degree
bound less than dc, then ensure that NRs ;H (c) 6= m.
In Section 6.4, we shall see that, if we follow the the steps of Procedure 6.3.1,
the standard attacks become infeasible. In fact, step (2) makes sure that the polyno-
mials in the secret key GT are well concealed. The step (5) ensures that not only the
plaintext message m is well hidden in the ciphertext polynomial c, but, by reducing
the sparsity of the polynomial c and by removing gaps in the degrees of the terms
in the support of c, we are, making c more ‘random-looking’. Similarly, by com-
pleting the steps (3) and (4), we are, respectively making the partial Gro¨bner basis
attack and the chosen ciphertext attack infeasible (see Section 6.4 for details).
Let us now try to construct a concrete instance of a TWGBC. In the following
example, we follow Step (2b) for creating a public key Q.
Example 6.3.2. Consider the Weyl algebra A2 = Z13[x1;x2;¶1;¶2] and let the term
ordering be s = DegRevLex. Choose a subset fF1;F2g  An where
F1 = x131 x
26
2 ¶
26
1  2 and F2 = 3x262 +2x132 ;
Let IT = hfF1;F2giT be the two-sided ideal generated by this subset. then the re-
duced two-sided Gro¨bner basis of IT is the set GT = fg1;g2g, where
g1 = x132 +5 and g2 = x
13
1 ¶
26
1 +2:
We now introduce the following TWGBC
(1) Secret Key:
The secret key is the two-sided Gro¨bner basis GT = fg1;g2g. Let GT =
(g1;g2).
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(2) Public Key:
Choose
f 01 = x
13
2 ¶2+3x
14
2 +5x
13
2  2x131 ¶ 261 x32+2x132 ¶2+3x132 ¶1¶2  x141 ¶ 281 ¶ 22  
x132 ¶
2
1   x31x2¶ 32   x22¶2 7
f 02 = 2x
13
2 ¶
2
2  3x132 ¶ 21 + x131 x262 ¶ 261  3x31x152 ¶ 22 +4x141 x22¶ 281  2x132 ¶ 132 +
x132 ¶1¶
2
2  3¶ 112 x102
and compute f1 = f 01 NFs ;GT ( f 01) and f2 = f 02 NFs ;GT ( f 02). Then
f1 =  x141 ¶ 281 ¶ 22  2x131 x32¶ 261   x132 ¶ 21 +3x132 ¶1¶2+3x142 +3x132 ¶2+5x132
 2x1¶ 21 ¶ 22  4x32 5¶ 21 +2¶1¶2+2x2+2¶2 1
f2 = x131 x
26
2 ¶
26
1 +4x
14
1 x
2
2¶
28
1  2x132 ¶ 132  3x31x152 ¶ 22 + x132 ¶1¶ 22  3x132 ¶ 21 +
2x132 ¶
2
2 +3¶
13
2  2x31x22¶ 22  5x1x22¶ 21 +5¶1¶ 22  2¶ 21  3¶ 22  2
Using f1 and f2, we can create polynomials p1; p2; : : : for the public key Q
by computing the standard forms of
p1 = h11 f1s11+h12 f2s12;
p2 = h21 f1s21+h22 f2s22:
Here we let
h11 = x162 +3¶1+2¶
3
2  1; s11 = x102 +3x31 1;
h12 = x1¶1¶ 22 ; s12 = ¶1;
h21 = x82¶2+ x
12
2 ; s21 = x
20
2 ¶2+ x
11
2 ;
h22 = x1¶1¶ 22 +5¶1¶
2
2 +2; and s22 = x
2
2¶1¶
2
2 +3x
2
1 2x22+1:
Then the Weyl polynomial p1 has degree 68 and its standard form consists of
332 terms. The Weyl polynomial p2 has degree 77 and there are 531 terms in
its standard form. These polynomials p1 and p2 are given in Appendix C.3.
(3) Message Space:
For the message space, we choose the K-vector space generated by the set
M = fxa¶ b j jaj  9; jb j  10g:
There are 133660 different possible plaintext units.
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(4) Encryption:
To encrypt a message m 2 hM iK , we use Step (5) of Procedure 6.3.1 and
choose polynomials `1; `2; `01; `
0
2 and r1;r2;r
0
1;r
0
2 of sufficiently high degree
and compute the standard form of the ciphertext polynomial
c=
s0
å
i=1
`i pki ri; where s
0  2 and ki 2 f1;2sg;
For instance, to encrypt a message
m= 3x21¶ 41 ¶ 42 +6x21x32¶ 52  x1x2¶ 31 ¶ 52 +3x31x32¶ 31  2x31¶ 61 +4x21¶ 71  2x61x2¶1¶2 x71¶ 22 +
x21x
3
2¶
2
1 ¶ 22 +3x31¶ 41 ¶ 22 +3x1x2¶ 51 ¶ 22 +5x2¶ 61 ¶ 22  4x41¶ 21 ¶ 32 +6x42¶ 52 +3x1¶ 82 +3x21x62 
3x21x2¶ 41 ¶2 + 6x41¶ 21 ¶ 22 + x1x2¶ 41 ¶ 22   6x1x22¶ 21 ¶ 32 + 3¶ 51 ¶ 32 + 3¶ 21 ¶ 62 + 4x2¶ 72 + x21x52 +
2x31¶ 41  4x1x2¶ 51 +2x21x42¶2+6x1x52¶2 2x21x2¶ 31 ¶2 2x41¶1¶ 22 +x31x2¶1¶ 22 +6x21x2¶ 42  
3¶ 21 ¶ 52 +2x1x22¶ 32 +6x31x22 2x1x32¶1 6¶ 41 +5x21¶ 22 +¶1;
we may choose
`1 = 3x41¶
6
1 ¶
6
2 + x1x
2
2¶
3
1 ¶
2
2 ; r1 = x
2
1x2¶1¶
3
2 ;
`2 =  4x21¶ 41 ¶ 32 + x1¶ 21   x1¶1¶2+¶1; r2 = x21¶ 21 ¶ 32   x1¶ 21 + x1¶1¶2  x1;
`3 =  x21x22; `4 = `5 = r3 = 1;
r4 = x41x
6
2¶
6
1 ¶
7
2  3x61x2¶ 71 ¶ 92 ; r5 = 4x41¶ 61 ¶ 62 +6x31¶ 51 ¶ 62 :
and compute the standard form of
c= m+ `1 p1 r1+ `2 p2 r2+ `3 p1 r3+ `4 p1 r4+ `5 p2 r5:
In the above representation of c we obtain a ciphertext polynomial of degree
89 and its standard form consists of 13,175 terms. The polynomials `i; ri
are chosen such that the highest degree form of the ciphertext polynomial c
cancels. For instance, we have deg(p1) = 68 and LTs (p1) = 6x141 x
25
2 ¶
28
1 ¶2.
We choose a random term t`1 = 3x
4
1¶
6
1 ¶
6
2 of degree 16 for `1 and another ran-
dom term tr1 = x
2
1x2¶1¶
3
2 of degree 7 for r1. Now the degree of the product
t`1  p1  tr1 is 91 and its leading term is 5x201 x262 ¶ 351 ¶ 102 , to cancel it from c,
choose  3x61x2¶ 71 ¶ 92 of degree 23 as a term in r4. This cancels the above
leading term of degree 91 from c. Now choose another term tr4 = x
4
1x
6
2¶
6
1 ¶
7
2
for r4, then the leading term of the product p1 r4 is 6x181 x
31
2 ¶
34
1 ¶
8
2 and its de-
gree is again 91. Again to cancel it from c, we choose terms in `2; r2 and r5
124
Chapter 6. Two Sided Weyl Gro¨bner Basis Cryptosystems
such that  2x181 x312 ¶ 341 ¶ 82 appears in the product `2 p2 r2 and  4x181 x312 ¶ 341 ¶ 82
appears in the product p2 r5 and this cancels 6x181 x
31
2 ¶
34
1 ¶
8
2 in c. Note also
that for the term tr4 = 4x
4
1¶
6
1 ¶
6
2 chosen for r4 and setting `4 = 1, we can can-
cel many terms in the product `4 p2 r4 by using various possible factors of tr4
for the left and the right multiplication with p2. For instance, among many
possibilities, we choose a term t`2 = 4x21¶ 41 ¶ 32 for `2 and the corresponding
factor tr2 = x
2
1¶
2
1 ¶
3
2 for r2. Note the strategy of choosing the terms t`2 and tr2
such that t`2  tr2 becomes equal to tr4 , here  means the multiplication in the
commutative sense. This does not only cancel the leading term of 1  p2  tr4
in c but altogether 531 terms are cancelled in the sum t`2  p2  tr2 +1  p2  tr4 .
All the terms that are left in this sum are due to Weyl multiplication. Contin-
uing this way, we keep on adding and setting various terms for `i and ri and
finally compute c as above. In this way, many terms in c are either cancelled
or their coefficients are changed. The degree form DF(c) contains 7 terms of
degree dc = 89. This means that all the terms of degree greater than 89 are
cancelled in c. Further, instead of 19, we only have 7 terms of degree 89,
i.e. some of the terms of degree 89 are cancelled or their coefficients are
changed in c. This can be easily seen by observing the number of terms in
the homogeneous components of `i pki ri,for each i and comparing them with
the number of terms of the homogeneous components of c.
Moreover, out of 39 monomials of m, 25 are not present in c, and the remain-
ing 14 monomials are mixed in 540 monomials of c from the message space.
Therefore, the message m is well-hidden.
(5) Decryption:
Sincem=NRs ;GT (c), to decipher c, it suffices to compute the normal remain-
der of the ciphertext polynomial c with respect to the secret key GT . In the
present case, the decryption takes 0.79 seconds on our computing machine
using the package Weyl of ApCoCoA.
Note that in the above Example 6.3.2, not all the requirements of Procedure
6.3.1 are satisfied. For instance, the polynomials g1 and g2 of the public key GT
are binomials. Moreover, none of the polynomials g1 and g2 have terms from
Os (I) n M in their support. If an attacker can guess the leading terms of these
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polynomials with respect to the term ordering s , he can try to break the system
by using the chosen ciphertext attack as described in Section 5.4 for the case of
WGBC.
Remark 6.3.3. In the case of a TWGBC, for encryption we need two sets of poly-
nomials, namely the polynomials `1; : : : ; `s0 that are multiplied from the left with
each pki and the polynomials r1; : : : ;rs0 for multiplication from the right. In view of
the requirement (6)-(c) the ciphertext polynomial may expand too much and may
result in a bad data-rate for transmitting the ciphertext c over a network. For in-
stance, in the above example, the resulting ciphertext contains 13;175 terms. This
gives us a data-rate of approx. 1/337 for transmitting c. To overcome this problem,
we suggest to use a message spaceM that allows us to represent a plaintext mes-
sage m with a polynomial of large size. In the above example, considering the size
of the message space, message expansion is rather moderate. The message expan-
sion can also be controlled by working in fields with small characteristic such as
F2;F3;F5; or F7.
Keeping these observations in mind, we now present a procedure for construct-
ing concrete instances of TWGBC.
6.4 Concrete Hard Instances
As in the case of WGBC, the structure and properties of Weyl algebras turn out
to be very useful in satisfying the requirements of Procedure 6.3.1 for constructing
concrete hard instances of TWGBC. In view of Example 6.3.2 and related obser-
vations, below we present a procedure that provides an explicit suggestion on how
this can be done. The idea is to choose a proper two-sided ideal IT  An such that
it satisfies condition of Proposition 6.1.11 (see Examples 6.1.12 and 6.1.13).
Procedure 6.4.1. Let K = Fp be a finite field of characteristic p. Let n > 2, and
consider the Weyl algebra An of index n over K. Let s be a term ordering on Bn.
Then the following instructions define a TWGBC which satisfies Conditions (1) –
(6) of Procedure 6.3.1.
(1) For 2 < k  n, choose a (random) set F = f f1; : : : ; fkg of Weyl polynomials
such that F  Cn nFp. Moreover, for i = 1; : : : ;k, every polynomial fi 2 F
should be such that
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(a) deg( fi) 2p
(b) The number of terms in support of each fi should be at least 3. This will
be helpful in satisfying requirement (2) below.
Let IT = hFiT be the two-sided ideal generated by F . Then by Proposition
6.1.11, a two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis GT will be a subset of Cn and hence IT
is a non trivial two-sided ideal in An. Moreover, it will be very likely that for
every polynomial g 2 GT , we will have deg(g) 2p and #Supp(g) 3.
(2) For the message space, choose the setM  Os (I) such that every gi has at
least one term from Os (I)nM in its support.
(3) Since every gi 2Cn, create Weyl polynomials p1; : : : ; ps of the form
pi = hi1 g1+   +hir gr
by choosing Weyl polynomials hi1; : : : ;hir 2 An such that Condition (2b) of
Procedure 6.3.1 is satisfied. At this point, we also suggest not to using a poly-
nomial g 2GT in the construction of more than one polynomial of the public
key Q. That is, if there are 6 polynomials g1; : : : ;g6 in the secret key GT , then
one may use g1;g3;g6 for computing p1, and g2;g4;g5 for computing p2. This
might be helpful in concealing the secret key well to make it difficult for an
attacker to guess it from the public information.
(4) To make the polynomial pi random-looking and to reduce its sparsity, choose
some polynomials h0i; q0i 2A and compute the standard form of p0i = h0i pi q0i. In
this way, some other other terms of hi j g j either cancel or their coefficients are
changed in p0i by the process of converting h0i pi q0i to standard form. Replace
pi by p0i and set Q= fp1; : : : ; psg as the public key. It is an optional step that
can be performed after step (3) if it seems that the secret polynomials used
for constructing pi are not well-hidden. Make sure that the size of the support
of pi does not grow too large after performing this step.
Later we will see that by following these steps, we can create a pair (GT ;Q), for
a secret communication by using a TWGBC.
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Remark 6.4.2. It is interesting to remark here that by construction, the secret key
GT is contained in the center Cn. Therefore, in the decryption process, while com-
puting the normal remainder with respect GT , the intermediate results will not grow
due to Weyl multiplication. This fact can make the decryption process of TWGBC
faster as compare to the decryption in WGBC.
Let us now use the instructions of Procedure 6.4.1 to formulate some concrete
cases of TWGBC.
Example 6.4.3. Let n= 3 and consider the Weyl algebra
A3 = F2[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2; ¶3]
over the field of characteristic 2. Let the term ordering on Bn be s = DegRevLex.
We now introduce the following TWGBC:
(1) Secret Key:
Choose the following polynomials of A3
f1 = x61x
4
2+ x
4
1x
2
2+ x
2
1+1; f2 = x
6
2+ x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
2+1;
f3 = ¶ 61 ¶
4
2 +¶
4
1 ¶
2
2 +¶
2
1 +1; f4 = ¶
8
3 + x
2
1¶
2
2 ¶
2
3 +1;
f5 = x22x
10
3 + x
6
3+ x
2
1x
2
3+ x
2
3+1:
Let IT = h f1; f2; f3 f4; f5i be the two-sided ideal generated by these poly-
nomials. Then the reduced two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis GT of IT is the set
fg1; : : : ;g10g where
g1 = x41x
10
3 + x
6
1x
6
3+ x
2
1x
10
3 + x
2
1x
4
2x
4
3+ x
2
1x
8
3+ x
10
3 + x
6
1x
2
3+ x
4
1x
2
2x
2
3+ x
4
1x
4
3+
x42x
4
3+ x
8
3+ x
6
1+ x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
1x
4
3+ x
2
2x
4
3+ x
2
1x
2
2+ x
4
3+ x
2
2+ x
2
3;
g2 = x143 + x
2
1x
10
3 + x
6
1x
2
3+ x
2
1x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
1x
2
2x
4
3+ x
4
2x
4
3+ x
8
3+ x
2
1x
4
2+ x
2
1x
2
2x
2
3+
x42+ x
2
1x
2
3+ x
2
2x
2
3+ x
4
3+ x
2
1+ x
2
2+ x
2
3+1;
g3 = x42x
6
3+ x
2
2x
8
3+ x
10
3 + x
2
1x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
1x
2
2x
4
3+ x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
2x
4
3+ x
6
3+ x
4
2+
x21x
2
3+ x
2
2x
2
3+ x
2
3+1;
g4 = x81+ x
2
1x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
1x
2
2x
4
3+ x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
2x
4
3+ x
4
2+ x
2
1x
2
3+ x
2
2x
2
3+ x
2
1+ x
2
2;
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g5 = x41x
4
2+ x
4
1x
2
2x
2
3+ x
6
1+ x
2
1x
4
2+ x
2
1x
2
2x
2
3+ x
4
1+ x
2
1x
2
2+ x
4
2+ x
2
1x
2
3+ x
2
2x
2
3+
x21+ x
2
2+ x
2
3+1;
g6 = x22x
10
3 + x
6
3+ x
2
1x
2
3+ x
2
3+1;
g7 = x61x
2
2+ x
2
1x
4
2+ x
2
1x
2
2x
2
3+ x
4
1+ x
4
2+ x
2
2x
2
3+ x
2
1+1;
g8 = ¶ 61 ¶
4
2 +¶
4
1 ¶
2
2 +¶
2
1 +1;
g9 = ¶ 83 + x
2
1¶
2
2 ¶
2
3 +1
g10 = x62+ x
4
2x
2
3+ x
2
2+1:
The set GT is our secret key. Moreover, the set Os (IT ) is also kept secret and
only a subset of it will disclosed publicly for the message space.
(2) Public Key:
Let us now create public polynomial p1; p2; p3 by choosing
h11 = x91x
5
3¶
5
1 ¶
3
3 + x
9
1x
4
3¶
5
1 ¶
2
3 + x
8
1x
5
3¶
4
1 ¶
3
3 + x
8
1x
4
3¶
4
1 ¶
2
3 + x
8
1x
3
3¶
2
1 ¶
2
3 +
x61x
2
3¶
3
1 ¶3+ x
5
1;
h12 = x131 x3¶
5
1 ¶
3
3 + x
13
1 ¶
5
1 ¶
2
3 + x
12
1 x3¶
4
1 ¶
3
3 ;
h13 = x31x
13
3 ¶
2
1 ¶
2
3 + x
3
1x
12
3 ¶
2
1 ¶3+ x
2
1x
12
3 ¶
3
1 ¶3+ x
2
1x
13
3 ¶1¶
2
3 + x
2
1x
12
3 ¶1¶3+ x1x
10
3 :
and then compute the standard form of
p1 = h11 g1+h12 g2+h13 g4:
The polynomial p1 has degree 34 and consists of 222 terms in its standard
form. The above polynomials h11;h12;h13 are chosen such that the condi-
tions of Procedure 6.3.1 are satisfied. In particular, we want that the re-
sulting polynomial p1 should not leak information about the polynomials
g1;g2; and g4 used for computing p1 and that it should look like a random
non-commuting polynomial of A3 with a sufficient high degree as compared
to dg =maxfdeg(g) j g 2 GTg.
For instance, since deg(g1) = 14 and LTs (g1) = x41x
10
3 , for h11, we choose
a random term t = x91x
5
3¶
5
1 ¶
3
3 of degree 22. Now the leading term of the
product t g1 is x131 x
15
3 ¶
5
1 ¶
3
3 and to cancel it so that it does not appear in p1,
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we set another term t 0 = x131 x3¶
5
1 ¶
3
3 for h12. If required, we proceed the same
way for cancelling the terms in DF(t g1). Note that now we have DF(t g2) =
x131 x
15
3 ¶
5
1 ¶
3
3 and it will not appear in p1. Continuing this way, we keep on
adding and setting various terms for h11;h12; and h13 and finally compute
p1 as above. In this way, many terms in p1 are either cancelled or their
coefficients are changed. This can be easily seen by observing the number
of terms in the homogeneous components of h11 g1, h12 g2, and h13 g4 and
comparing them with the number of terms of the homogeneous components
of p1, for instance, by using a CAS.
Similarly, choose
h21 = x31x
3
2x
4
3¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 ¶3+ x
3
1x
2
2x
4
3¶
3
1 ¶
2
2 ¶3+ x
2
1x
3
2x
4
3¶
2
1 ¶
3
2 ¶3+ x
4
1x
4
2x
4
3¶3+
x21x
2
2x
4
3¶
2
1 ¶
2
2 ¶3+ x
6
1x
4
3¶1¶2+ x
6
1x
4
3+ x
6
1x
3
2¶3+ x
4
1x
2
2¶3+ x
4
3;
h22 = x31x
5
2¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 ¶3+ x
3
1x
3
2x
2
3¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 ¶3+ x
4
1x
6
2¶3+ x
6
1x
2
2¶1¶2+ x
6
1x
2
2+ x
2
2;
h23 = x52x
6
3¶3+ x
2
3¶3+¶1¶2+1;
h31 = x1x32¶1+ x
4
2¶1+ x1x2x
2
3¶1+ x1x
2
2¶1¶2+ x1x
3
2+ x
2
2¶1+¶1;
h32 = x1x2x3¶ 31 ¶
3
2 ¶
9
3 + x1x2¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
8
3 + x1x3¶
3
1 ¶
2
2 ¶
9
3 + x2x3¶
2
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
9
3 +
x1¶ 31 ¶
2
2 ¶
8
3 + x2¶
2
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
8
3 + x3¶
2
1 ¶
2
2 ¶
9
3 +¶
2
1 ¶
2
2 ¶
8
3 + x
6
2¶
2
1 ¶
2
2 +¶1¶
9
3 +
¶ 93 + x
6
2¶1¶2+ x
6
2;
h33 = ¶ 61 ¶
4
2 ¶3+ x1x2x3¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 ¶3+¶
7
1 ¶2¶3+ x1x2¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 + x1x3¶
3
1 ¶
2
2 ¶3+
x2x3¶ 21 ¶
3
2 ¶3+ x1¶
3
1 ¶
2
2 + x2¶
2
1 ¶
3
2 + x3¶
2
1 ¶
2
2 ¶3+¶
2
1 ¶
2
2 +¶
3
1 ¶3+¶3;
h34 = ¶ 81 ¶
6
2 +¶
7
1 ¶
5
2 + x
5
1x2¶1+ x
4
1x
2
2¶1+ x
5
1¶1¶2+ x
5
1x2+ x
4
1¶1+1;
and then compute
p2 = h21 g3+h22 g6+h23 g7;
p3 = h31 g5+h32 g8+h33 g9+h34 g10:
The polynomial p2 has degree 27 and consists of 148 terms in its standard
form. The polynomial p3 has degree 28 and 126 terms in its standard form.
The polynomials hi j are chosen such that the highest degree forms during the
computation of the polynomials pi cancel. Moreover, the leading terms of the
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polynomials in GT are difficult to guess from the polynomials p1; p2; and p3
of the public key Q. To increase the member of lower degree terms in p2 and
p3, we can now use Step (4) of Procedure 6.4.1 as follows: Choose q02 = x2+
1;q03 = x1 and replace p2 and p3 by p2 q
0
2 and p3 q
0
3. The number of terms,
respectively, in the standard forms of the new replaced polynomials p2 and
p3 is 290 and 166 respectively, and deg(p2) = 28; deg(p3) = 29:
We set the public key as Q = f p1; p2; p3 g. These public polynomials are
given in Appendix C.3.
(3) The Message Space:
For the message space we choose
M = fxa ¶ b j jaj+ jb j  4g
That is, hM iK is the vector space of all polynomials in A3 of degree less than
or equal to 4. With thisM , we can have 2210 possible plaintext messages.
This message space is also known publicly.
This message space fulfils Condition (2) of Procedure 6.4.1, i.e. every poly-
nomials in GT has at least one element from Os (IT )nM .
(4) Encryption:
Suppose that the plaintext messagem2 hM iK is given by the following poly-
nomial
m = x1x2x3¶1+ x1x2¶ 21 + x2x3¶
2
1 + x1x2¶1¶2+ x
2
2¶1¶2+ x1x3¶1¶2+ x1¶1¶
2
2
+x32¶3+ x3¶
2
1 ¶3+ x1x3¶2¶3+ x3¶
2
2 ¶3+¶1¶2¶
2
3 + x2x3¶1+ x3¶
2
1 + x
2
1¶2
+x22¶2+ x2x3¶3+ x1¶1¶3+ x2¶
2
3 + x1x2+ x2¶2+¶1:
For the encryption, choose
`1 = x61x
2
2x
3
3¶
9
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
9
3 +1; r1 = x
5
1x
3
2x
3
3¶
5
1 ¶
2
2 ¶
5
3 + x1x2+ x3;
`2 = x101 x2x
4
3¶
11
1 ¶2¶
11
3 +¶2¶3+¶3+1;
r2 = x91x
3
3¶
5
1 ¶2¶
5
3 + x
3
1x
3
2+ x1¶1+ x3+1;
`3 = ¶ 31 ¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 +¶1¶
5
3 +¶2¶3+¶1; r3 = x
3
1x
3
2x
3
3+ x
3
1x2;
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`4 = x31x
3
2x
3
3¶
3
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 ; `5 = x1x2¶1+ x2x3¶1+¶2;
`6 = x1x2x3+ x1x2¶1+ x2x3¶1+ x3¶2; r7 = x111 x
4
2x
6
3¶
14
1 ¶
5
2 ¶
14
3 ;
r8 = x3¶ 21 ¶3+ x3¶
2
2 ¶3+ x3¶1¶3+ x1x2+ x2¶3+¶3;
r9 = x22¶1¶2+ x3¶1+¶
2
2 + x1+ x2+ x3+1;
r4 = r5 = r6 = `7 = `8 = `9 = 1:
and compute the ciphertext c as the standard form of
c= `1p1r1+`2p2r2+`3p3 r3+`4p1+`5p2+`6 p3+ p1r7+ p2 r8+ p3 r9+m:
Note that by taking r4 = r5 = r6 = `7 = `8 = `9 = 1, we are using sum-
mands with only one-sided multiplication. The polynomial c then has de-
gree 87 and there are 13,532 terms in its standard form. We have selected
the polynomials `1; : : : ; `9, and r1; : : : ;r9 in the same way as described earlier
in the encryption process of Example 6.3.2. In this way, the highest degree
terms cancel and many other terms are either cancelled or their coefficients
are changed in the middle and lower part of the resulting ciphertext. The
lower degree parts of the ciphertext polynomial c are dense enough to in-
clude many terms from the setM . In this way out of 22 monomials of m,
16 are cancelled or their coefficients are changed in the ciphertext c. The re-
maining 6 monomials of m are mixed among other 82 monomials of c from
the message space.
(5) Decryption:
For recovering the plaintext message m we compute NR(s ;GT )(c), the normal
remainder of c modulo the Gro¨bner basis GT . An efficient implementation of
the left Division Algorithm 2.3.18 can recover m within a few seconds. For
instance, such an implementation on the CAS Singular takes 3.93 seconds
on our computing machine for the decryption.
Observations: In the setting of such a TWGBC, the secret key GT is contained
in the center Cn. Since they are commuting polynomials of Weyl algebra, the cre-
ation of a key-pair is relatively easy as compared to WGBC. For instance, in the
above example note the computation of the polynomials p1; p2; and p3. Here, Bob,
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only have to choose a polynomial hi j as described in Procedure 6.3.1, such that no
information about structure of the system of generators of the ideal IT is visible un-
changed. On the other hand, the sender Alice can mess-up the ciphertext by using
suitably chosen Weyl polynomials both for the left and the right multiplication in
the encryption process. It turns out that such a ciphertext can only be decrypted
efficiently when the correct secret key, i.e. when a two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis is
at hand. As far as the attacker Eve is concerned, it seems that her only choice is
to compute a complete two-sided Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J = hp1; p2; p3iT  IT .
But, on the basis of our experimental results, by using Algorithm 6.1.9 for comput-
ing a two-sided Gro¨bner basis, this task turns out to be infeasible for the attacker in
the setting of TWGBC (see Section 6.4 for details).
Let us now create another concrete case of TWGBC with a Weyl algebra over a
field of characteristic 3.
Example 6.4.4. Over the finite field K = F3, consider the Weyl algebra A3 =
F3[x1;x2;x3;¶1:¶2;¶3] of index 3. Let the term ordering on B3 be s = DegRevLex.
Note that here the center is given by C3 = F3[x31;x
3
2;x
3
3;¶
3
1 ;¶
3
2 ;¶
3
3 ]. With these in-
gredients, we introduce following TWGBC.
(1) Secret Key:
Choose the following polynomials of A3
f1 = x91x
6
2+ x
6
1x
3
2+¶
3
1 +1; f2 = x
9
2+ x
6
2x
3
3  x32+1;
f3 = ¶ 91 ¶
6
2 +¶
6
1 ¶
3
2 +¶
3
1 +1; f4 = ¶
12
3 + x
3
1¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 +¶
6
1 +1;
f5 = x153 ¶
3
2 +¶
9
3   x33¶ 31 +¶ 32 +1:
Let IT = h f1; f2; f3 f4; f5i be the two-sided ideal generated by these poly-
nomials. Then the reduced two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis GT of IT is the set
fg1; : : : ;g10g where
g1 = x303 ¶
3
1 + x
30
3   x183 ¶ 91 + x63¶ 181 ¶ 32 +¶ 181 ¶ 32 ¶ 63   x63¶ 151 ¶ 32  ¶ 151 ¶ 32 ¶ 63  
x153 ¶
9
3 + x
3
3¶
12
1 ¶
9
3   x31x153 ¶ 31   x183 ¶ 31 + x153 ¶ 61   x63¶ 151   x31x33¶ 121 ¶ 32 +
x33¶
15
1 ¶
3
2 +¶
12
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
6
3   x31x153   x153 ¶ 31   x63¶ 121   x33¶ 121 ¶ 32  ¶ 121 ¶ 63  
¶ 91 ¶
3
2 ¶
6
3  ¶ 91 ¶ 93   x31x33¶ 91   x33¶ 121 + x31¶ 91 ¶ 32 +¶ 121 ¶ 32 + x33¶ 91  ¶ 91 ¶ 32
 ¶ 61 ¶ 63 + x31¶ 93 + x31¶ 61  ¶ 91  ¶ 93   x31¶ 31   x33¶ 31   x31+¶ 31  1;
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g2 = x153 ¶
3
1 ¶
3
3 + x
3
3¶
12
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 +¶
15
1 ¶
3
2 + x
15
3 ¶
3
3 + x
3
3¶
9
1 ¶
3
3  ¶ 91 ¶ 32 ¶ 33 +¶ 121 +
¶ 91 ¶
3
2   x31¶ 31 ¶ 33  ¶ 61 ¶ 33 +¶ 61   x31¶ 33 +¶ 31 ¶ 33 +¶ 33 ;
g3 = ¶ 91 ¶
3
2 ¶
9
3   x153 ¶ 31   x33¶ 121 ¶ 32   x153 +¶ 61 ¶ 93   x33¶ 91 +¶ 91 ¶ 32 +¶ 61  
¶ 31  1;
g4 = x121   x31x62¶ 31   x31x32x33¶ 31   x62x33¶ 31   x32x63¶ 31 + x91+ x61x32  x31x62+
x61x
3
3  x31x32x33  x62x33  x32x63  x31x32¶ 31   x31x33¶ 31   x31x32  x31x33+
x31¶
3
1 + x
3
3¶
3
1 + x
3
1+ x
3
3+¶
3
1 +1;
g5 = x61x
6
2+ x
6
1x
3
2x
3
3  x91+ x62¶ 31 + x32x33¶ 31   x61+ x62+ x32x33+ x32¶ 31
+x33¶
3
1 + x
3
2+ x
3
3 ¶ 31  1;
g6 = x153 ¶
3
2 +¶
9
3   x33¶ 31 +¶ 32 +1;
g7 = x91x
3
2  x62¶ 31   x32x33¶ 31 + x61  x62  x32x33+¶ 31 +1;
g8 = ¶ 91 ¶
6
2 +¶
6
1 ¶
3
2 +¶
3
1 +1;
g9 = ¶ 123 + x
3
1¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 +¶
6
1 +1;
g10 = x92+ x
6
2x
3
3  x32+1:
The secret key is the set GT and the set Os (IT ) is also kept secret. Let GT =
(g1; : : : ;g10).
(2) Public Key:
Let us now create polynomials p1; p2 for the public key Q by using some
polynomials in GT . As described in Example 6.4.3, choose
h11 = x3¶ 71 ¶
7
2 + x1¶1¶2¶
5
3   x3¶ 53 +¶ 21 ¶2¶ 23 ;
h12 =  x1x153 ¶1¶2¶ 23   x153 ¶ 21 ¶2¶ 23 + x163 ¶ 23 +¶ 61 ¶ 92 +¶ 31 ¶ 62 ;
h13 =  x313 ¶1¶2  x153 ¶ 32 ¶ 33  ¶ 31 ¶ 32 +1;
h21 =  x1¶ 71 ¶ 92 +¶ 31 ¶ 32 + x1¶1¶ 32 +¶1¶2¶ 33  ¶ 53 +¶ 32 ¶3+1;
h22 =  x1¶ 101 ¶ 62 + x1¶ 41  ¶ 43 ; h23 =  ¶ 101 ¶ 42 +¶ 91 ¶ 32 ¶ 23 +¶3;
h24 = x1¶ 71 ¶
6
2 ¶
9
3  ¶ 31 ¶ 93  ¶ 103 ;
and then compute the standard form of
p1 = h11 g1+h12 g2+h13 g8
p2 = h21 g3+h22 g6+h23 g7+h24 g8:
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The polynomial p1 has degree 45 and consists of 203 terms in its standard
form. The polynomial p2 has degree 35 and there are 91 terms in its stan-
dard form. The polynomials hi j are chosen (as the way described in Example
6.4.3) such that the highest degree forms of the polynomials pi are cancelled.
To make p2 more random looking, we can use Step (4) of Procedure 6.4.1 as
follows: choose h02 = ¶1;q
0
3 = x1x3 and replace p2 by h
0
2 p2 q
0
2. The polyno-
mial p2 has degree 38 and there are 258 terms in its standard form.
We set the public key Q = f p1; p2g. These public polynomials are given in
Appendix C.3.
(3) The Message Space:
For the message space we choose
M = fxa ¶ b j jaj+ jb j  8g
That is, hM iK is the vector space of all polynomials in A3 of degree less than
or equal to 8. With thisM , we can have 33003 possible plaintext messages.
As usual, M is known publicly. Moreover, every polynomial in GT has at
least one element from Os (IT )nM .
(4) Encryption:
Suppose that the plaintext message m 2 hM iK is given by the polynomial
m = x32x
2
3¶
2
2   x22x33¶1¶3+ x32x3¶1¶2¶3  x2x3¶1¶ 32 ¶3+ x1¶ 31 ¶2¶ 23 + x22¶ 32 ¶ 23
 x22¶ 32 +¶ 52 + x21x2¶2¶3  x1x2x3¶2  x1x3¶ 22 + x21x2¶3+ x1x2x3¶3 
x1x3¶ 23 + x1¶
2
1 + x1x2¶2+ x1x3¶2+ x
2
3¶2+ x1¶1:
For the encryption, choose
`1 = x21x
3
2x
2
3¶
2
1 ¶
4
2 ; r1 = x
2
1x
4
2x
2
3¶
16
1 ¶
4
2 ;
`2 =  x1x32x153 ¶ 21 ¶2+¶ 23 ; r2 = x1x42x163 ¶ 31 ¶ 22 + x22;
`3 = x32x
2
3¶
2
2   x22x33¶1¶3+ x32x3¶1¶2¶3  x2x3¶1¶ 32 ¶3  x1x2¶2;
`4 = x1¶2+ x3¶2+¶1¶2  x1+¶1 1;
r6 = x1x43 ¶ 21 ¶2¶ 23 + x22¶ 23   x22+¶ 22 ;
r3 = r4 = r5 = `5 = `6 = 1:
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Next, we compute the ciphertext c as the standard form of
c= `1 p1 r1+ `2 p2 r2+ `3 p1r3+ `4 p2r4+ `5p1r5+ `6p2r6+m
Then the polynomial c has degree 84 and there are 8,557 terms in its support.
We have selected the polynomials `1; : : : ; `6, and r1; : : : ;r6 in the same way
as described in the encryption process of Example 6.3.2. In this way, the
highest degree terms cancel and many other terms are either cancelled or
their coefficients are changed in the resulting ciphertext. The lower part of
the ciphertext polynomial c is dense enough to include many terms from the
set M and the monomials of the plaintext message m are either cancelled
or their coefficients are changed in the ciphertext c. In this way out of 19
monomials of m, 13 are cancelled from the ciphertext c. The remaining 6
monomials of m are mixed in 282 monomials of the message space that are
present in c. Therefore, m is well-hidden in c.
(5) Decryption:
For recovering the plaintext message m, we compute NR(s ;GT )(c). An ef-
ficient implementation of the left Division Algorithm 2.3.18 can recover m
within a second. For instance, such an implementation in the CAS Singular
takes 0.63 seconds on our computing machine for the decryption.
In the next section, we shall discuss the security of these instances of TWGBC
against known standard attacks.
6.5 Efficiency and Security
As explained in Chapter 5, efficient algorithms are available for the computation
in Weyl algebras both for positive and zero characteristic. In particular, both
Alice and Bob can compute effectively in the setting of TWGBC for the encryp-
tion and decryption processes respectively. For a TWGBC, the key-generation is
rather faster than the key-generation process of WGBC, since, by construction,
the polynomials in the secret key GT are elements of the commutative polyno-
mial ring Cn = Fp[xp1 ; : : : ;x
p
n ;¶ p1 ; : : : ;¶
p
n ]. Therefore, in this case, Bob can easily
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control the sizes of the supports of polynomials p1; : : : ; ps in his public key. Note
here that p1; : : : ; ps =2Cn, and therefore the sender Alice has to perform several Weyl
multiplications for the encryption. Recall that, for encrypting a plaintext message
m 2 hM iK , Alice has to compute the ciphertext c as the standard form of
c=
s0
å
i=1
`i pki ri; where s
0  s and ki 2 f1; :::;sg (*)
In the computation of c, both left and right Weyl multiplication of polynomi-
als are involved. This is of course a plus point for a TWGBC. In this setting, the
TWGBC environment seems to be more favourable for the users of the cryptosys-
tem. The process of converting the resulting polynomials into their standard form
after both the left and the right multiplication provides sufficient flexibility to hide
the polynomials that are used for the encryption. Contrary to the general non-
commutative setting of GBC, this is very interesting phenomenon of TWGBC and
we, therefore, explain it further in the following remark.
Remark 6.5.1 (TWGBC and non-commutative Polly Cracker). Our proposed
TWGBC has a major advantage over Rai’s basic non-commutative Polly Cracker
cryptosystem. In our setting of TWGBC, we are multiplying a polynomial pi from
the left side by a polynomial `i and from the right side by a polynomial ri. Then we
convert the product `i pki ri into its standard form, where, as before ki 2 f1; : : : ;sg.
Therefore, for a term t 2 Supp(pki), an attacker will have difficulties to guess which
terms t` 2 Supp(`i) and tr 2 Supp(ri) was used for the left and the right multipli-
cation by the term t. This will become more difficult to guess from the ciphertext
polynomial c when various such summands are combined, as in the Equation (*)
above.
This favourable environment of TWGBC might also reduce its efficiency by
increasing the size of the support of c to a value that may results in a bad ‘data-
rate’ for transmitting c over a network. Therefore, users of TWGBC have to be
very careful in choosing various polynomials in Equation (*) for the encryption.
Note that, the aim for the encryption is to hide the plaintext message m and also
to make c random-looking, so that the polynomials used for the encryption become
difficult to guess from the ciphertext. For controlling the size of Supp(c), we have
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suggested in Remark 6.3.3 to use a finite field Fp such that p  7. Moreover, we
also suggest in the above Equation (*) to use most of the summands with only one-
sided multiplication with pki by taking one of `i or ri as 1. For the summands where
the polynomials ` j and r j are used for the left as well as the right multiplication
with pk j , keep the sizes of the supports of ` j and r j as low as possible. We illustrate
this by the following example.
Example 6.5.2. Consider the instance of TWGBC of Example 6.4.3. Let the plain-
text message m and the polynomial p1; p2; p3 be given as in Example 6.4.3. For
encrypting the message m, choose
`1 = x61x
2
2x
3
3¶
9
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
9
3 ; r1 = x
5
1x
3
2x
3
3¶
5
1 ¶
2
2 ¶
5
3 ;
`2 = x101 x2x
4
3¶
11
1 ¶2¶
11
3 ; r2 = x
9
1x
3
3¶
5
1 ¶2¶
5
3 ;
`3 = ¶ 31 ¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 +¶1¶2¶3; r3 = x
2
1x
3
2x
3
3+ x
3
1x2+ x
3
2x3;
`4 = ¶1+¶2+1; `5 = x2x3¶1+¶ 21 +¶2¶3+¶3+1;
`6 = x1x2x3+ x1x2¶1+ x2x3¶1;
r7 = x3¶ 21 ¶3+ x1x2+ x1x3+ x1¶1+ x2¶3+ x1+ x2+ x3;
r8 = x3¶1¶2¶3+ x1x3¶1+ x3¶ 21 + x3¶1¶2+ x3¶1¶3+ x1¶2¶3+ x2¶2¶3+ x3¶2¶3+
x21+ x1x2+ x1x3+ x1¶1+ x2¶1+ x3¶1+ x1¶2+ x2¶2+ x3¶2+¶1¶2+ x1¶3+
x2¶3+ x3¶3+¶2¶3+ x1+1;
r4 = r5 = r6 = `7 = `8 = 1;
and compute the ciphertext c as
c= m+ `1 p1 r1+ `2 p2 r2+ `3 p3 r3+ `4 p1+ `5 p2+ `6 p3+ p2r7+ p3r8:
Note that by taking r4 = r5 = r6 = `7 = `8 = 1 in the above representation of c,
we are using only one-sided multiplication in the last 5 summands. The polyno-
mial c then has degree 88 and number of terms in its support is reduced to 8890
from 13,532 (see Example 6.4.3). Moreover, the lower part of the ciphertext poly-
nomial c is dense enough to include many terms from the message space and that
the message m is also well-hidden, i.e. again, out of 22 monomials of m, 15 are
cancelled from the ciphertext c and other 7 monomials are mixed among 82 mono-
mials in c that are from the message space. Simultaneously, the decryption time is
reduced to 2.9 seconds on our computing machine.
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Hence the efficiency issue arising from the growth of the ciphertext polyno-
mial is somewhat controllable by using the above suggestions for encryption and
by choosing a base field of small characteristic. Of course, it also depends on
the size s, the number of polynomials in the public key and the sizes of the sup-
ports of these polynomials. The instances of TWGBC that have been presented
in Examples 6.3.2, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4, have decryption time of 0.79, 3.93 and 0.63
seconds respectively on our computing machine. There is strong evidence that our
proposed TWGBC is efficient in terms of the amount of time required to legally
decrypt the ciphertext and to recover the plaintext message m. For these instances
of TWGBC, we have achieved data-rates of 1=337; 1=615; and 1=450 respectively.
For the case of TWGBC shown in Example 6.4.3, we have seen in Example 6.5.2,
that by changing the polynomials used for the encryption, the size of the resulting
ciphertext can be controlled to improve the efficiency both in terms of decryption
time and the data-rate. In this case, the data-rate is improved to approx. 1=400 and
the decryption time has been reduced to 2.9 second. To sum up, the efficiency of
TWGBC, in terms of data-rate for transmitting the ciphertext seems to be reason-
able as compared to the instances of usual CGBC that have been presented so far.
We believe that further investigation might result in better ways to control the size
of the resulting ciphertext and hence to improve the data-rate for transmission.
On the other hand, the set-up of TWGBC gives us more security and reliability
as compared to WGBC. We have already seen in Chapter 5, that hard instances
of WGBC can be formulated that seem to be secure against the known standard
attacks. Let us now discuss the security of TWGBC against these attacks:
(1) Linear Algebra Attacks: For the WGBC case, we have described in Section
5.2 that hard instances of WGBC can be formulated that are secure against
the attacks based on linear algebra. For instance, in this setting, we have seen
that for the instances of WGBC presented in Chapter 4, these attacks are not
practical to apply, because the resulting linear system of equations turns out
to be hard to solve. In contrast, there is no room for such attacks on TWGBC
(see Remark 6.2.4), i.e. an instance of TWGBC is not vulnerable to Attacks
5.2.1 and 5.2.4.
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(2) The Chosen Ciphertext Attack: As in the case of WGBC, the basic setup of
TWGBC provides security against Attack 5.4, since every polynomial g2GT
is chosen such that Supp(g) contains at least one term from Os (IT ) nM ,
where IT is the two-sided ideal on which the instance of TWGBC is based.
Hence Step (7) of Procedure 6.3.1 ensures that the basic chosen ciphertext
attack will not be successful for a TWGBC, because of its built-in mechanism
of recognizing an ‘illegal’ or ‘fake’ ciphertext (see Section 5.4 for details on
how this attack works).
(3) Partial Gro¨bner Basis Attack and TWGBC: This attack on an instance
of TWGBC works exactly the same way as described in Section 5.3 in the
setting of WGBC. In the setting of TWGBC, the computation of a two-sided
partial Gro¨bner basis, even for the degree bound that is less than the required
by the attack, turns out to be more harder than for the cases of WGBC. Our
experimental results give a strong evidence that a partial Gro¨bner basis attack
is infeasible to apply on an instance of TWGBC based on Procedure 6.4.1
(see the examples below).
We now give computational evidence that the partial Gro¨bner basis attack is infea-
sible for the instances of TWGBC presented in Examples 6.3.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4.
Example 6.5.3. For the instance of TWGBC of Example 6.3.2, let J = hp1; p2iT be
the two-sided ideal generated by the Weyl polynomials p1 and p2 of the public key
Q. In this case, we have deg(c) = 93, where c is the ciphertext polynomial. Let us
now attempt to attack this system by computing a partial two-sided Gro¨bner basis
of J. For this, we first try to compute a left partial Gro¨bner basis of the ideal J using
the CAS Singular for the degree bound 85. This computation takes more than
56 hours of CPU time on our ‘computing machine, consumes 4.4 GB of memory,
and returns a partial left Gro¨bner basis consisting of 817 polynomials.
On the other hand, for the same value of the degree bound, a two-sided partial
Gro¨bner basis is found to be infeasible. In fact, we terminated the computation after
10512.4 minutes of CPU time and utilizing more than 7 GB of memory. Since c is
computed in a two-sided ideal, its normal remainder with respect to a complete or a
partial left Gro¨bner basis cannot be equal to the plaintext message m. In the present
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case, computation of the normal remainder resulted in a polynomial of degree 84
and its standard form contains 120535 terms. The time taken by this computation
was 12.1 hours on our computing machine. On the basis of these observations,
we conclude that the partial Gro¨bner basis attack does not work on this instance of
TWGBC.
Example 6.5.4. Consider the TWGBC presented in Example 6.4.3. In this case,
for the ciphertext polynomial c we have deg(c) = 88. Let J = hp1; p2; p3iT be the
two sided ideal of A3 = F2[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] generated by the polynomials in the
public key Q= fp1; p2; p3g of this system. Again, the partial Gro¨bner basis attack
on this system does not work, since a partial Gro¨bner basis for the degree bound 50
is found to be hard to compute. Note that for the possibility of success of this attack,
an attacker has to compute a partial Gro¨bner basis for a degree bound larger than 50.
In the present case, for the degree bound 50, the memory consumed during the
computation on the CAS Singular grows to 4.1 GB in 643.24 minutes of CPU
time on our computing machine. Hence there is sufficient evidence that, for a value
larger than the degree bound, the computation of a partial two-sided Gro¨bner basis
is infeasible.
Example 6.5.5. For the TWGBC of Example 6.4.4, a partial Gro¨bner basis attack
fails as follows: The computation of a two-sided partial Gro¨bner basis of the ideal
J = hp1; p2iT is found to be infeasible, where p1; p2 2 A3 = F3[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3]
are as given in Example 6.4.4. In this case, for the degree bound 71, our computa-
tion had grown to consume 2.2 GB of memory in 74.4 minutes and remained busy
in the reduction process for the next 1220 minutes. We terminated our computations
without an output after 1294.43 minutes of CPU time on our computing machine.
The computational results and observations obtained from the above examples
are sufficient to conclude that there is strong evidence that a partial Gro¨bner basis
attack can be ignored safely for the instances of TWGBC that are based on Proce-
dure 6.4.1.
Conclusion: To conclude this thesis, we believe that hard instances of our
proposed WGBC and TWGBC can be constructed such that they will have resis-
tance against known standard attacks proposed by cryptanalyst of Gro¨bner basis
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type cryptosystems. The underlying problem of these systems is the computation
of Gro¨bner basis of ideals of Weyl algebras. that is known to be EXPSPACE hard
in general (see [53]). Therefore, Gro¨bner basis type cryptosystems do not have a
threat of ‘quantum computing’ like RSA and ElGamal cryptosystems.
The cryptanalysis of such cryptosystems might be helpful in exploring the struc-
ture of their base rings, i.e. Weyl algebras. For instance, one might come up with
new ideas and the modification of known attacks or some interesting algorithmic
results for computations in Weyl algebras. In particular, a faster and more efficient
way to compute a two-sided Gro¨bner basis of two-sided ideals of Weyl algebras
will be a good contribution. Our examples presented in this chapter can be used
to check the timings, efficiency and complexity of these new algorithms. Further
investigation of these cryptosystems might also result in suggesting better ways of
controlling the size of the ciphertext c and improving the efficiency of these sys-
tems, but not at the cost of security. A positive solution could be to minimize the
sizes of the supports of polynomials p1; : : : ; ps in public key such that computa-
tion of a left (resp. two-sided) Gro¨bner basis of the left (resp. two-sided) ideal
J generated by these polynomial remains infeasible. Currently, to the best of our
knowledge of the subject, we believe that these systems are reliable and might be
adapted for the secret communication. We support our claim by all our experimen-
tal results, observations and examples presented in this thesis and by the challenges
presented in the next section.
6.6 TWGBC Challenge:
Challenge 6.6.1. Over the fieldK=F3, consider theWeyl algebra A3=F3[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3].
Let the term ordering s = DegRevLex on the set of terms B3 of A3. We introduce
the following TWGBC
(1) Secret Key
The secret key is the reduced two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis G of a two-sided
ideal IT  A3.
(2) Public Key
The set Q= fp1; p2; p3g is our public key, where
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(3) Message Space For the message space we choose
M = fxa ¶ b j jaj+ jb j  7g
That is, hM iK is the vector space of all polynomials in A3 of degree less than
or equal to 7. With thisM , we can have 31716 possible plaintext messages.
We have encrypted a message m and obtained the ciphertext c of degree 80 and
its standard form consists of 9,703 terms. We believe that this ciphertext is se-
cure and cannot be broken by using the known standard attacks presented in this
thesis. The ciphertext c together with the public key Q is available in the file
twgbc challenge.coc in a format usable for the CAS ApCoCoA. This file can be
downloaded from the WWW page
http://www.megaupload.com/?d=54LD2L16
We welcome our readers to attack this cryptosystem and provide us further useful
suggestions and improvements. Keeping in mind the chosen-ciphertext security for
the attack presented in Section 5.5, we are ready to decrypt any ciphertext message
that is the encryption of a message in the following message space:
M 0 = fxa ¶ b j jaj+ jb j  4g
147
6.6. TWGBC Challenge:
148
AppendixA
Package Weyl
In Chapters 2 and 4 we talk about computations in Weyl algebra. In particular, we
have defined the standard form of aWeyl polynomial and described the left Division
Algorithm 2.3.18 for Weyl algebras. We have also explained algorithms for com-
puting left and two-sided Gro¨bner bases of ideals in Weyl algebras (see Algorithms
2.3.24 and 6.1.9 for details). We have developed the package Weyl for performing
various computations in Weyl algebras using ApCoCoA. In this appendix we are go-
ing to explain the usage of this package by briefly describing the functions which
are implemented in this package for performing various computations in Weyl al-
gebras. The CAS ApCoCoA, an acronym of ‘Applied Computations in Commutative
Algebra’ is based on the CAS CoCoA. It is primarily designed for working with
‘real-problems’ by using the symbolic computations methods of CoCoAand by de-
veloping new libraries for related computations.
The CAS ApCoCoAis available free of charge via the internet and can be down-
loaded from the WWW page
http://www.apcocoa.org/
For a short introduction to CoCoA and for the help on getting started with it we
refer to [27] (Appendix A, page 275). The ApCoCoAworks exactly the same way as
explained there.
For working with the Weyl algebra of index n by using the CAS ApCoCoA,
one first has to define and activate a ring in 2n indeterminates. For instance, for
A.1. Available Functions
working with the Weyl algebra A5 = Z7[x1; : : : ;x5;¶1; : : : ;¶5] of index 5 one can
start by using the following two commands:
An ::= ZZ/(7)[x[1..5],y[1..5]];
Use An;
Note that the symbol ¶ can be replaced by any other symbol that can be used to
represent indeterminates in ApCoCoA. In general, given a ring in 2n indeterminates
in ApCoCoA, the package Weyl takes the first n indeterminates as x1; : : : ;xn and
the last n indeterminates as ¶1; : : : ;¶n in the definition of the Weyl algebra An (see
Definition 2.1.1). The default term ordering s for the rings in ApCoCoA is defined
as DegRevLex. For using other term orderings, see the ApCoCoA documentation
from the help-menu.
A.1 Available Functions
In the following we give a short description of the functions available in the package
Weyl for working with the Weyl Algebra An over a field K. This description is also
available as part of the documentation of this package and can be seen from the
help-menu of ApCoCoA.
A.1.1. WStandardForm(L)
Purpose: Computes the standard form of a Weyl polynomial.
Syntax Weyl.WStandardForm(L:LIST):POLY
Input A list L of lists where each list represents a monomial of a Weyl polynomial.
Output The standard form of the Weyl polynomial represented by the above list L.
Example Consider the Weyl algebra A2 =Q[x1;x2;y1;y2]. For converting a Weyl poly-
nomial F := 2x2y1x22 9y2x21x32+5 in to its standard form, one has to run the
following commands in ApCoCoA interactive window:
A2::=QQ[x[1..2],y[1..2]]; -- Define the appropriate ring
Use A2;
L := [ [2x[1],y[1],x[2]ˆ 2], [-9y[2],x[1] 2ˆ,x[2]ˆ 3],[5] ];
– note how the polynomial F is represented by the above list L.
Weyl.WStandardForm(L);
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-9x[1]ˆ 2x[2]ˆ 3y[2] - 27x[1]ˆ 2x[2]ˆ 2 + 2x[1]x[2] 2ˆy[1] + 5
-- this output is the standard form of the given polynomial F .
Note. From now on, by a Weyl polynomial we mean a polynomial represented in
its unique standard form. For using any of the function below, if a polynomial is not
given in its standard form then first convert it into the standard form as explained
above.
A.1.2. WMulByMonom(M,P)
Purpose: Computes the product M*P of a Weyl monomial M and a Weyl Polynomial P.
Syntax Weyl.WMulByMonom(M:POLY,P:POLY):POLY
Input 1st parameter M, a Weyl monomial in its standard form.
2nd parameter P, a Weyl polynomial.
Output The Weyl polynomial for the product M*P.
Example For multiplying a monomial M = x3y4 with the polynomial F := x3+ y3+
3xy+5, where both M;F 2 A1 =Q[x;y], We proceed as follows:
A1::=QQ[x,y]; Use A1; -- Define and activate the appropriate ring
M:=x 3ˆyˆ 4; F:=xˆ 3+yˆ 3+3xy+5;
Weyl.WMulByMonom(M,F);
x 6ˆyˆ 4+xˆ 3yˆ 7+3xˆ 4yˆ 5+12xˆ 5yˆ 3+17xˆ 3yˆ 4+36xˆ 4yˆ 2+24xˆ 3y
-- this output is the standard form of the product M*F.
A.1.3. WMul(F,G)
Purpose: computes the product F*G of the Weyl polynomials F and G.
Syntax Weyl.WMul(F:POLY,G:POLY):POLY
Input Two Weyl polynomials F and G.
Output A polynomial which is the standard form of the product F*G.
Example Consider the Weyl algebra A2 =Z101[x1;x2;y1;y2], then we can perform mul-
tiplication of various polynomials in A2 as follows:
A2::=ZZ/(101)[x[1..2],y[1..2]]; -- Define the appropriate ring
Use A2;
Weyl.WMul(x[1]ˆ 11,y[1]ˆ 11);
x[1]ˆ 11y[1]ˆ 11
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-- this is the standard form of the product of x111 ;y
11
1 2 A2
Weyl.WMul(y[1]ˆ 11,x[1]ˆ 11);
x[1] 1ˆ1y[1]ˆ 11+20x[1]ˆ 10y[1]ˆ 10-10x[1]ˆ 9y[1]ˆ 9+33x[1]ˆ 8y[1]
ˆ8+23x[1]ˆ 7y[1]ˆ 7-17x[1]ˆ 6y[1]ˆ 6-x[1]ˆ 5y[1]ˆ 5- 18x[1]ˆ 4y[1]
ˆ4-36x[1]ˆ 3y[1]ˆ 3-36x[1]ˆ 2y[1]ˆ 2+26x[1]y[1]-16
-- this is the standard form of the product of y111 ;x
11
1 2 A2
F:=3x[1] 2ˆy[1]ˆ 3-2x[2]y[2]ˆ 2+5x[2]-5y[2]-7;
G:=4x[1] 2ˆy[1]ˆ 2-9x[2]y[2]-7x[1]+y[1]+11;
12x[1]ˆ 4y[1]ˆ 5 - 29x[1]ˆ 3y[1]ˆ 4 - 27x[1] 2ˆx[2]y[1]ˆ 3y[2] -
8x[1] 2ˆx[2]y[1]ˆ 2y[2]ˆ 2 - 21x[1] 3ˆy[1]ˆ 3 + 3x[1]ˆ 2y[1]ˆ 4 +
20x[1]ˆ 2x[2]y[1]ˆ 2 + 4x[1]ˆ 2y[1]ˆ 3 - 20x[1] 2ˆy[1]ˆ 2y[2] +
18x[2]ˆ 2y[2]ˆ 3 + 10x[1]ˆ 2y[1]ˆ 2 + 14x[1]x[2]y[2] 2ˆ -
2x[2]y[1]y[2]ˆ 2 - 45x[2] 2ˆy[2] - 42x[2]y[2]ˆ 2 - 35x[1]x[2]
+ 5x[2]y[1] + 35x[1]y[2] - 38x[2]y[2] - 5y[1]y[2] +
49x[1] - 46x[2] - 7y[1] - 10y[2] + 24
-- this is the standard form of the product F*G of polynomials F and G.
A.1.4. WMult(F,G)
Purpose: Just like the function explained in A.1.3, this function also computes the prod-
uct F*G of the Weyl polynomials F and G. The only difference is that it is
implemented in ApCoCoAServer for the faster computation while working
with the Weyl polynomials of very large size. This will also be useful for the
computations in Weyl algebra by using ApCoCoALib. The ApCoCoAServer
should be running for using this function.
Syntax Weyl.WMult(F:POLY,G:POLY):POLY
Input Two Weyl polynomials F and G.
Output A polynomial which is the standard form of the product F*G.
A.1.5. WPower(F,N)
Purpose: Computes the integer-power N of a Weyl polynomial F.
Syntax Weyl.WPower(F:POLY,N:INT):POLY
Input 1st parameter F, a Weyl polynomial.
2nd parameter N, a positive integer.
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Output FˆN as a Weyl polynomial.
Example For instance to compute (xy3  xy+ 1)4 in A1 = Q[x;y], we proceed as fol-
lows:
A1::=QQ[x,y]]; Use A1; --Define and activate the appropriate ring
Weyl.WPower(xyˆ 3-xy+1,4);
x 4ˆyˆ 12-4xˆ 4yˆ 10+18xˆ 3yˆ 11+6xˆ 4yˆ 8-56xˆ 3yˆ 9+87xˆ 2yˆ 10-4xˆ 4yˆ 6
+60x 3ˆyˆ 7-204xˆ 2yˆ 8+105xyˆ 9+xˆ 4yˆ 4-24xˆ 3yˆ 5+148xˆ 2yˆ 6-
180xy 7ˆ+2xˆ 3yˆ 3-32xˆ 2yˆ 4+84xyˆ 5+xˆ 2yˆ 2-8xyˆ 3-xy+1
-- this is the standard form of (xy3  xy+1)4.
A.1.6. WNR(F,G)
Purpose: Computes the normal remainder of a Weyl polynomial F with respect to a
polynomial G or a set of polynomials in the list G. If G is a Gro¨bner basis then
this function is used for the ideal membership problem. TheApCoCoAServer
should be running for using this function.
Syntax Weyl.WNR(F:POLY,G:POLY):POLY
Weyl.WNR(F:POLY,G:LIST):POLY
Input 1st parameter F, a Weyl polynomial.
2nd parameter G, a list of Weyl polynomials or simply a Weyl polynomial.
Output The normal remainder of F with respect to the tuple of the Weyl polynomials
given by the list G using the normal remainder algorithm 2.3.18.
Example Consider the Weyl algebra A3 = Z7[x1;x2;x3;¶1;¶2;¶3] with the term or-
dering s=DegRevLex. Let f1 =  ¶ 31 ¶ 52 ¶ 53 + x52, f2 =  3x2¶ 52 ¶ 53 + x2¶ 31 ,
f3 = 2¶ 41 ¶ 52  x1¶ 72 +x33¶ 53 , and f4 = ¶ 31 ¶ 72 ¶ 63 +x52 be the given Weyl poly-
nomials. To compute the normal remainder of f1 with respect to G = ( f2; f3)
we proceed as follows
A3::=ZZ/(7)[x[1..3],d[1..3]]; --DegRevLex is the default term
ordering in ApCoCoA.
-- Define the appropriate ring using d[1],d[2],d[3] for the indetermi-
nates ¶1;¶2;¶3 respectively.
Use A3;
F1:=-d[1]ˆ 3d[2]ˆ 5d[3]ˆ 5+x[2]ˆ 5;
F2:=-3x[2]d[2]ˆ 5d[3]ˆ 5+x[2]d[1]ˆ 3;
153
A.1. Available Functions
F3:=-2d[1]ˆ 4d[2]ˆ 5-x[1]d[2]ˆ 7+x[3]ˆ 3d[3]ˆ 5;
F4:=x[2] 5ˆ-d[1]ˆ 3d[2]ˆ 7d[3]ˆ 6;
G:=[F2,F3];
Weyl.WNR(F1,G);
-d[1]ˆ 3d[2]ˆ 5d[3]ˆ 5 + x[2]ˆ 5
-- This is the normal remainder NRs ;G ( f1). Similarly, to compute NRs ; f1( f4),
run the following command:
Weyl.WNR(x[2]ˆ 5-d[1]ˆ 3d[2]ˆ 7d[3]ˆ 6,F1);
-x[2]ˆ 5d[2]ˆ 2d[3] - 3x[2] 4ˆd[2]d[3] + x[2]ˆ 5 + x[2] 3ˆd[3]
-- this output is the result of NRs ; f1( f4).
A.1.7. WSPoly(F,G)
Purpose: Computes the S-polynomial of Weyl polynomials F andG.
Syntax Weyl.WSPoly(F:POLY,G:POLY):POLY
Input Both parameters F and G are Weyl polynomials.
Output The S-polynomial of F and G.
Example In the Weyl algebra A3 of A.1.6, consider again the polynomials f1; f2 and f3.
For computing the S-polynomials (see Definition 2.3.23) S f1 f2 , S f2 f3 using
ApCoCoA, as before first define and activate the appropriate ring and the run
the following commands:
F1:=-d[1] 3ˆd[2]ˆ 5d[3]ˆ 5+x[2]ˆ 5;
F2:=-3x[2]d[2]ˆ 5d[3]ˆ 5+x[2]d[1]ˆ 3;
F3:=-2d[1]ˆ 4d[2]ˆ 5-x[1]d[2]ˆ 7+x[3]ˆ 3d[3]ˆ 5;
Weyl.WSPoly(F1,F2);
x[2]d[1] 6ˆ - 3x[2]ˆ 6
Weyl.WSPoly(F2,F3);
-3x[1]x[2]d[2]ˆ 7d[3]ˆ 5 + 3x[2]x[3]ˆ 3d[3]ˆ 10 + 3x[2]x[3] 2ˆd[3]
ˆ9 - 2x[2]x[3]d[3]ˆ 8 - 2x[2]d[1] 7ˆ - 2x[2]d[3] 7ˆ
-------------------------------
A.1.8. WGB(...)
Purpose: This function computes the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I using the correspond-
ing implementation in CoCoALib. The ApCoCoAServer should be running
in order to use this function.
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Syntax Weyl.WGB(I:IDEAL,L:LIST,N:INT):LIST
Input 1. Ideal I of An.
2. (optional) List L of positive integers corresponding to the numbers of the
indeterminates that are to be eliminated while computing Gro¨bner basis
of I.
3. (optional) Integer N = 0 or 1.
Output The list of Weyl polynomials forming the Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I. If the
2nd parameter is given as a list of positive integers, then the function returns
the Gro¨bner basis computed with by eliminating the indeterminates corre-
sponding to the positive integers in the list L. The default value for the list L
is the empty list []. If the value 0 is used for the 3rd parameter N, then the
function will returns the complete Gro¨bner basis computed by the Weyl code
implemented in the CoCoALib without reduction otherwise default value of
1 will be used for N and output will be the reduced Gro¨bner basis of I. Note
that, user can interchange the position of the two optional 2nd and 3rd param-
eters.
Example Following commands illustrate how one can use this function for computing
a left Gro¨bner basis of an ideal I of An
A1::=QQ[x,d]; -- Define the appropriate ring
Use A1;
I:=Ideal(x,d);
Weyl.WGB(I);
[1] -- Note that the Gro¨bner basis obtained is minimal.
-------------------------------
Weyl.WGB(I,0);
[x,y,1] -- The Gro¨bner basis obtained is not minimal.
-------------------------------
W3::=ZZ/(7)[x[1..3],y[1..3]];
Use W3;
I3:=Ideal(x[1]ˆ 3y[2],x[2]y[1]ˆ 2);
Set Indentation;
Weyl.WGB(I3,0);
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[
x[2]y[1] 2ˆ,
x[1] 3ˆy[2],
x[1] 3ˆy[1]ˆ 2 + x[1]ˆ 2x[2]y[1]y[2] + x[1]x[2]y[2],
x[1] 2ˆx[2]y[1]y[2]ˆ 2 + 2x[1]ˆ 2y[1]y[2] + x[1]x[2]y[2] 2ˆ +
2x[1]y[2],
x[1] 2ˆx[2]ˆ 2y[1]y[2] + x[1]x[2]ˆ 2y[2],
x[1]x[2]y[1]y[2]ˆ 2 + 2x[1]y[1]y[2] - 2x[2]y[2] 2ˆ + 3y[2],
x[1] 2ˆx[2]y[2]ˆ 2 + 2x[1]ˆ 2y[2],
x[1]x[2] 2ˆy[1]y[2] - 2x[2]ˆ 2y[2],
x[1] 2ˆx[2]ˆ 2y[2],
x[2]y[1]y[2]ˆ 2 + 2y[1]y[2],
x[1]x[2]y[2]ˆ 2 + 2x[1]y[2],
x[2] 2ˆy[1]y[2],
x[1]x[2] 2ˆy[2],
x[2]y[2] 2ˆ + 2y[2],
x[2] 2ˆy[2]]
-------------------------------
Weyl.WGB(I3); -- now the reduced Gro¨bner basis will be returned
[
x[2] 2ˆy[2],
x[2]y[2] 2ˆ + 2y[2],
x[1] 3ˆy[1]ˆ 2 + x[1]ˆ 2x[2]y[1]y[2] + x[1]x[2]y[2],
x[1] 3ˆy[2],
x[2]y[1] 2ˆ]
-------------------------------
Unset Indentation;
A.1.9. TwoWGB(I)
Purpose: Computes the two-sided s -Gro¨bner basis G of a two-sided ideal I of An. Re-
call that the Weyl algebra An is simple when K is a field of characteristic 0.
The usage of this function makes sense only when K has positive character-
istic. The ApCoCoAServer should be running for using this function.
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Syntax Weyl.TwoWGB(I:IDEAL):LIST
Input An ideal I of An.
Output The two-sided Gro¨bner basis of the ideal I as a list of Weyl polynomials.
Example We illustrate the usage of this function by the following ApCoCoA commands.
A2::=ZZ/(2)[x[1..2],y[1..2]];--Define the appropriate ring
Use A2;
Weyl.TwoWGB(Ideal(x[1],y[1]));
[1]
Weyl.TwoWGB(Ideal(x[1] 2ˆ+1,y[2]ˆ 2));
[x[1] 2ˆ+1,y[2]ˆ 2]
Weyl.TwoWGB(Ideal(x[1] 2ˆ-1,y[1]ˆ 2-x[1]));
[1]
Weyl.TwoWGB(Ideal(x[1] 2ˆy[1]ˆ 2-x[2]ˆ 2+1,x[2]ˆ 2y[1]ˆ 2-1));
[x[2] 4ˆ + x[1]ˆ 2 + x[2]ˆ 2, x[1]ˆ 2y[1]ˆ 2 + x[2]ˆ 2 + 1, x[2]
ˆ2y[1]ˆ 2 + 1]
-------------------------------
A.1.10. WDim(I)
Purpose: Computes dimension (GK-dimension) of an ideal I of An. TheApCoCoAServer
should be running in order to use this function.
Syntax Weyl.WDim(I:IDEAL):INT
Input Ideal I of a Weyl Algebra An.
Output An integer N, the GK-dimension of the ideal I.
Example The following commands illustrate the usage of this function.
A2::=QQ[x[1..2],y[1..2]];
Use A3;
I1:=Ideal(x[1]y[1] + 2x[2]y[2] - 5, y[1] 2ˆ - y[2]);
Weyl.WDim(I);
2 -- this output is the GK-dimension of the ideal I.
I2:=Ideal(x[1]y[1] + 2x[2]y[2] - 5, y[1] 2ˆ - y[2]-1);
Weyl.WDim(I);
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-1 -- if the dimension is zero then -1 will be returned
Use W2::=ZZ/(2)[x[1..2],y[1..2]]; --Define and activate W2
I3:=Ideal(y[2]ˆ 2 + 2x[2] 2ˆy[2]ˆ 4 - 5, y[1] 2ˆ - y[2] 2ˆ-y[1]
2ˆy[1]ˆ 2, x[2]ˆ 4-1);
Weyl.WDim(I); 1 -- the dimension of I3 in W2 is 1.
A.1.11. IsHolonomic(I)
Purpose: Checks whether an ideal I of An is holonomic or not. Recall that an ideal I
is said to be holonomic if and only if its dimension is n, the index of the Weyl
algebra An.
The ApCoCoAServer should be running in order to use this function.
Syntax Weyl.IsHolonomic(I:IDEAL):BOOL
Input An ideal I of An.
Output True, if I is holonomic and False otherwise.
Example We explain the usage by the following commands:
A2::=QQ[x[1..2],y[1..2]]; --Define the appropriate ring
Use A2;
I:=Ideal(x[1]y[1] + 2x[2]y[2] - 5, y[1] 2ˆ - y[2]-1);
Weyl.IsHolonomic(I);
False
I:=Ideal(x[1]y[1] + 2x[2]y[2] - 5, y[1] 2ˆ - y[2] 3ˆ-y[1]ˆ 2x[1]);
Weyl.IsHolonomic(I);
True -- the ideal I is holonomic.
A.1.12. WRGB(G)
Purpose: Converts a Gro¨bner basis G into the reduced Gro¨bner Basis. If G is not a
Gro¨bner basis then the output will not be the reduced Gro¨bner basis.
Syntax Weyl.WRGB(G:LIST):LIST
Input A list G, of Weyl polynomials.
Output A reduced list L of Weyl polynomials such that hLi= hGi.
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Example For instance, consider the Weyl algebra A1 in indeterminates x and d over
the field Q and let I be the ideal of A1 generated by elements in the list
L:=[x,d,1]. Then L is a Gro¨bner basis of I and its reduced Gro¨bner basis
can be computed as follows:
A1::=QQ[x,d]; -- Define the appropriate ring
Use A1;
L:=[x,y,1];
Weyl.WRGB(L);
[1] -- this output is the reduced Gro¨bner basis of I.
A.1.13. WLT(I)
Purpose: Computes the leading term ideal of an ideal I of An.
The ApCoCoAServer should be running in order to use this function.
Syntax Weyl.WLT(I:IDEAL):IDEAL
Input An ideal I of An.
Output An ideal, which is the leading term ideal of I
Example A2::=QQ[x[1..2],y[1..2]]; -- Define the appropriate ring
Use A2;
I:=Ideal(x[1]y[2],x[2]y[1]);
Weyl.WLT(I);
Ideal(x[2] 2ˆy[2], x[2]y[2]ˆ 2, x[1]y[1], x[2]y[1], x[1]y[2])
-- this output is the leading terms ideal of I.
Many other functions have also been implemented for the package Weyl. These
functions are not relevant to the results presented in this thesis and therefore we have
not described them here. For instance, one can also use this package for computing
the characteristic ideal, the annihilating ideal of a polynomial f s using the algo-
rithm of Oaku and Takayama, the Bernstein-Sato polynomial of a polynomial f .
The detailed description of these functions is available on-line at WWW page:
http://www.apcocoa.org/wiki?title=Category:Package weyl
or also from the ‘help menu’ of your installed ApCoCoA.
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Implementation
B.1 Linear Algebra Attack (commutative)
Define LAA(PK, C, Dm) DegC := Deg(C);
NPi := Len(PK); -- no. of public polynomials
HF := NewList(NPi, 1);
MC := Monomials(C);
D1 := Deg(PK[1]); D2 := Deg(PK[2]);
DegPi := [Deg(P)|P In PK];
DegH := DegC - Max(DegPi);
S := Sum(Indets());
SH1 := 0; SH2 := 0; SC2 := 0; M2 := 0;
S := Sum(Indets());
For N := 0 To Dm Do
M2 := M2 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
M2 := Support(M2);
Sol := Mat([[]]);
While Sol=Mat([[ ]]) Do
MC := Monomials(C);
For N := 0 To DegH Do
SH1 := SH1 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
SH1 := Support(SH1);
For N := 0 To DegC Do
SC2 := SC2 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
SC2 := Support(SC2);
SizeH := Len(SH1);
While Len(MC) <> Len(SC2) Do
Append(MC, Poly(1));
EndWhile;
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For I := 1 To Len(SC2) Do
If LPP(SC2[I]) <> LPP(MC[I]) Then
Insert(MC, I, 0);
Remove(MC, Len(MC));
EndIf;
EndFor;
MatB := Transposed(Mat([[LC(Term)|Term In MC]]));
NRows := Len(SC2);
Lis := []; MonomPi := [];
For I := 1 To Len(PK) Do
Append(Lis, SH1); -- Lis is list of general li’s in å lipi
Append(MonomPi, Monomials(PK[I]));
EndFor;
Cols := ConcatLists([ConcatLists(Lis), M2]);
NCols := Len(Cols);
PrintLn(" Size of the Linear system = ",NRows,"  ",NCols);
PrintLn("Creating matrix of coefficients . . . ");
Ax := NewMat(NRows, NCols, 0);
For I := 1 To SizeH Do
For K := 0 To (NPi-1) Do
HF[K + 1] := Monomials(Cols[I + K*SizeH] * PK[K + 1]);
While HF[K + 1] <> [] Do
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Len(HF[K + 1]) = 0 Then Break;EndIf;
Lpp := LPP(HF[K + 1][1]);
If Lpp = SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I + K*SizeH] := LC(HF[K + 1][1]);
Remove(HF[K + 1],1);
EndIf;
EndFor;
EndWhile;
EndFor;
Print(".");
EndFor;
PrintLn();
I := NPi*SizeH + 1;
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Cols[I] = SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I] := 1;
I := I + 1;
EndIf;
EndFor;
PrintLn("Now trying to solve using LinBox ...");
Sol := $apcocoa/linbox.Solve(Ax,MatB);
If Sol = Mat([[]]) Then
PrintLn("Increasing Degree of Li >>>>>>>>>>>");
DegH := DegH + 1; SH1 := 0; SC2 := 0;
HF := NewList(NPi,1);
DegC := DegH + Max(DegPi);
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EndIf;
EndWhile;
NewLis := [];
S2 := ConcatLists(List(Sol));
For I := 1 To NPi Do
Li := [Cols[J]|J In 1..SizeH];
CLi := [S2[J]|J In ((I-1)*SizeH + 1)..(I*SizeH)];
Append(NewLis, ScalarProduct(CLi, Li));
EndFor;
CM := [S2[J]|J In (NPi*SizeH + 1)..Len(S2)];
C2 := 0;
For I := 1 To NPi Do
C2 := C2 + NewLis[I]*PK[I];
EndFor;
M2 := ScalarProduct(CM, M2);
PrintLn("Message was = ", M2);
Return [M2, NewLis];
EndDefine; -- EndOf LAA( )
B.2 Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack
Define ILAA(PK, C, Dm)
-- PK is list of public polynomials
-- C is ciphertext.
-- Dm is degree of message polynomial M
DegC := Deg(C);
SizeC := Len(C);
NPi := Len(PK); -- no. of public polynomials
HF := NewList(NPi,1);
MC := Monomials(C);
Inds := NumIndets();
DegPi := [Deg(P)|P In PK];
DegH := DegC-Max(DegPi);
PrintLn("Initalizing degree Li --> ",DegH);
S := Sum(Indets());
SH1 := 0; SH2 := 0; SC2 := 0; M2 := 0;
NewRing ::= QQ[x[1..NumIndets()]];
For N := 0 To Dm Do
M2 := M2 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
M2 := Support(M2);
Using NewRing Do
SH2 := CreateD(ZPQ(PK),ZPQ(C));
EndUsing;
Sol := Mat([[]]);
SH2 := QZP(SH2);
While Sol=Mat([[ ]]) Do
SH1 := [];
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Foreach MonH In SH2 Do
If Deg(MonH)<=DegH Then
Append(SH1,MonH);
EndIf;
EndForeach;
PrintLn(" # SH1 = ", Len(SH1));
SizeH := Len(SH1);--SH2 := [];
Lis := []; MonomPi := [];
For I := 1 To NPi Do
Append(Lis,SH1);
-- Lis is list of general li’s in encryption
Append(MonomPi,Monomials(PK[I]));
EndFor;
WExpecC := []; Counter := 0;
WSC2 := [];
Foreach MonH In SH1 Do
For I := 1 To NPi Do
Append(WExpecC,MonH*PK[I]);
EndFor;
Counter := Counter + 1;
If Mod(Counter,2000)=0 Then
Using NewRing Do
WExpecC := ZPQ(WExpecC);
Append(WSC2,Sum(WExpecC));
WSC2 := [Sum(WSC2)];
EndUsing;
WExpecC := [];
EndIf;
EndForeach;
PrintLn();
Using NewRing Do
WExpecC := ZPQ(WExpecC);
Append(WSC2,Sum(WExpecC));
WSC2 := Support(Sum(WSC2));
EndUsing;
WSC2 := QZP(WSC2);
PrintLn(".................# WExpecC = ",Len(WSC2));
SC2 := WSC2;
SizeSC2 := Len(SC2);
SupC := Support(C);
CoefC := Coefficients(C);
CoefC := [Cast(Coef, INT) | Coef In CoefC];
MC2 := [];
For I :=1 To SizeSC2 Do
If Len(SupC) > 0 Then
If SupC[1]= SC2[I] Then
Append(MC2,[CoefC[1]]);
Remove(SupC,1);Remove(CoefC,1);
Else
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Append(MC2,[Zero]);
EndIf;
Else
Append(MC2,[Zero]);
EndIf;
EndFor;
MatB := Mat(MC2);
PrintLn("Calculating Ax . . . . . ");
NRows := Len(SC2);
Cols := ConcatLists([ConcatLists(Lis),M2]);
NCols := Len(Cols);
PrintLn(" Dimension of Ax = ",NRows," X ",NCols);
Ax := NewMat(NRows,NCols,0);
For I := 1 To SizeH Do
For K := 0 To (NPi-1) Do
HF[K + 1] := Monomials(Cols[I + K*SizeH] * PK[K + 1]);
While HF[K + 1]<>[] Do
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Len(HF[K + 1])=0 Then Break; EndIf;
Lpp := LPP(HF[K + 1][1]);
If Lpp=SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I + K*SizeH] := LC(HF[K + 1][1]);
Remove(HF[K + 1],1);
EndIf;
EndFor;
EndWhile;
EndFor;
Print(".");
EndFor;
PrintLn();
I := NPi*SizeH + 1;
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Cols[I]=SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I] := Unit;
I := I + 1;
EndIf;
EndFor;
PrintLn(" System’s size = ", NRows, "  ", NCols);
PrintLn("Now trying to solve LinBox . . .");
Sol := $apcocoa/linbox.Solve(Ax,MatB);
If Sol = Mat([[]])
OR NonZero(ConcatLists(List(Sol))) = [] Then
PrintLn("Increasing Degree of Li >>>>>>>>>>>");
DegH := DegH + 1; SH1 := 0; HF := NewList(NPi,1);
SC2 := 0;MC := Monomials(C);Sol := Mat([[]]);
EndIf;
EndWhile;
NewLis := [];
S2 := ConcatLists(List(Sol));
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For I := 1 To NPi Do
Li := [Cols[J]|J In 1..SizeH];
CLi := [S2[J]|J In ((I-1)*SizeH + 1)..(I*SizeH)];
Append(NewLis,ScalarProduct(CLi,Li));
EndFor;
CM := [S2[J]|J In (NPi*SizeH + 1)..Len(S2)];
C2 := 0;
For I := 1 To NPi Do
C2 := C2 + NewLis[I]*PK[I];
EndFor;
M2 := ScalarProduct(CM,M2);--Message found
C2 := C2 + M2;
PrintLn("Message was = ", M2);
PrintLn("CipherText = ", C2=C);
Return [M2,NewLis,Sol];--,Cols,Ax,MatB];
EndDefine;--End of ILAA( )
B.3 Linear Algebra Attack for Weyl Algebras
Define WLAA(PK, C, Dm) DegC := Deg(C);
NPi := Len(PK); -- no. of public polynomials
HF := NewList(NPi, 1);
MC := Monomials(C);
D1 := Deg(PK[1]); D2 := Deg(PK[2]);
DegPi := [Deg(P)|P In PK];
DegH := DegC - Max(DegPi);
S := Sum(Indets());
SH1 := 0; SH2 := 0; SC2 := 0; M2 := 0;
S := Sum(Indets());
For N := 0 To Dm Do
M2 := M2 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
M2 := Support(M2);
For N := 0 To DegH Do
SH1 := SH1 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
SH1 := Support(SH1);
For N := 0 To DegC Do
SC2 := SC2 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
SC2 := Support(SC2);
Sol := Mat([[]]);
While Sol=Mat([[ ]]) Do
MC := Monomials(C);
SizeH := Len(SH1);
While Len(MC) <> Len(SC2) Do
Append(MC, Poly(1));
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EndWhile;
For I := 1 To Len(SC2) Do
If LPP(SC2[I]) <> LPP(MC[I]) Then
Insert(MC, I, 0);
Remove(MC, Len(MC));
EndIf;
EndFor;
MatB := Transposed(Mat([[LC(Term)|Term In MC]]));
NRows := Len(SC2);
Lis := []; MonomPi := [];
For I := 1 To Len(PK) Do
Append(Lis, SH1); -- Lis is list of general li’s in å lipi
Append(MonomPi, Monomials(PK[I]));
EndFor;
Cols := ConcatLists([ConcatLists(Lis), M2]);
NCols := Len(Cols);
PrintLn(" Size of the Linear system = ",NRows,"  ",NCols);
PrintLn("Creating matrix of coefficients . . . ");
PrintLn("Time depends upon the size of the system ... ");
Ax := NewMat(NRows, NCols, 0);
For I := 1 To SizeH Do
For K := 0 To (NPi-1) Do
HF[K + 1] := Monomials($apcocoa/weyl.WMul(Cols[I +
K*SizeH], PK[K+1]));
While HF[K + 1] <> [] Do
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Len(HF[K + 1]) = 0 Then Break;EndIf;
Lpp := LPP(HF[K + 1][1]);
If Lpp = SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I + K*SizeH] := LC(HF[K + 1][1]);
Remove(HF[K + 1],1);
EndIf;
EndFor;
EndWhile;
EndFor;
Print(".");
EndFor;
PrintLn();
I := NPi*SizeH + 1;
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Cols[I] = SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I] := 1;
I := I + 1;
EndIf;
EndFor;
PrintLn("Now trying to solve using LinBox ...");
Sol := $apcocoa/linbox.Solve(Ax,MatB);
If Sol = Mat([[]]) Then
PrintLn("Increasing Degree of Li >>>>>>>>>>>");
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DegH := DegH + 1;
HF := NewList(NPi,1);
SH1:= Support(Sum(SH1)+DensePoly(DegH));
SC2:= Support(Sum(SC2)+DensePoly(DegC+1));
DegC := DegH + Max(DegPi);
EndIf;
EndWhile;
NewLis := [];
S2 := ConcatLists(List(Sol));
For I := 1 To NPi Do
Li := [Cols[J]|J In 1..SizeH];
CLi := [S2[J]|J In ((I-1)*SizeH + 1)..(I*SizeH)];
Append(NewLis, ScalarProduct(CLi, Li));
EndFor;
CM := [S2[J]|J In (NPi*SizeH + 1)..Len(S2)];
C2 := 0;
For I := 1 To NPi Do
C2 := C2 + $apcocoa/weyl.WMul(NewLis[I],PK[I]);
EndFor;
M2 := ScalarProduct(CM, M2);
PrintLn("Message was = ", M2);
Return [M2, NewLis];
EndDefine; -- EndOf WLAA( )
B.4 Intelligent Linear Algebra Attack forWeyl Alge-
bras
Define WILAA(PK, C, Dm)
-- PK is list of public polynomials
-- C is ciphertext.
-- Dm is degree of message polynomial M
DegC := Deg(C);
SizeC := Len(C);
NPi := Len(PK); -- no. of public polynomials
HF := NewList(NPi,1);
MC := Monomials(C);
Inds := NumIndets();
DegPi := [Deg(P)|P In PK];
DegH := DegC-Max(DegPi);
PrintLn("Initalizing degree Li --> ",DegH);
S := Sum(Indets());
SH1 := 0; SH2 := 0; SC2 := 0; M2 := 0;
NewRing ::= QQ[x[1..NumIndets()]];
For N := 0 To Dm Do
M2 := M2 + DensePoly(N);
EndFor;
M2 := Support(M2);
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Using NewRing Do
SH2 := CreateD(ZPQ(PK),ZPQ(C));
-- It is the set of candidate terms for Li’s
EndUsing;
Sol := Mat([[]]);
SH2 := QZP(SH2);
While Sol=Mat([[ ]]) Do
SH1 := [];
Foreach MonH In SH2 Do
If Deg(MonH)<=DegH Then
Append(SH1,MonH);
EndIf;
EndForeach;
PrintLn(" # SH1 = ", Len(SH1));
SizeH := Len(SH1);--SH2 := [];
Lis := []; MonomPi := [];
For I := 1 To NPi Do
Append(Lis,SH1);
-- Lis is list of general li’s in encryption
Append(MonomPi,Monomials(PK[I]));
EndFor;
WExpecC := []; Counter := 0;
WSC2 := [];
Foreach MonH In SH1 Do
For I := 1 To NPi Do
Append(WExpecC,$apcocoa/weyl.WMul(MonH,PK[I]));
EndFor;
Counter := Counter + 1;
If Mod(Counter,2000)=0 Then
Using NewRing Do
WExpecC := ZPQ(WExpecC);
Append(WSC2,Sum(WExpecC));
WSC2 := [Sum(WSC2)];
EndUsing;
WExpecC := [];
EndIf;
EndForeach;
PrintLn();
Using NewRing Do
WExpecC := ZPQ(WExpecC);
Append(WSC2,Sum(WExpecC));
WSC2 := Support(Sum(WSC2));
EndUsing;
WSC2 := QZP(WSC2);
PrintLn(".................# WExpecC = ",Len(WSC2));
SC2 := WSC2;
SizeSC2 := Len(SC2);
SupC := Support(C);
CoefC := Coefficients(C);
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CoefC := [Cast(Coef, INT) | Coef In CoefC];
MC2 := [];
For I :=1 To SizeSC2 Do
If Len(SupC) > 0 Then
If SupC[1]= SC2[I] Then
Append(MC2,[CoefC[1]]);
Remove(SupC,1);Remove(CoefC,1);
Else
Append(MC2,[0]);
EndIf;
Else
Append(MC2,[0]);
EndIf;
EndFor;
MatB := Mat(MC2);
PrintLn("Calculating Ax . . . . . ");
NRows := Len(SC2);
Cols := ConcatLists([ConcatLists(Lis),M2]);
NCols := Len(Cols);
PrintLn(" Dimension of Ax = ",NRows,"  ",NCols);
Ax := NewMat(NRows,NCols,0);
For I := 1 To SizeH Do
For K := 0 To (NPi-1) Do
HF[K + 1] := Monomials($apcocoa/weyl.WMul(Cols[I +
K*SizeH], PK[K + 1]));
While HF[K + 1]<>[] Do
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Len(HF[K + 1])=0 Then Break; EndIf;
Lpp := LPP(HF[K + 1][1]);
If Lpp=SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I + K*SizeH] := LC(HF[K + 1][1]);
Remove(HF[K + 1],1);
EndIf;
EndFor;
EndWhile;
EndFor;
Print(".");
EndFor;
PrintLn();
I := NPi*SizeH + 1;
For J := 1 To NRows Do
If Cols[I]=SC2[J] Then
Ax[J][I] := 1;
I := I + 1;
EndIf;
EndFor;
PrintLn("Now trying to solve LinBox . . .");
Sol := $apcocoa/linbox.Solve(Ax,MatB);
If Sol = Mat([[]])
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OR NonZero(ConcatLists(List(Sol))) = [] Then
PrintLn("Increasing Degree of Li >>>>>>>>>>>");
DegH := DegH + 1; SH1 := 0; HF := NewList(NPi,1);
SC2 := 0;MC := Monomials(C);Sol := Mat([[]]);
EndIf;
EndWhile;
NewLis := [];
S2 := ConcatLists(List(Sol));
For I := 1 To NPi Do
Li := [Cols[J]|J In 1..SizeH];
CLi := [S2[J]|J In ((I-1)*SizeH + 1)..(I*SizeH)];
Append(NewLis,ScalarProduct(CLi,Li));
EndFor;
CM := [S2[J]|J In (NPi*SizeH + 1)..Len(S2)];
C2 := 0;
For I := 1 To NPi Do
C2 := C2 + $apcocoa/weyl.WMul(NewLis[I],PK[I]);
EndFor;
M2 := ScalarProduct(CM,M2);--Message found
C2 := C2 + M2;
PrintLn("Message was = ", M2);
PrintLn("CipherText = ", C2=C);
Return [M2,NewLis];
EndDefine;--End of WILAA( )
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Examples Data
The aim of this Appendix is to include some data related to various examples that
are presented in this thesis. For the reader’s convenience, the title of each section
below is the chapter number in which such examples are presented. In each section,
there is an enumerated items list in which every item starts with the reference to the
corresponding example in that chapter.
C.1 Chapter 2
(1) Example 2.5.6 The Gro¨bner basis elements g1; : : : ;g7 are:
g1 = x6+2x4¶  2x3¶ 2 3x2¶ 3+3x¶ 4+¶ 5+3x4+x3¶  x2¶ 2 3x¶ 3 3¶ 4 x3 x2¶ +
x¶ 2  x2 2x¶  ¶ 2 2¶ +2;
g2 = ¶ 6+3x5 2x4¶   x3¶ 2  x2¶ 3+ x¶ 4+3¶ 5 3x4  x3¶  3x2¶ 2  x¶ 3+3¶ 4 3x3 
x2¶  2x¶ 2+¶ 3 2x2 2x¶ + x ¶  2”
g3 = x¶ 5+2x5 x4¶ 3x3¶ 2+x2¶ 3+2x¶ 4+3¶ 5+x4 2x2¶ 2 3x3 3x2¶+3x¶ 2+2¶ 3 
3x2+ x¶ +2¶ 2+3x 2¶ +1;
g4 = x5¶   x5   2x4¶ + x3¶ 2 + 2x2¶ 3 + 3x¶ 4 + 3¶ 5 + x4 + 2x2¶ 2 + 3x¶ 3   3x3 + 3x2¶  
3x¶ 2+2¶ 3+ x2 2x¶   x 3¶ ;
g5 = x4¶ 2 3x5 3x4¶  2x3¶ 2 3x2¶ 3+3¶ 5 3x3¶ +3x2¶ 2 2x¶ 3 3¶ 4 2x3+3x2¶  
3x2+2x¶  2¶ 2+ x 2”;
g6 = x2¶ 4+3x4¶ +2x3¶ 2  x2¶ 3+ x¶ 4 2¶ 5+ x4 ¶ 4+2x3+ x2¶ +3x¶ 2 2¶ 3+2x2+
2¶ 2 2x 2¶  2;
g7 = x3¶ 3+ x2¶  ¶  1
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C.2 Chapter 4
(1) Example 4.1.3 The Gro¨bner basis G of the ideal I = h f1; f2; f3i consists of
the following 26 Weyl polynomials in standard form:
G = fx2¶ 53 +¶ 31 ; x52¶2  x42; x52¶1; x42¶ 31 ; ¶ 41 ¶ 52   x1¶ 72 ; x32¶ 61 ;
x1¶ 21 ¶ 82  ¶1¶ 82 ; x1x2¶ 21 ¶ 72 +¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶ 53 +¶ 61 ¶ 42   x2¶1¶ 72 + x27;
x1x42¶ 62 + x
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(2) Example 4.3.3
The polynomials p1 and p2 of the public key Q are
p1 = 4x101 x92¶ 101 ¶ 72 +6x81x112 ¶ 81 ¶ 92 +4x101 x102 ¶ 101 ¶ 42  3x101 x82¶ 101 ¶ 62 +4x91x92¶ 91 ¶ 72 +x81x102 ¶ 81 ¶ 82 +
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6x61x2¶
6
1  2x61¶ 71 +x61¶ 61 ¶2+2x31x52¶ 52  4x21x52¶1¶ 52 +6x1x52¶ 21 ¶ 52  4x52¶ 31 ¶ 52 +6x61¶ 61 +2x21x52¶ 52  
4x1x52¶1¶
5
2  x52¶ 21 ¶ 52  2x51¶ 61 +6x1x52¶ 52 +3x62¶ 52  4x52¶1¶ 52  5x52¶ 62  x52¶ 42  6x42¶ 52  x42¶ 42  
2x32¶
4
2   6x52  6x31¶ 21 + x21x2¶ 21   5x21¶ 31   3x42¶2 + 2x21¶ 21 ¶2 + 4x2¶ 42 + 2¶ 52 + 2x41 + 4x31x2 
5x42 + 6x
3
1¶1  x21¶ 21   5x1¶ 31 + 3x2¶ 31   2¶ 41   5x31¶2  6x32¶2 + 6¶ 31 ¶2  3x2¶ 32   4¶ 42 + x31 
3x21x2+6x
3
2 4x1x2¶1+6x2¶ 21 +6¶ 31  6x21¶2 2x22¶2+5x1¶1¶2 ¶ 21 ¶2+6x2¶ 22 +¶ 32  6x21 
174
Appendix C. Examples Data
2x1x2  x22+5x1¶1 5x2¶1+6¶ 21  4x1¶2 4x2¶2+3¶1¶2 5¶ 22  2x1+2x2+¶1 ¶2+1,
and
p2 = 5x91x122 ¶ 131 ¶ 142  2x71x142 ¶ 111 ¶ 162 +5x91x132 ¶ 131 ¶ 112 +6x91x112 ¶ 131 ¶ 132 +4x81x122 ¶ 121 ¶ 142  x71x132 ¶ 111 ¶ 152 +
x91x
9
2¶
13
1 ¶
15
2  2x61x142 ¶ 101 ¶ 162  3x91x122 ¶ 131 ¶ 112  4x91x92¶ 131 ¶ 142  x91x122 ¶ 131 ¶ 102  4x81x132 ¶ 121 ¶ 112 +
x91x
11
2 ¶ 131 ¶
11
2 +5x
9
1x
10
2 ¶
13
1 ¶
12
2 +3x
8
1x
11
2 ¶ 121 ¶ 132 +2x
9
1x
9
2¶
13
1 ¶
13
2  x61x132 ¶ 101 ¶ 152  6x81x92¶ 121 ¶ 152 +
3x51x
14
2 ¶ 91 ¶
16
2 +5x
9
1x
11
2 ¶ 131 ¶
10
2 +5x
8
1x
12
2 ¶ 121 ¶ 112  2x81x92¶ 121 ¶ 142  2x91x112 ¶ 131 ¶ 92 +6x81x122 ¶ 121 ¶ 102  
4x91x
10
2 ¶
13
1 ¶
10
2   6x81x112 ¶ 121 ¶ 112 + x91x92¶ 131 ¶ 112   4x81x102 ¶ 121 ¶ 122 + x81x92¶ 121 ¶ 132   5x51x132 ¶ 91 ¶ 152 +
x41x
14
2 ¶ 81 ¶
16
2  2x91x102 ¶ 131 ¶ 92  4x81x112 ¶ 121 ¶ 102 +2x51x142 ¶ 61 ¶ 162  5x21x142 ¶ 91 ¶ 162 +x91x102 ¶ 131 ¶ 82  x81x112 ¶ 121 ¶ 92 +
6x91x
9
2¶
13
1 ¶
9
2   2x81x102 ¶ 121 ¶ 102   6x81x92¶ 121 ¶ 112   6x41x132 ¶ 81 ¶ 152 + 5x41x142 ¶ 61 ¶ 162   5x31x142 ¶ 71 ¶ 162 +
3x21x
14
2 ¶ 81 ¶
16
2  6x91x92¶ 131 ¶ 82  x81x102 ¶ 121 ¶ 92 +x51x132 ¶ 61 ¶ 152 +4x21x132 ¶ 91 ¶ 152  3x41x142 ¶ 51 ¶ 162  x31x142 ¶ 61 ¶ 162 +
4x21x
14
2 ¶ 71 ¶ 162 +2x
9
1x
9
2¶
13
1 ¶
7
2  6x81x102 ¶ 121 ¶ 82 +3x81x92¶ 121 ¶ 92  4x41x132 ¶ 61 ¶ 152 +4x31x132 ¶ 71 ¶ 152  5x21x132 ¶ 81 ¶ 152  
5x31x
14
2 ¶ 51 ¶
16
2 + 6x
2
1x
14
2 ¶ 61 ¶
16
2   3x81x92¶ 121 ¶ 82 + 5x41x132 ¶ 51 ¶ 152 + 6x31x132 ¶ 61 ¶ 152 + 2x21x132 ¶ 71 ¶ 152  
2x31x
14
2 ¶ 41 ¶ 162  6x21x142 ¶ 51 ¶ 162 +x81x92¶ 121 ¶ 72 +4x31x132 ¶ 51 ¶ 152 +3x21x132 ¶ 61 ¶ 152  6x21x142 ¶ 41 ¶ 162  x31x132 ¶ 41 ¶ 152  
3x21x
13
2 ¶
5
1 ¶
15
2 +6x
2
1x
14
2 ¶ 31 ¶
16
2  3x21x132 ¶ 41 ¶ 152 +3x21x132 ¶ 31 ¶ 152 +3x81¶ 71 +x71x2¶ 71 +2x71¶ 71  x71¶ 61 +
4x61x2¶
6
1   5x61¶ 61   2x52¶1¶ 52 + x52¶ 62 + 4x52¶ 52 + 5x42¶1¶ 42   4x42¶ 52 + 3x42¶ 42 + 3x32¶ 42 + 4x42¶1 
2x31¶
2
1   5x21x2¶ 21   2x42¶2 + 6¶1¶ 42   3¶ 52 + 5x41 + 6x31x2 + 5x42   5x32¶1 + 3x21¶ 21   6x1¶ 31  
2x2¶ 31   4x32¶2 + 2¶1¶ 32 + 5x31 + 2x21x2 + 2x32   5x21¶1   6x1x2¶1 + 6x22¶1 + x1¶ 21   4x2¶ 21  
4¶ 31   3x22¶2  6x2¶1¶2 + 3x2¶ 22   ¶1¶ 22 + 3¶ 32   5x21  3x1x2 + 2x22  2x1¶1  x2¶1 + 5¶ 21  
x2¶2+2¶ 22  4x2+6¶1 ¶2+1.
(3) Example 4.3.6
The polynomials p1; p2, and p2 of the public key Q are
p1 = x22¶ 81 ¶
5
2 ¶
5
3 +x2¶
5
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
10
3  ¶ 31 ¶ 62 ¶ 103 +x2¶ 81 ¶ 42 ¶ 53 +¶ 31 ¶ 52 ¶ 103 +x71x32¶ 72  x51x52¶ 72  x22¶ 51 ¶ 52 ¶ 53  
x2¶ 52 ¶
10
3 +x
5
1x
4
2¶ 62  x21x62¶ 21 ¶ 53 +x82¶ 21 ¶ 53  x2¶ 51 ¶ 42 ¶ 53 +x21x32¶ 41 ¶ 52  x52¶ 41 ¶ 52 +¶ 42 ¶ 103  x51¶1¶ 72  
x1x62¶1¶
5
3  x42¶ 41 ¶ 42  x1x32¶ 31 ¶ 52 +x41¶ 72 +x62¶ 53  x21x32¶2¶ 53 +x52¶2¶ 53 +x32¶ 41 ¶ 32  ¶ 51 ¶ 52 +x21x32¶ 53  
x52¶
5
3 + x
3
2¶
2
1 ¶ 53 + ¶
5
2 ¶
5
3   x42¶ 53   x41x32¶2 + x21x52¶2 + x2¶ 22 ¶ 53   x2¶2¶ 53   x21x42 + x21x32   x52 +
¶ 31 ¶
2
2 +¶ 53 + x
2
1¶1¶2 ¶ 31 ¶2  x1¶2 ¶ 22 +¶2 1,
p2 =  x61x72¶2 + x21x112 ¶2  x61x52x23¶2 + x21x92x23¶2  x21x23¶ 103   x61x22¶ 53 + x41x42¶ 53 + x41x22x23¶ 53  
x62x
2
3¶ 53  x21x23¶ 31 ¶2¶ 53  x21¶2¶ 103 +x61x62+x61x42x23 x61x22¶ 31 ¶2 x62x23¶ 31 ¶2+x41x22¶2¶ 53  x62¶2¶ 53 +
x41x
6
2  x102 + x61x32¶2  x41x52¶2  x21x32x43¶2+ x52x43¶2  x41x2¶ 53   x52¶ 53 + x22x23¶2¶ 53 + x41x52  x92 
x21x
6
2¶2+x
4
1x
2
2x
2
3¶2+x21x42x23¶2+x41x42 x42x43+x21x32¶ 31 +x2x23¶ 53 +x61x2+x21x52 x41x2x23+x21x32x23+
x52  x41¶2+ x43¶2 ¶ 53   x42+ x21x2¶2  x2x23¶2+¶ 31 ¶2+ x21  x23 ¶2 1, and
175
C.2. Chapter 4
p3 = x72x
4
3¶ 122 ¶ 53  x21x92x43¶ 122 +x112 x43¶ 122 +x31x43¶1¶ 122 ¶ 53 +x1x22x43¶1¶ 122 ¶ 53  x71x43¶1¶ 122  x51x22x43¶1¶ 122 +
x1x62x
4
3¶1¶ 122 +x102 ¶
7
1 ¶ 62  x72¶ 41 ¶ 72 ¶ 53 +x22x43¶ 122 ¶ 53 +x21x92¶ 41 ¶ 72  x112 ¶ 41 ¶ 72  x61x43¶ 122 +x41x22x43¶ 122 +
x62x
4
3¶ 122 +x52x
4
3¶1¶ 62 ¶
5
3 +x
4
1x
5
2x
4
3¶1¶ 62 +x
2
1x
7
2x
4
3¶1¶ 62  x92x43¶1¶ 62  x21x82¶ 41 ¶ 62  x102 ¶ 41 ¶ 62  x1x92¶ 31 ¶ 72  
x41x
2
2¶ 71 ¶ 72  x21x42¶ 71 ¶ 72  x62¶ 71 ¶ 72  x51x42¶ 62 ¶ 53 +x1x82¶ 62 ¶ 53 +x31x52x43¶ 62  x1x72x43¶ 62  x92x23¶1¶ 62  
x1x82¶
3
1 ¶
6
2 +x
2
1x
3
2¶
7
1 ¶ 62  x52¶ 71 ¶ 62  x21x72x23¶ 72  x31x22¶ 61 ¶ 72 +x1x42¶ 61 ¶ 72 +x21x42¶1¶ 62 ¶ 53  x41x62¶1¶ 62 +
x21x
8
2¶1¶
6
2 + x
9
2x3¶1¶
6
2 + x1x
7
2¶ 71 ¶2   x21x62x23¶ 62   x1x32¶ 61 ¶ 62 + x21x72¶ 72 + x1x72x3¶ 72 + x21x92¶ 53  
x112 ¶ 53   x43¶1¶ 62 ¶ 53 + x31x62¶ 62   x41x43¶1¶ 62 + x21x22x43¶1¶ 62 + x41x2¶ 41 ¶ 62 + x21x32¶ 41 ¶ 62 + x31x2¶ 62 ¶ 53  
x1x62¶
7
1 + x
7
2¶ 61 ¶2 + x
5
1x
3
2¶
6
2 + x
3
1x
5
2¶
6
2 + x
2
1x
6
2¶
6
2 + x1x
7
2¶ 62 + x1x
6
2x3¶
6
2   x31x43¶ 62   x1x22x43¶ 62  
x41x
2
3¶1¶ 62   x21x22x23¶1¶ 62   x42x23¶1¶ 62 + x1x32¶ 31 ¶ 62   x41x23¶ 72   x21x22x23¶ 72   x62¶ 61 + x41x3¶1¶ 62 +
x21x
2
2x3¶1¶ 62 + x
4
2x3¶1¶ 62   x1x52x43¶1  x1x62¶ 41 + x1x22¶ 71 ¶2  x31x23¶ 62 + x21x2x23¶ 62 + x1x22x23¶ 62 +
x41¶ 72 + x21x22¶ 72 + x31x3¶
7
2 + x1x
2
2x3¶ 72 + x21x42¶ 53 + x
6
2¶
5
3   x21x82 + x102 + x31x3¶ 62   x1x22x3¶ 62  
x52x
4
3+x1x
5
2x
2
3¶1+x1x52x
2
3¶2+x22¶ 61 ¶2 x31¶ 62  x21x2¶ 62  x1x22¶ 62  x1x2x3¶ 62  x1x52x3¶1 x1x42x23+
x52x
2
3   x1x52¶2   x52x3¶2   x52x3   x1x43¶1   x1x2¶ 41   x2¶ 53   x21x32 + x1x42   x52 + x42x3   x43 +
x1x23¶1+ x1x23¶2  x1x3¶1+ x23  x1¶2  x3¶2  x3+1
(4) Example 4.4.2
The polynomials p1; p2, and p2 of the public key Q are
p1 = x31x62x103 ¶1¶ 32 +2x31x62x73¶1¶ 32 ¶ 23 +x21x62¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶ 43 +3x1x103 ¶1¶ 22 ¶ 33  x1x62¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶ 43 +3x31x32¶ 72 ¶ 43 +
3x31x
6
2¶
3
2 ¶
4
3 +3x
2
1x
6
2¶1¶
3
2 ¶
4
3  2x31x32¶ 62 ¶ 43 +x1x73¶1¶ 22 ¶ 53  x1x93¶1¶ 22 ¶ 23 +x31x52¶ 32 ¶ 43 +3x21x62¶ 32 ¶ 43 +
x1x62¶1¶
3
2 ¶
4
3  x31x42¶ 42 ¶ 43  3x31x32¶ 52 ¶ 43 +2x1x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 62 ¶ 43 +x113 ¶ 33 +3x31x42¶ 32 ¶ 43  2x1x62¶ 32 ¶ 43 +
3x62¶1¶
3
2 ¶
4
3 +2x
3
1x
3
2¶
4
2 ¶ 43  x1x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 52 ¶ 43 +x1x103 ¶ 21 +x2x103 ¶ 22  x103 ¶ 32  2x1x83¶1¶ 22 ¶3 x31x42¶ 22 ¶ 43  
3x1x32x3¶
2
1 ¶ 22 ¶ 43  x31x32¶ 32 ¶ 43 +3x62¶ 32 ¶ 43 +3x1x22x3¶ 21 ¶ 32 ¶ 43 +2x1x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 42 ¶ 43  2x83¶ 53 +2x1x103 ¶1+
x1x103 ¶2+2x
10
3 ¶
2
3  2x1x73¶ 21 ¶ 23  2x2x73¶ 22 ¶ 23 +2x73¶ 32 ¶ 23 +2x31x32¶ 22 ¶ 43  2x1x22x3¶ 21 ¶ 22 ¶ 43 +x1x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 32 ¶ 43 +
3x103 ¶1 3x1x73¶1¶ 22 +¶ 31 ¶ 72 ¶3+3x1x73¶1¶ 23  2x1x73¶2¶ 23  x31x32¶2¶ 43 +2x1x22x3¶ 21 ¶2¶ 43  x31¶ 42 ¶ 43  
3x93¶3+3¶
3
1 ¶
6
2 ¶3+x
7
3¶1¶
2
3 +3x1x2x3¶ 21 ¶2¶ 43  3x31¶ 32 ¶ 43  2x1x2¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3+2x22¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3 2x2¶ 31 ¶ 42 ¶3+
¶ 31 ¶
5
2 ¶3 2x31x22¶ 43 +x1x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 43 +2x31x2¶2¶ 43  x31¶ 22 ¶ 43 +3x3¶ 42 ¶ 43  x83+3x1x2¶ 31 ¶ 32  x2¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3 
3¶ 31 ¶
4
2 ¶3+x31x2¶
4
3 +3x
3
1¶2¶
4
3 +2x3¶ 32 ¶
4
3  x31¶ 42  3x32¶ 42  2x1x23¶ 31 ¶3 2x2¶ 31 ¶ 22 ¶3+x21x2¶ 32 ¶3+
x1x2¶1¶ 32 ¶3 2¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3+3x31¶ 43  x22x3¶ 43 +x2x3¶2¶ 43 +3x3¶ 22 ¶ 43  3x31¶ 32 +2x21x2¶ 32  2x32¶ 32 +
2x1x2¶1¶ 32 + x1x2¶
3
1 ¶3  3¶ 31 ¶ 22 ¶3 + 2x1x2¶ 32 ¶3  x2¶1¶ 32 ¶3  3x2x3¶ 43   2x3¶2¶ 43   2x31x22 +
x52 + 2x
3
1x2¶2   x42¶2   x31¶ 22   3x32¶ 22   3x1x2¶ 32   2x2¶1¶ 32 + 3x3¶ 42 + x21x23¶3 + x1x23¶1¶3  
3x1¶ 31 ¶3 2¶ 31 ¶2¶3 x2¶ 32 ¶3 2x3¶ 43 +x31x2+3x42+3x31¶2+2x32¶2 2x2¶ 32 +2x3¶ 32 +3x21x2¶3+
2x1x23¶3+3x1x2¶1¶3 x23¶1¶3+3x31+2x32 x22x3+x2x3¶2+3x3¶ 22  2x21¶3 x1x2¶3 x23¶3 
2x1¶1¶3 3x2¶1¶3 3x2x3 2x3¶2+3x1¶3 3x2¶3+2¶1¶3 2x3+2¶3,
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p2 = 3x21x
4
2x
9
3¶
4
2 ¶3 + 2x21x22x93¶
6
2 ¶3   3x21x32x73¶ 52 ¶ 33 + 3x21x22x73¶ 62 ¶ 33   x21x32x93¶ 52 + x21x22x93¶ 62  
x21x
4
2x
9
3¶
3
2 ¶3+x
2
1x
3
2x
9
3¶
4
2 ¶3+2x21x22x93¶
5
2 ¶3 x21x42x73¶ 32 ¶ 33 +x21x32x73¶ 42 ¶ 33 +x21x22x73¶ 52 ¶ 33 +2x21x42x93¶ 32  
3x21x
4
2x
8
3¶
4
2  2x21x32x93¶ 42  2x21x22x93¶ 52  2x21x22x83¶ 62 +x21x22x93¶ 42 ¶3+x21x32x73¶ 32 ¶ 33  2x21x22x73¶ 42 ¶ 33 +
x21x
4
2x
8
3¶
3
2  2x21x32x93¶ 32   x21x32x83¶ 42  3x21x22x93¶ 42  2x21x22x83¶ 52 +
x21x
3
2x
9
3¶
2
2 ¶3+x21x22x93¶
3
2 ¶3+x
2
1x
3
2x
7
3¶ 22 ¶ 33  2x21x22x73¶ 32 ¶ 33  3x31x53¶ 21 ¶ 42 ¶ 33  2x1x53¶ 41 ¶ 42 ¶ 33  2x21x32x93¶ 22  
3x21x
2
2x
9
3¶
3
2  x21x22x83¶ 42 +3x21x22x73¶ 22 ¶ 33 +x1x42x23¶ 41 ¶ 22 ¶ 33  x1x32x23¶ 41 ¶ 32 ¶ 33  x21x53¶ 21 ¶ 42 ¶ 33  x1x53¶ 31 ¶ 42 ¶ 33  
x21x
3
2x
8
3¶
2
2 +x
2
1x
2
2x
9
3¶
2
2  x21x22x83¶ 32  2x1x52x23¶ 41 ¶ 33 +x21x22x73¶2¶ 33 +2x1x42x23¶ 41 ¶2¶ 33 +2x1x32x23¶ 41 ¶ 22 ¶ 33 +
3x21x
5
3¶1¶
4
2 ¶ 33  x1x53¶ 21 ¶ 42 ¶ 33  2x53¶ 31 ¶ 42 ¶ 33  2x21x22x93¶2+3x1x103 ¶ 33  3x113 ¶ 33 +2x1x42x23¶ 41 ¶ 33 +
3x1x53¶1¶
4
2 ¶ 33  x53¶ 21 ¶ 42 ¶ 33 +x21x93¶ 23 +3x93¶1¶2¶ 23  3x1x32x23¶ 41 ¶ 33 +3x1x53¶ 42 ¶ 33  2x53¶1¶ 42 ¶ 33 +
2x1x93¶
2
3  2x103 ¶ 23  2x53¶ 42 ¶ 33 +x21x83¶3 2x2x93¶3+x93¶2¶3+3x83¶1¶2¶3+3x61x23¶1¶ 23 +2x41x23¶ 31 ¶ 23 +
x51x
2
3¶1¶ 23 +x41x23¶ 21 ¶ 23  x21x73+2x2x83 x83¶2 3x73¶1¶2+2x51x23¶ 23 +x41x23¶1¶ 23  2x1x2¶1¶ 42 ¶ 23 +
2x1¶1¶ 52 ¶
2
3 +2x
4
1x
2
3¶ 23  3x1x22¶1¶ 22 ¶ 23 +3x1x2¶1¶ 32 ¶ 23 +3x1¶1¶ 42 ¶ 23 +x22x3¶ 21 ¶ 22  x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 32 +
x31x
2
3¶ 23 +3x1x2¶1¶ 22 ¶ 23 +3x1¶1¶ 32 ¶
2
3  2x32x3¶ 21 +2x22x3¶ 21 ¶2+2x2x3¶ 21 ¶ 22  3x51¶3 2x31¶ 21 ¶3+
2x1x2¶1¶2¶ 23   2x1¶1¶ 22 ¶ 23 + 2x31x2¶1 + 2x22x3¶ 21   x1x2¶ 31 + x1x2¶1¶ 22   x1¶1¶ 32   2x2¶ 42 +
2¶ 52  x41¶3 x31¶1¶3 x1¶1¶2¶ 23  x31x3+3x21x2¶1 2x1x22¶1+3x1x2¶ 21  3x1x3¶ 21  3x2x3¶ 21 +
2x1x2¶1¶2 3x22¶ 22  3x2x3¶ 22 +2x1¶1¶ 22 +3x2¶ 32 +3x3¶ 32 +3¶ 42  3x31¶3+2x21¶1¶3+x1¶ 21 ¶3 
x2¶ 22 ¶3+¶ 32 ¶3+x1¶1¶
2
3  x21x2+2x21x3 x22x3 2x1x2¶1+2x1x3¶1+x2x3¶2+3x2¶ 22 +x3¶ 22 +
3¶ 32  2x21¶3+2x22¶3 3x1¶1¶3 2x2¶2¶3 2¶ 22 ¶3  x1x2+2x1x3+ x2x3 3x1¶1+3x3¶1+
2x2¶2 2¶ 22  3x1¶3 2x2¶3 ¶1¶3+3x2 ¶2 ¶3+1, and
p3 = 3x1x22x103 ¶ 31 ¶2¶3 2x1x103 ¶ 31 ¶ 32 ¶3+x1x22x103 ¶ 31 ¶3 x1x2x103 ¶ 31 ¶2¶3+3x21x2x103 ¶1¶ 22 ¶3 
2x1x103 ¶
3
1 ¶
2
2 ¶3   3x21x103 ¶1¶ 32 ¶3 + x1x22x83¶ 31 ¶ 33   2x1x22x103 ¶ 31   x1x2x103 ¶ 31 ¶3   x1x103 ¶ 31 ¶2¶3 +
2x21x2x
10
3 ¶
2
2 ¶3  x21x103 ¶1¶ 22 ¶3 + 3x1x2x103 ¶1¶ 22 ¶3  2x21x103 ¶ 32 ¶3  3x1x103 ¶1¶ 32 ¶3 + x21x32x93¶1 +
2x1x103 ¶
3
1 ¶3 3x21x103 ¶ 22 ¶3 2x1x2x103 ¶ 22 ¶3 x1x103 ¶1¶ 22 ¶3+2x1x103 ¶ 32 ¶3+3x21x22x73¶2¶ 33  2x21x2x73¶1¶2¶ 33 +
3x1x22x
7
3¶1¶2¶ 33  x21x83¶ 22 ¶ 33 +3x1x83¶1¶ 22 ¶ 33 +2x2x83¶1¶ 22 ¶ 33 +2x21x73¶ 32 ¶ 33  3x1x83¶ 32 ¶ 33 +2x1x73¶1¶ 32 ¶ 33  
2x83¶1¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 +3x
2
1x
3
2x
9
3+x1x
3
2x
9
3¶1+3x
2
1x2x
9
3¶1¶2+2x
2
1x
10
3 ¶
2
2 +x1x
10
3 ¶1¶
2
2 +3x2x
10
3 ¶1¶
2
2  x1x103 ¶ 32  
3x103 ¶1¶
3
2 + 3x1x
10
3 ¶
2
2 ¶3 + x2x103 ¶
2
2 ¶3   x103 ¶ 32 ¶3   x21x22x73¶ 33   2x21x2x73¶1¶ 33   x1x22x73¶1¶ 33 +
2x21x2x
7
3¶2¶
3
3  x1x2x73¶1¶2¶ 33 +2x21x73¶ 22 ¶ 33 +2x1x73¶1¶ 22 ¶ 33  3x1x32x93+2x21x2x93¶2+3x1x2x93¶1¶2+
2x103 ¶
2
2 ¶3+2x21x2x73¶ 33  x1x2x73¶1¶ 33 +x21x73¶2¶ 33  x1x2x73¶2¶ 33 +x1x73¶1¶2¶ 33 +x1x83¶ 43  2x32x93 
2x1x2x93¶2 2x1x103 ¶3 2x21x73¶ 33  x1x2x73¶ 33  2x1x73¶1¶ 33  3x2x73¶2¶ 33  x83¶2¶ 33  3x1x73¶ 43 +
x2x93¶2 + 2x
10
3 ¶2  x1x93¶3  2x1x73¶ 33   3x2x73¶ 33   x1x2¶ 31 ¶2¶ 53 + 2x1x22x33¶2¶ 33   x1x33¶ 32 ¶ 33  
x1x2¶ 31 ¶
5
3  2x21x2¶ 22 ¶ 53  2x1x2¶1¶ 22 ¶ 53 +2x21¶ 32 ¶ 53 +2x1¶1¶ 32 ¶ 53  2x1x83 3x1x22x33¶ 33 +3x1x2x33¶2¶ 33  
177
C.3. Chapter 6
x1x33¶
2
2 ¶ 33   2x1¶ 31 ¶ 53   3x21¶ 22 ¶ 53 + 3x1x2¶ 22 ¶ 53   x1x2x3¶ 31 ¶2¶3 + 3x1x2x33¶ 33 + 3x1x33¶2¶ 33 +
x22x
4
3¶2 + 3x43¶ 32 + x
3
1x2x3¶1¶3  x1x2x3¶ 31 ¶3  2x21x2x3¶ 22 ¶3  2x1x2x3¶1¶ 22 ¶3 + 2x21x3¶ 32 ¶3 +
2x1x3¶1¶ 32 ¶3+ x1x
3
3¶
3
3 +2x
2
2x
4
3 2x2x43¶2+ x21¶ 31 ¶2  x1x2¶ 31 ¶2+3x43¶ 22  2x1x22¶ 32   x22¶ 42 +
x1¶ 52  3¶ 62 +3x31x2x3¶3+x21x2x3¶1¶3 2x1x3¶ 31 ¶3 3x21x3¶ 22 ¶3+3x1x2x3¶ 22 ¶3+3x21x2¶1¶ 23  
3x32¶2¶
2
3  2x2¶ 32 ¶ 23 +3¶ 21 ¶ 43  3x2¶2¶ 43 +x1¶ 53  2x2x43 x1x2¶ 31  x32x3¶2+x22x23¶2 2x43¶2+
3x21¶ 21 ¶2+x1¶ 31 ¶2 2x21x2¶ 22 +3x1x22¶ 22  2x1x2¶1¶ 22 +2x21¶ 32  3x1x2¶ 32  2x22¶ 32  3x2x3¶ 32 +
3x23¶ 32 +2x1¶1¶
3
2 +x1¶
4
2 +2x2¶ 42  3¶ 52  3x21x2x3¶3+2x31¶1¶3+2x21x2¶ 23 +x32¶ 23 +3x1x2¶1¶ 23  
x22¶2¶ 23  2x2¶ 22 ¶ 23  3x3¶ 43  2x32x3+2x22x23 3x43 3x21x2¶1 2x1¶ 31 +2x22x3¶2 2x2x23¶2+
3x22¶1¶2 + x1¶ 21 ¶2  3x21¶ 22   x1x2¶ 22   3x2x3¶ 22 + 3x23¶ 22   3x1¶ 32 + 3x2¶ 32 + 2¶1¶ 32 + 2¶ 42  
x31¶3   2x1x2x3¶3   2x1x2¶ 23   x22¶ 23   x2¶2¶ 23   2x21x2 + 2x22x3   2x2x23   3x1x2¶1   x22¶1 +
3x3¶ 21  2x1x2¶2 x2x3¶2 2x23¶2 2x1¶1¶2+x2¶1¶2+2x2¶ 22 +2¶1¶ 22 +2¶ 32 +2x21¶3+x1x3¶3 
2x1¶1¶3+3x2¶ 23 +2x1x2+3x2x3+ x23+ x2¶1 3x1¶2 3¶1¶2+2x1¶3  x2 2¶1+¶2 3¶3
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(1) Example 6.2.2
The generating set fp1; p2g consists of the following Weyl polynomials in A3
p1 = x61x
5
2x3¶
6
1 + x
6
1x
4
2x3¶ 71 + x51x
5
2¶
7
1 ¶2  x31x62x33¶ 21 ¶ 42   x71x2¶ 61 ¶ 42 + x31x82¶1¶ 62 + x32x63¶ 21 ¶ 72  
x52x
3
3¶1¶
9
2 +x
8
1x
3
3¶
6
1 ¶3+x
5
1x
2
2¶ 71 ¶ 32 ¶3+x
10
1 ¶
6
1 ¶
2
3 +x
7
1x
3
2¶
6
1 ¶
2
3 +x
3
1x
3
2x
6
3¶
2
1 ¶2¶ 33  x31x52x33¶1¶ 32 ¶ 33  
x51x2x
2
3¶ 91 + x
6
1x
2
2x3¶ 61 ¶
2
2   x51x92¶ 32 + x31x2x3¶ 71 ¶ 52 + x21x62x33¶ 62   x41x22¶ 91 ¶2¶3 + x61x2¶ 61 ¶ 32 ¶3 +
x31x
6
3¶
6
1 ¶
2
3  x41x32x3¶ 71 ¶ 23 +x31x23¶ 101 ¶ 23 +x51x62x33¶ 33 +x51x33¶ 61 ¶ 33  x31x2x23¶ 71 ¶2¶ 33  x31x53¶ 61 ¶2¶3 
x31x3¶
8
1 ¶
4
3  x61x32x33¶ 21 ¶2+x61x52¶1¶ 32  x31x62x3¶ 21 ¶ 32  x21x82¶1¶ 42 +x31x32x33¶ 21 ¶ 42  x52x43¶ 62  x31x52¶1¶ 62  
x42x
4
3¶1¶ 62 +x
3
2x
4
3¶ 21 ¶ 62 +x
4
1x
4
2¶ 72  x51x32x33¶ 32 ¶3 x31x2¶ 71 ¶ 32 ¶3 x31¶ 61 ¶ 52 ¶3 x21x52¶1¶ 62 ¶3 x31x2x3¶ 61 ¶ 22 ¶ 23  
x71x
3
2¶
3
2 ¶
2
3  x1x32x33¶ 62 ¶ 23 +x31x32x43¶ 21 ¶ 33 +x41x23¶ 61 ¶ 33 +x21x52x33¶1¶2¶ 33  x41x2x33¶ 42 ¶ 33 +x51x63¶ 43 +
x21x
2
2x
3
3¶1¶
3
2 ¶
4
3 +x
7
1x
3
3¶
5
3  x63¶ 21 ¶2¶ 63 +x22x33¶1¶ 32 ¶ 63  x81x62+x31x33¶ 61 ¶ 22 +x21x42x23¶ 31 ¶ 32  x31x52x3¶ 52 +
x21x
3
2x
3
3¶
6
2  x42x3¶1¶ 82 +x1x52¶ 31 ¶ 42 ¶3 x31x42¶ 62 ¶3 x32x63¶ 32 ¶ 23 +x1x62x3¶1¶ 32 ¶ 23  x32x23¶ 41 ¶ 32 ¶ 23 +
x51x
3
2x
3
3¶
3
3  x21x2x53¶ 31 ¶ 33 +x31x22x43¶ 22 ¶ 33  x21x32x33¶ 32 ¶ 33 +x42x23¶1¶ 42 ¶ 33 +x2x43¶1¶ 52 ¶ 33  x1x22x33¶ 31 ¶2¶ 43 +
x31x2x
3
3¶
3
2 ¶
4
3 +x
9
3¶
5
3  x1x32x43¶1¶ 53 +x53¶ 41 ¶ 53  x21x32x33¶ 63 +x21x63¶ 63  x2x53¶1¶2¶ 63 +x31x2x23¶ 71 +
x32x
5
3¶
4
2 ¶3 x83¶2¶ 43 +x32x3¶ 21 ¶ 32 ¶ 43  x43¶ 21 ¶ 73  x61x32x3¶ 21  x51x52¶1¶2 x31x32x33¶ 21 ¶2+x31x52¶1¶ 32 +
x31x
3
2x3¶
2
1 ¶ 32 +x
7
1x2¶ 42 +x21x52¶1¶
4
2  x41x2¶ 72  x81x33¶3+x51x33¶ 32 ¶3 x51x22¶1¶ 32 ¶3+x21x22¶1¶ 62 ¶3+
x42¶1¶ 62 ¶3 + x
3
2¶
8
2 ¶3  x101 ¶ 23 + x71¶ 32 ¶ 23 + x42x3¶ 52 ¶ 23   x1x32x23¶ 32 ¶ 33   x2x33¶1¶ 32 ¶ 43   x33¶ 52 ¶ 43  
x2x43¶ 22 ¶ 53 +x
2
2x
4
3¶ 63 +x1x
5
3¶
6
3 +x2x
4
3¶1¶ 63  x43¶ 21 ¶ 63 +x1x33¶ 83  x81x32 x51x62+x51x2x23¶ 31  x61x22x3¶ 22 +
178
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x51x
3
2¶
3
2  x21x2x23¶ 31 ¶ 32 +x31x22x3¶ 52  x32x33¶ 52  x31x2x3¶1¶ 52 +x2x3¶1¶ 82 +x41x22¶ 31 ¶2¶3 x61x2¶ 32 ¶3 
x1x22¶ 31 ¶
4
2 ¶3+x31x2¶
6
2 ¶3 x31x63¶ 23 +x41x32x3¶1¶ 23  x31x23¶ 41 ¶ 23 +x63¶ 32 ¶ 23  x1x32x3¶1¶ 32 ¶ 23 +x23¶ 41 ¶ 32 ¶ 23  
x51x
3
3¶
3
3 +x
3
1x2x
2
3¶1¶2¶ 33 +x
6
3¶
2
2 ¶ 33 +x
2
1x
3
3¶
3
2 ¶
3
3  x2x23¶1¶ 42 ¶ 33  x21x33¶ 63  x42x23¶1¶ 32 +x31x53¶2¶3 
x53¶
4
2 ¶3+x2x53¶1¶
3
3 +x
3
1x3¶
2
1 ¶ 43  x3¶ 21 ¶ 32 ¶ 43  x31x32x3¶ 21  x21x52¶1¶2+x33¶ 51 ¶2 x22¶ 41 ¶ 32 +x41x2¶ 42  
x51x
3
3¶3+x
3
1x2¶1¶
3
2 ¶3 x21x22¶1¶ 32 ¶3+x31¶ 52 ¶3 x2¶1¶ 62 ¶3 ¶ 82 ¶3 x71¶ 23 +x31x2x3¶ 22 ¶ 23  x2x3¶ 52 ¶ 23  
x41x
2
3¶ 33  x33¶ 21 ¶2¶ 33 +x1x23¶ 32 ¶ 33 +x22¶1¶ 32 ¶ 33  x51x32+x21x32¶ 31 +x21x2x23¶ 31  x31x22x3¶ 22  x31x33¶ 22 +
x33¶
5
2  x2x3¶1¶ 52 +x1x22¶ 31 ¶2¶3 x31x2¶ 32 ¶3 x63¶ 23 +x1x32x3¶1¶ 23  x23¶ 41 ¶ 23  x21x32¶ 33  x21x33¶ 33 +
x2x23¶1¶2¶ 33  x31x2x23¶1+x2x23¶1¶ 32 +x53¶2¶3+x3¶ 21 ¶ 43  x22x3¶ 31  x2x3¶ 41 +x3¶ 51 +x33¶ 21 ¶2 
x22¶1¶ 32 + x2¶1¶
3
2 ¶3+¶
5
2 ¶3  x1¶ 31 ¶ 23 + x2x3¶ 22 ¶ 23 + x22x3¶ 33   x1x23¶ 33 + x2x3¶1¶ 33   x3¶ 21 ¶ 33 +
x1¶ 53 + x
2
1x
3
2+ x
2
1¶ 31   x33¶ 22   x21¶ 33   x2x23¶1  x22x3  x2x3¶1+ x3¶ 21   x1¶ 23 + x21;
p2 = x51x2x
4
3¶ 71  x31x82x3¶ 21 ¶ 32 +x41x2x23¶ 71 ¶ 32 +x61x62¶1¶ 42 +x52x43¶ 21 ¶ 62  x31x32x33¶1¶ 72  x61¶ 61 ¶ 42 ¶3 
x31x
4
2¶ 81 ¶
2
3 +x
5
1x
3
2¶
6
1 ¶2¶
2
3 +x
5
1x
2
2x3¶ 61 ¶2¶
2
3 +x
5
1x2¶
6
1 ¶
3
2 ¶
2
3 +x
3
1x
5
2x
4
3¶ 21 ¶ 33  x61x32x33¶1¶2¶ 33  x31x22x3¶ 71 ¶2¶ 33 +
x31x2¶
6
1 ¶
7
3 +x
3
1x
6
2¶
7
1  x41x42¶ 71 ¶3+x41x32x3¶ 71 ¶3+x31x2¶ 61 ¶ 52 ¶3 x61x3¶ 61 ¶2¶ 23  x41x2x3¶ 61 ¶ 22 ¶ 23  
x41x
2
2x3¶ 61 ¶
3
3 + x
4
1¶ 61 ¶
3
2 ¶
3
3 + x
7
1x3¶ 71   x31x32¶ 61 ¶ 32   x41x22¶ 61 ¶ 22 ¶3  x31x72¶1¶ 32 ¶3 + x42x33¶1¶ 62 ¶3 +
x51x
2
3¶ 61 ¶
2
3 + x
3
1x2¶
7
1 ¶2¶ 33 + x
3
1x
4
2x
3
3¶1¶
4
3   x31x2x3¶ 61 ¶ 43   x61x52x3¶ 21 + x91x32¶1¶2  x21x42x43¶1¶ 32 +
x31x
5
2x3¶
2
1 ¶ 32  x61x32¶1¶ 42  x1x42x23¶1¶ 62 +x61x3¶ 61 ¶3+x41x2x3¶ 61 ¶2¶3+x31x2x23¶ 61 ¶2¶3+x31x32¶ 72 ¶3 
x51¶
7
1 ¶ 23 + x72¶ 21 ¶ 32 ¶
2
3   x21x62¶ 42 ¶ 23   x21x52x3¶ 42 ¶ 23   x21x42¶ 62 ¶ 23 + x21x2x73¶1¶ 33 + x1x2x53¶1¶ 32 ¶ 33 +
x52x3¶1¶
4
2 ¶ 33  x31x33¶ 42 ¶ 43  x42x33¶ 21 ¶ 53 +x21x32x33¶2¶ 53 +x21x22x43¶2¶ 53 +x21x2x33¶ 32 ¶ 53  x22x43¶ 21 ¶ 63 +
x31x
3
3¶1¶2¶
6
3  x22x43¶1¶2¶ 63  x42¶ 32 ¶ 73 +x2x33¶ 103  x92¶1¶ 32 +x1x72¶1¶ 32 ¶3 x1x62x3¶1¶ 32 ¶3 x42¶ 82 ¶3+
x31x
3
2x3¶
4
2 ¶ 23 +x1x42x3¶ 52 ¶
2
3 +x
6
2x
3
3¶1¶
3
3  x31x3¶ 61 ¶ 33 +x1x52x3¶ 32 ¶ 33  x1x32¶ 62 ¶ 33  x1x42x33¶1¶ 43 +
x1x32x
4
3¶1¶ 43 + x2x33¶
5
2 ¶
4
3   x31x43¶2¶ 53   x1x2x43¶ 22 ¶ 53   x1x22x43¶ 63 + x1x33¶ 32 ¶ 63   x41x32x3¶1¶ 32 +
x62¶
6
2  x61x42¶1¶3+x31x42¶1¶ 32 ¶3+x1x52¶ 52 ¶3 x21x32x23¶ 32 ¶ 23 +x41x43¶1¶ 33  x32x33¶ 32 ¶ 33  x42¶1¶ 42 ¶ 33  
x1x22x
3
3¶
2
2 ¶ 43 +x42x3¶ 32 ¶
4
3 +x
2
1x
5
3¶
5
3 +x2x
3
3¶1¶2¶
6
3  x2x43¶ 73  x2x33¶1¶ 73  x51x2x43¶1 x31x52x3¶ 21 +
x61x
3
2¶1¶2  x41x2x23¶1¶ 32 + x21x2x43¶1¶ 32 + x1x2x23¶1¶ 62   x31x32x3¶ 32 ¶3 + x61¶ 42 ¶3  x1x42x3¶ 42 ¶3 
x42x
2
3¶ 42 ¶3 x31¶ 72 ¶3+x31x42¶ 21 ¶ 23  x51x32¶2¶ 23  x51x22x3¶2¶ 23  x51x2¶ 32 ¶ 23 +x21x32¶1¶ 32 ¶ 23  x42¶ 21 ¶ 32 ¶ 23 +
x21x
3
2¶
4
2 ¶ 23 +x21x22x3¶ 42 ¶ 23 +x21x2¶ 62 ¶
2
3 +x
3
1x
2
2x3¶1¶2¶ 33  x22x3¶1¶ 42 ¶ 33 +x31x43¶ 43 +x1x2x43¶2¶ 43 +
x2x53¶2¶
4
3  x21x33¶1¶ 53  x31x2¶ 73 +x2¶ 32 ¶ 73  x31x62¶1+x62¶1¶ 32 +x41x42¶1¶3 x41x32x3¶1¶3 x1x42¶1¶ 32 ¶3+
x1x32x3¶1¶
3
2 ¶3   x31x2¶ 52 ¶3 + x2¶ 82 ¶3 + x61x3¶2¶ 23 + x41x2x3¶ 22 ¶ 23   x31x3¶ 42 ¶ 23   x1x2x3¶ 52 ¶ 23 +
x41x
2
2x3¶ 33  x41¶ 32 ¶ 33  x1x22x3¶ 32 ¶ 33 +x32x3¶ 32 ¶ 33 +x1¶ 62 ¶ 33  x43¶ 63  x71x3¶1+x31x32¶ 32 +x41x3¶1¶ 32  
x32¶
6
2   x31x42¶1¶3 + x41x22¶ 22 ¶3  x1x22¶ 52 ¶3  x51x23¶ 23 + x21x23¶ 32 ¶ 23   x31x2¶1¶2¶ 33 + x2¶1¶ 42 ¶ 33 +
x31x2x3¶
4
3   x2x3¶ 32 ¶ 43   x21x2x43¶1 + x22x3¶ 51   x31¶ 41 ¶2  x1x2x23¶1¶ 32   x61x3¶3  x41x2x3¶2¶3 
x31x2x
2
3¶2¶3+x31x3¶
3
2 ¶3+x
3
1¶
4
2 ¶3+x1x2x3¶ 42 ¶3+x2x23¶ 42 ¶3+x51¶1¶
2
3 +x
4
2¶ 21 ¶ 23  x21x32¶2¶ 23  
179
C.3. Chapter 6
x21x
2
2x3¶2¶ 23   x21x2¶ 32 ¶ 23   x21¶1¶ 32 ¶ 23   x22x3¶ 21 ¶ 33 + x31¶1¶2¶ 33 + x22x3¶1¶2¶ 33   x2¶ 73   x62¶1 +
x1x42¶1¶3  x1x32x3¶1¶3  x2¶ 52 ¶3+ x31x3¶2¶ 23 + x1x2x3¶ 22 ¶ 23 + x31x3¶ 33 + x1x22x3¶ 33   x1¶ 32 ¶ 33  
x3¶ 32 ¶
3
3  x41x3¶1+x32¶ 32 +x2¶ 41 ¶3+x1x22¶ 22 ¶3 x21x23¶ 23  x2¶1¶2¶ 33 +x2x3¶ 43  x2¶1¶ 43 +x22x3¶ 21  
x31¶1¶2  x31x3¶3  x1x2x3¶2¶3  x2x23¶2¶3+ x21¶1¶ 23 + x3¶ 33 + x2¶1¶3
(2) Example 6.3.2
The polynomials p1; and p2 of the public key Q are:
p1 = 6x141 x
25
2 ¶
28
1 ¶2+x
14
1 x
24
2 ¶ 281  3x171 x162 ¶ 281 ¶ 22  6x161 x192 ¶ 261  5x161 x162 ¶ 271 ¶ 22 +x141 x162 ¶ 281 ¶ 22  
5x151 x
16
2 ¶
26
1 ¶
2
2 +2x
13
1 x
19
2 ¶
26
1  2x141 x102 ¶ 281 ¶ 52  3x141 x102 ¶ 291 ¶ 22  4x131 x132 ¶ 261 ¶ 32 +4x141 x92¶ 281 ¶ 42 +
x141 x
10
2 ¶
28
1 ¶
2
2  6x131 x132 ¶ 271 +5x141 x92¶ 291 ¶2 3x131 x102 ¶ 281 ¶ 22  6x141 x82¶ 281 ¶ 32 +2x131 x132 ¶ 261  6x141 x92¶ 281 ¶2+
3x141 x
8
2¶
29
1 +5x
13
1 x
9
2¶
28
1 ¶2+4x
14
1 x
7
2¶ 281 ¶
2
2  x141 x82¶ 281  6x171 ¶ 281 ¶ 52 +3x131 x82¶ 281 +x141 x62¶ 281 ¶2+
4x151 x
2
2¶ 301 ¶
2
2 +4x
17
1 ¶ 291 ¶
2
2 +x
16
1 x
3
2¶
26
1 ¶
3
2 +3x
16
1 ¶
27
1 ¶ 52 +4x
14
1 x
5
2¶
28
1 +3x
15
1 x2¶
30
1 ¶2+3x
17
1 ¶ 281 ¶
2
2 +
4x141 x
2
2¶ 291 ¶
2
2 +2x
14
1 ¶ 281 ¶
5
2  5x161 x32¶ 271  4x161 x22¶ 261 ¶ 22 +x161 ¶ 281 ¶ 22 +3x151 ¶ 261 ¶ 52 +6x161 x32¶ 261  
5x151 ¶
30
1 +3x
14
1 x2¶ 291 ¶2+5x
16
1 ¶
27
1 ¶ 22 +3x141 ¶ 291 ¶
2
2 +4x
13
1 x
3
2¶
26
1 ¶
3
2  2x151 x32¶ 261 +5x161 x2¶ 261 ¶2+
5x151 ¶
27
1 ¶ 22  x141 ¶ 281 ¶ 22 +6x131 x32¶ 271  5x141 ¶ 291 +5x151 ¶ 261 ¶ 22  3x131 x22¶ 261 ¶ 22 +3x131 ¶ 281 ¶ 22 +6x161 ¶ 261  
2x131 x
3
2¶
26
1  4x141 ¶ 261 ¶ 22  x392 ¶ 21 +3x392 ¶1¶2 6x131 x2¶ 261 ¶2+3x402 +3x392 ¶2+5x392 +4x382 ¶1 
2x131 ¶
26
1 +4x
38
2  3x31x292 ¶ 21  4x31x292 ¶1¶2 4x31x302  4x31x292 ¶2+2x31x292  5x21x292 ¶1+x21x292 ¶2+
x292 ¶
2
1  3x292 ¶1¶2 2x1x262 ¶ 21 ¶ 22  2x1x132 ¶ 21 ¶ 152  5x1x292  3x302  3x292 ¶2+4x292  x1x252 ¶ 21 ¶2 
4x162 ¶
13
2  5x262 ¶ 21 +2x262 ¶1¶2 2x232 ¶ 21 ¶ 32 +6x232 ¶1¶ 42 +2x272 +2x1x242 ¶ 21 +2x262 ¶2+6x242 ¶ 32 +
6x232 ¶
4
2  x262  6x252 ¶1 3x232 ¶ 31  4x232 ¶ 21 ¶2+5x222 ¶ 21 ¶ 22  3x232 ¶ 32 +6x222 ¶1¶ 32  6x252  4x242 ¶1+
x232 ¶
2
1 +6x
23
2 ¶1¶2+3x
23
2 ¶
2
2 +6x
22
2 ¶ 32  3x41x152 ¶ 21 ¶ 42  3x242 +2x232 ¶1 x222 ¶ 21  3x232 ¶2+6x212 ¶ 21 ¶2+
x222 ¶ 22 +3x212 ¶1¶ 22  6x41x162 ¶ 21 ¶ 22  5x232  5x222 ¶1+4x222 ¶2 6x31x182 ¶ 22 +3x212 ¶ 22 +x41x142 ¶ 21 ¶ 32 +
4x31x
15
2 ¶1¶
4
2 + x
3
1x
19
2   4x222 + 3x202 ¶ 21   4x212 ¶2 + 3x202 ¶1¶2 + 3x31x162 ¶1¶ 22   x212   2x31x162 ¶ 21 +
3x202 ¶2+6x
3
1x
16
2 ¶1¶2 6x41x132 ¶ 21 ¶ 22 +2x1x162 ¶ 21 ¶ 22 +3x31x142 ¶1¶ 32  6x31x132 ¶ 21 ¶ 32 +5x31x132 ¶1¶ 42 +
x1x132 ¶
3
1 ¶
4
2 +6x
3
1x
17
2  2x202 +2x192 ¶1+6x31x162 ¶2+3x21x162 ¶ 22  3x1x132 ¶ 41 ¶ 22 +5x31x142 ¶ 32 +5x31x132 ¶ 42 +
2x1x132 ¶
2
1 ¶ 42   3x31x162 + 6x192 + x21x162 ¶1 + 4x31x132 ¶ 31 + 5x21x162 ¶2 + x31x132 ¶ 21 ¶2   5x31x132 ¶1¶ 22 +
2x162 ¶1¶
2
2 +4x
3
1x
13
2 ¶
3
2 +3x
2
1x
13
2 ¶1¶
3
2 +2x
2
1x
13
2 ¶
4
2 +x
3
1x
14
2 ¶1+3x31x
13
2 ¶
2
1  x162 ¶ 21 +5x31x132 ¶1¶2 
2x162 ¶1¶2+2x
3
1x
13
2 ¶
2
2 +4x
16
2 ¶
2
2 +2x
13
2 ¶
2
1 ¶ 32  6x132 ¶1¶ 42  4x1x102 ¶ 21 ¶ 52 +3x1¶ 21 ¶ 152 +4x31x142 +
x1x162  2x172 +6x31x132 ¶1 3x21x132 ¶ 21 +4x31x132 ¶2 2x162 ¶2+6x21x132 ¶1¶2+3x1x132 ¶ 32  6x142 ¶ 32  
6x132 ¶
4
2  2x31x132 +3x21x142 + x162 +5x21x132 ¶1+3x132 ¶ 31 +2x21x132 ¶2+4x132 ¶ 21 ¶2 6x1x102 ¶ 31 ¶ 22  
5x132 ¶
3
2  5x1x92¶ 21 ¶ 42 +6x32¶ 132 +5x21x132  6x1x132 ¶1+4x142 ¶1 x132 ¶ 21 +6x1x132 ¶2 6x132 ¶1¶2 
5x132 ¶
2
2 +2x1x
10
2 ¶
2
1 ¶ 22 +3x102 ¶
2
1 ¶ 32 +4x
10
2 ¶1¶
4
2 +5x1x
13
2 +3x
14
2  x132 ¶1+3x132 ¶2 3x1x92¶ 31 ¶2 
6x102 ¶
2
1 ¶ 22 +4x112 ¶ 32 +x1x
8
2¶
2
1 ¶ 32 +4x
10
2 ¶
4
2  6x132  2x102 ¶ 31 +x1x92¶ 21 ¶2+6x102 ¶ 21 ¶2 x92¶ 21 ¶ 22  
180
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2x102 ¶
3
2 +4x
9
2¶1¶
3
2 +6x
11
2 ¶1+5x102 ¶
2
1 +6x1x
8
2¶
3
1 +4x
10
2 ¶1¶2 3x92¶ 21 ¶2+2x102 ¶ 22  5x1x72¶ 21 ¶ 22 +
4x92¶
3
2  2x41x22¶ 21 ¶ 42  2x112  3x102 ¶1 2x1x82¶ 21  5x92¶ 21  2x102 ¶2+4x82¶ 21 ¶2+5x92¶ 22 +2x82¶1¶ 22 +
x41¶ 21 ¶ 52 +x
10
2 +x
9
2¶1+6x
8
2¶
2
1  6x92¶2+2x1x62¶ 21 ¶2 4x31x52¶ 22 +2x82¶ 22  5x21x22¶ 41 ¶ 22 +5x41x2¶ 21 ¶ 32  
6x31x
2
2¶1¶ 42 +6x92+2x
7
2¶ 21 +6x82¶2+2x
7
2¶1¶2 5x41¶ 31 ¶ 22 +2x31x32¶ 32 +6x31¶1¶ 52  5x82 5x1x52¶ 21 +
2x72¶2 + 6x21x2¶ 41 ¶2 + 2x41¶ 21 ¶ 22   5x1x22¶ 31 ¶ 22 + 2x31x2¶1¶ 32   4x31¶ 21 ¶ 32   x31¶1¶ 42 + 5x1¶ 31 ¶ 42 +
4x1¶ 21 ¶ 52 +3x
7
2+3x
3
1x
3
2¶1 3x62¶1+5x31x22¶ 22 +2x31¶ 21 ¶ 22  2x1¶ 41 ¶ 22  x31x2¶ 32  x31¶ 42  3x1¶ 21 ¶ 42 +
6x21¶ 52  x31x32 3x62 6x31¶ 31 +3x21¶ 41 +5x31¶ 21 ¶2+6x1x2¶ 31 ¶2 2x31¶1¶ 22  3x32¶1¶ 22 +6x1¶ 31 ¶ 22  
6x31¶
3
2  5x32¶ 32 +2x21¶1¶ 32  3x21¶ 42  4x21x32+5x31x2¶1+2x31¶ 21  4x32¶ 21  3x31x2¶2 x31¶1¶2 
3x31¶
2
2   6x32¶ 22   3x21¶1¶ 22   4x1¶ 21 ¶ 22   3¶ 21 ¶ 32   4¶1¶ 42   6x31x2 + 4x31¶1   x32¶1   2x21¶ 21 +
3x1¶ 31  6x31¶2+4x21¶1¶2 3x21¶ 22  6x22¶ 22 +6¶ 21 ¶ 22 +2x1¶ 32  4x2¶ 32  4¶ 42 +2x31+2x21x2+
5x32 x21¶1+2¶ 31  3x21¶2 6¶ 21 ¶2+5x1¶ 22 +2¶ 32  x21 4x1¶1 6x2¶1 5¶ 21 +4x1¶2+x2¶2 
4¶1¶2+¶ 22   x1+2x2+3¶1+2¶2 2, and
p2 = x141 x322 ¶ 281 ¶ 32  2x131 x352 ¶ 261 ¶2 x141 x312 ¶ 281 ¶ 22  3x141 x302 ¶ 281 ¶2+5x131 x282 ¶ 281 ¶ 42  2x131 x312 ¶ 261 ¶ 22  
4x141 x
27
2 ¶ 281 ¶
3
2 +3x
16
1 x
26
2 ¶
27
1 ¶ 22  2x141 x282 ¶ 271 ¶ 22  6x131 x272 ¶ 281 ¶ 32 +6x131 x302 ¶ 261 ¶2+2x151 x262 ¶ 271 ¶ 22 +
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C.3. Chapter 6
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(4) Example 6.4.4
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C.3. Chapter 6
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